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Abstract 
Humans, often suggested as the weakest link in information security, 
require security education, training and awareness (SETA) programs 
to strengthen themselves against information security threats. These 
SETA programs improve security awareness (also called information 
security awareness or ISA) which makes users conscious about the 
information security threats and risks and motivates them to learn 
knowledge and measures to safeguard their information security. 
 
Studies have shown that most of the SETA programs do not achieve 
their desired objectives and been proven ineffective. This 
ineffectiveness is probably because: 1) current SETA programs are 
designed as a one-fits-all solution and are not tailored as per users’ 
needs, 2) users are not included in the design phase of the SETA 
programs and 3) the SETA programs lack theory-grounded 
approaches. Nonetheless, the relationship between ISA and security 
behaviour also needs explanation. This thesis sets out to address the 
issues mentioned above. 
 
In this thesis, four separate studies grounded in both quantitative and 
qualitative methods are conducted. Cross-sectional data from 
students of a single case was collected using online surveys, with one 
exception in which data was collected as part of a class assignment. 
The results showed that, in general, students believed they know 
more than they actually did. The impacts of gender, previous training, 
and educational discipline were evident on security knowledge, 
behaviour, perceived awareness and actual awareness.  
 
Students have a wide range of security concerns, related to their 
personal, social, technological, non-technological and institutional 
dimensions of everyday life, and not just technological and non-
technological aspects as shown in the existing literature. Further, 
students differ significantly from security experts in terms of their 
security practices. However, aware students (having training in 
information security) were more similar in security practices to 
security experts than the unaware students (having no formal or 
informal information security training). Lastly, it was found that the 
relationship between ISA and security behaviour can be explained 
using Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills (IMB) model. The 
research presented in this thesis has implications for faculty members 
who teach students and the security professionals responsible for 
information security of higher education institutions. 
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Abstract in Finnish 
 
Ihminen mielletään usein tietoturvan heikoimmaksi lenkiksi. Jotta 
tietoturvauhkilta osattaisiin suojautua, tarvitaan erillistä 
tietoturvakoulutusta, -harjoitusta sekä -tietoisuutta. Erilaiset 
tietoturvakoulutukset lisäävät henkilön tietoisuutta erilaisista 
tietoturvauhkista ja -riskeistä sekä motivoivat oppimaan tapoja ja 
toimenpiteitä, jotka parantavat henkilökohtaista tietoturvaa. 
Tutkimuksissa on kuitenkin ilmennyt, että useimmat 
tietoturvakoulutukset eivät saavuta toivottuja tavoitteita, ja ne 
ovatkin osoittautuneet tehottomiksi. Tehottomuus johtuu 
todennäköisesti siitä, että (1) koulutuksia ei ole räätälöity käyttäjien 
tarpeiden mukaisiksi vaan yleisluontoisiksi, (2) käyttäjiä ei ole otettu 
mukaan koulutusten suunnitteluun, ja (3) koulutuksilta puuttuvat 
teoriapohjaiset lähestymistavat. Tässä väitöskirjassa tutkitaan yllä 
mainittuja epäkohtia ja selvitetään ihmisen tietoturvakäyttäytymisen 
ja -tietoisuuden suhdetta.   
Väitöskirjassa esitetyt tulokset saavutettiin tekemällä neljä erillistä 
tutkimusta kvantitatiivisin (määrällisin) ja kvalitatiivisin (laadullisin) 
menetelmin. Tietoa kerättiin tutkimusten kohteina olleilta opiskelijoilta 
verkkokyselyillä, paitsi yhdessä tapauksessa, jossa kysely toteutettiin 
osana kurssitehtävää. Tulokset osoittavat, että yleisesti opiskelijat 
mielsivät tietävänsä enemmän kuin todellisuudessa tiesivät. 
Sukupuolella, aiemmalla koulutuksella ja tieteenalalla oli selkeä 
vaikutus vastaajien tietoturvakäytökseen - sekä miellettyyn että 
varsinaiseen tietoisuuteen.  
Opiskelijoilla on monenlaisia tietoturvaan liittyviä huolenaiheita, jotka 
liittyvät persoonallisiin, sosiaalisiin, teknologisiin, ei-teknologisiin sekä 
arkisiin ulottuvuuksiin. Tämä poikkeaa nykyisen kirjallisuuden 
näkemyksestä, joka käsittää vain teknologisen ja ei-teknologisen 
ulottuvuuden. Opiskelijat eroavat merkittävästi tietoturva-
asiantuntijoista tietoturvakäytäntöjensä suhteen. Tietoturvakoulutusta 
saaneet, tietoisemmat opiskelijat olivat käyttäytymiseltään lähempänä 
tietoturva-asiantuntijoita kuin vähemmän tietoiset ja vähemmän 
koulutusta aiheesta saaneet opiskelijat. Tutkimuksessa kävi ilmi 
myös, että tietoturvatietoisuuden ja -käyttäytymisen välistä suhdetta 
voidaan selittää käyttäen IMB-mallia (Information-Motivation-
Behavioural Skills model). Tässä väitöskirjassa  esitetty tutkimus ja 
sen tulokset  ovat korkeakoulujen opetushenkilöstön ja tietoturvasta 
vastaavien ammattilaisten suoraan hyödynnettävissä. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In today’s world, the Internet has become the backbone 
of our societies and businesses. Both individuals and 
organisations use this technology to gather a variety of 
technical and social benefits. The organisation has implemented 
information systems backed by the Internet to ease out their 
operations and maximise their output, whereas, the individual 
user makes use of the Internet for several purposes ranging 
from information gathering to entertainment, and from 
shopping to socialising. The around-the-clock access of the 
internet at one end provides numerous opportunities for both 
individuals and organisations,  at the other, exposes the users 
to many challenges including information security risks [3], [4]. 
Organisations employ a variety of technical solutions such as 
firewalls, backups, and anti-malware software, to improve their 
information security. However, these are proven insufficient due 
to failures caused by the users - making users the weakest link 
in the information security [5]–[7]. A recent study showed that 
27% of security breaches in organisations were due to process 
failure, whereas 25% was due to the negligent behaviour of the 
employee [8]. However, it is not clear from the study if the 
incidents were overlapping or otherwise. To strengthen this 
weakest link, Organisations adopt non-technical measures such 
as policies, and security education, training and awareness 
(SETA) programs to improve human ability to deal with the 
information security threats[9]–[12]. These SETA programs 
improve security awareness (also called information security 
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awareness or ISA) which make users conscious about the 
information security threats, risks, and motivates them to learn 
knowledge and measures to safeguard their information 
security [13]–[15]. Users’ security behaviours are affected by 
their perception of information security threats [16], whereas, 
ISA improve their understanding of possible threats and the 
countermeasures that can be used to safeguard their 
information security. In short, ISA helps users in decision 
making in the event of security threat. Due to these reasons, 
ISA has been regarded as the most significant indicator of the 
overall information security situation in an organisation [10], 
[17], [18] as well as one of the essential prerequisites of users’ 
security behaviour [10], [15], [19]. 
Like other organisations, educational institutions, notably 
higher education institutions (HEIs), are heavily dependent on 
information technology (IT) for their operations and decision 
support activities ([20], [21]), as well as for storing and 
maintenance of a significant amount of private information of 
students, faculty members and staff [22]. The availability of a 
vast amount of computing power, personal information of 
students and employees, and information assets related to 
cutting edge research make HEIs attractive to both 
cybercriminals and insider threats. A recent surge of 
information security incidents [23]–[25] is an indication of what 
HEIs should expect in the coming days. However, HEIs are not 
ready to deal with information security challenges. It has been 
found that HEIs do not have adequate information security 
mechanisms [26], [27]. The security policies in HEIs are highly 
techno-centric [28] and employees do not comply with them 
either [29]. In addition to employees, HEIs also has a large 
population of students who are most of the time connected to 
the Internet for several reasons ranging from educational to 
entertainment. It has been found that students are more prone 
to cybercrimes than employees [30]. They have been found 
behind data breaches incidents as well [31]. Thus, information 
security in HEIs is not possible without taking both populations 
(employees and students) into consideration.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
While ISA has been found as one of the significant 
contributors to information security of an organisation-   
behaviour of the users -, studies have shown that most of the 
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SETA programs do not achieve their desired objectives and 
proven ineffective [32], [33]. This is a serious problem when a 
proposed remedy for an issue is not giving the desired results. 
There are following reasons for the said ineffectiveness: 
 
1. Awareness programs (also called SETA programs) 
lack the theory-grounded approaches 
2. The user-centred approach is lacking; where users 
are not involved in the design phase of the SETA 
programs 
3. SETA programs are usually designed as a one-fit-all 
solution and are not tailored as per users’ needs 
 
1. Lack of theoretical backing 
Existing SETA programs lack theory-grounded approaches. To 
understand the relationship between ISA and security 
behaviour, researchers have used theories such as Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA), Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), 
and Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) [34]–[36]. These 
theories-based studies help us understand the relationship 
between ISA and security behaviour. Despite these studies and 
the evidence that existing SETA programs are ineffective, there 
is still room to explore and examine the relationship between 
ISA and security behaviour using different theory-based 
approaches. One thing which is common in the existing theory-
based studies is that ISA has never been a constituent 
construct of the theory. It has always been studied as an 
external factor to the theory or model. For example, TRA 
explains the relationship of attitude and subjective norms with 
behavioural intention; TPB builds upon TRA and adds a 
construct of perceived behavioural control (often referred as 
self-efficacy), and PMT describes how threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal affect the motivation of the users to take 
security measures. In all the studies where the relationship of 
ISA with security behaviour has been studied, ISA has been 
used as an antecedent for the models mentioned above rather 
than the constituent construct. (For detail consult review study 
[34]). Thus, there is a need for a behavioural model where ISA 
is a component of the model to have a better understanding of 
ISA-security behaviour relationship so that both security 
awareness and behaviour of the users can be improved.  
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2. Users’ involvement in the design of ISA programs 
Users are not involved in the design phase of such programs. 
The security experts identify the areas where users’ security 
awareness needs to be improved. Later, ISA of the users is 
assessed using the identified focus areas. For example, 
Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius and Pattinson proposed a tool to 
determine ISA of employees for which focus areas were 
identified by interviewing the security managers [37], [38]. 
There is hardly any evidence in the literature that users were 
involved in the design phase of SETA programs (a review of 
related research is given in Chapter 4). 
 
3. Users’ awareness needs assessment 
One type of SETA program is used across the board in the 
organisation, without considering users’ need. As mentioned 
earlier, threat perceptions play an important role in users’ 
decision making. If a user does not consider an action risky, 
s/he will not be interested in awareness programs focused on 
improving that action. There is a need to identify the segment 
of users who need awareness training [6].  
 
1.2 Purpose and Objectives 
As mentioned in section 1.1, current studies lack tailored 
security awareness programs; there is a scarcity of user-
centred approaches; theory-based approaches are needed to 
understand and improve security behaviours. The ultimate 
objective, in any case, is to enhance security behaviour. 
Although ISA has been proven to play a significant role in the 
improvement of security behaviour, the research on how ISA 
affect security behaviours is on-going and needs further 
investigation. 
This thesis addresses the gaps mentioned in previous 
sections in the context of higher educational institutions by 
focusing on students. However, the primary purpose of this 
thesis is to explain the relationship of security awareness and 
security behaviour of students using a behavioural model that 
has not been used in the context of information security before. 
Following is the main question of the thesis: 
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RQ: How does information security awareness 
affect the security behaviour of the students? 
 
To find the answer to the above question as well as to 
address the gaps stated in the previous section, following 
objectives are set for this thesis: 
 
 O1: To describe the relationship of information 
security awareness (ISA) with different individual 
factors of students   
To conduct awareness assessment among the students, 
to identify, if any, student groups having a differing level of 
ISA, and to compare them? This objective will help in 
identifying the student group(s) having a different level of 
security awareness. 
 
O2: To identify perceived information security 
threat (concerns) of the students 
 To understand the security concerns of the students, and 
to identify the areas where students perceived to have 
information security risks. This objective will identify perceived 
security threats of the students, as well as the areas which 
should be kept in mind for designing SETA programs. 
 
O3: To describe differences in security behaviours 
of students and security expert 
To examine the security behaviour of the students and to 
compare them with that of the security experts, to identify the 
differences, if any. The comparison will help us understand the 
role of ISA, that is if students with high awareness level 
perform better than lower awareness level. 
 
O4: To explain the relationship between security 
awareness and security behaviour of the students 
To study the relationship of ISA with students’ security 
behaviour using a new model, called IMB model where ISA is 
operationalized in the form of knowledge of threats and security 
measures. 
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1.3 Research Design and Methodology 
For the studies in this thesis, a single case study was 
conducted. In this methodology, data is gathered from primary 
sources as well as secondary sources. The primary source was 
the data collected from the students, whereas, a literature 
review was used as a secondary source of data. 
 
1.3.1 Research Approach 
 Scientific inquiry can take two forms: inductive and 
deductive [39]. The research contribution of the study is mostly 
dependent upon the selection and application of one of these 
two approaches.  
The inductive approach is usually called a bottom-up 
approach where the research process is not guided by theory 
but based upon what data tells [40] — a typical example is 
Grounded theory. The observations from the collected data are 
then used to construct generalisations, understand relationships 
and even suggest theories. However, it cannot be said that the 
inductive approach does not take note of pre-existing theories 
or ideas when approaching a problem. The purpose of the 
inductive approach is to establish patterns and meanings 
without falsifying a theory [39].  
On the other hand, the deductive approach aims at 
testing (confirming, refuting or modifying) a hypothesis, 
explaining the relationship between two or more concepts. The 
deductive inquiry, on the other end, is based upon an existing 
theory. This testing takes place in a series of steps (more detail 
in Chapter 6). Though inductive and deductive approaches are 
different, however, these are not mutually exclusive. 
Researchers can also combine both inductive and deductive 
methods to address a problem [39]. There is a separate debate 
if the research can be strictly inductive. Moreover, it has been 
proposed that both inductive and deductive inquiries are 
connected [41]. Sometimes the difference can only be seen in 
the initial framework; whether or not it is loosely or strictly 
grounded in the previous research [42]. 
In this thesis, I have used both inductive and deductive 
approaches. For objectives O1 to O3 an inductive approach has 
been used, where data is collected to examine patterns, 
whereas, a deductive approach has been used to achieve 
objective O4. 
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1.3.2 Research Philosophy 
  “Epistemology provides a philosophical background 
for deciding what kinds of knowledge and legitimate and 
adequate” [39]. Broadly there are three epistemological 
stances: Objectivism, Constructivism and Subjectivism [39], 
[43].  
Objectivists believe that reality exists out there, 
independent of consciousness. So, knowledge is out there, and 
we need to discover it. Constructivists believe there is no 
objective truth out there. The meaning is what is constructed 
by the subject’s interaction and engagement with the world. So, 
the truth or knowledge is constructed rather than discovered. 
The subjectivists believe that meaning is not an outcome of the 
interplay of subject and object, but what subject imposes on 
the object. Subjects create meanings through their beliefs, 
dreams or from within unconsciousness and objects do not have 
any role to play in it. The theoretical perspectives associated 
with objectivism, constructivism and subjectivism are 
positivism, interpretivism and postmodernism respectively. 
Matching with the approaches - deductive and inductive - 
the studies presented in this thesis are associated with both 
positivism and interpretivism [39, 43]. Positivism supports the 
idea of ISA and security behaviour, where ISA is studied as an 
object (O1), security behaviour is studied as an object and 
comparison are made between students and security experts 
(O3). Interpretivism supports the idea that students have 
different perceptions about security threats (concerns) and their 
security awareness, and resultantly behave differently. O2 aims 
at identifying and exploring the security concerns of the 
students. The identifying part pertains to positivism whereas 
the exploratory part takes the subjective interpretation of the 
respondents. The final objective (O4), which also relates to the 
main research question of the thesis falls into the interpretivism 
paradigm.   
 
1.3.3 Research Design 
To ensure that the thesis provides reliable results, the 
right choice of research methodology is essential. The research 
design acts as a tool for planning of methods used for collecting 
relevant data and analysis, which are in line with the objectives 
of the research. According to Creswell [44], there is a need to 
identify the philosophical standing of the research as it directs 
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the mode of inquiry. The philosophical standing, also termed as 
a research paradigm, helps in identifying both the problem 
under investigation and the solution to the problem [45]. In 
social science research, identifying the correct research 
paradigm is the first step in the research. However, this 
approach is hardly evident in users’ focused research in 
information security even though users’ studies in information 
security are highly dependent on theories from social sciences 
and psychology. The closest evidence of the use of research 
design is found in the information system. Cronje [1], proposed 
a four-quadrant model (shown in Figure 1.1) outlining the 
research design in the information system. This model is 
adapted from the four paradigms suggested by [2]. 
Traditionally, the knowledge cycle moves in the following way: 
 
DescribeàExploreàExplainàDevelop 
 
Here describe and develop consider knowledge as an 
objective whereas, whereas, explore and explain consider 
subjectivism. However, the traditional sequence of knowledge 
does not limit researchers’ abilities to research in different 
quadrants.   
To meet the stated objectives stated in section 1.2, the 
thesis uses a multi-faceted approach of combining exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory insights. The placement of the 
objectives in research design can be seen in Figure 1.1. The 
research also involved the development of a cybersecurity 
course for students of different educational backgrounds, which 
relates to develop phase of knowledge cycle. However, in this 
thesis development and assessment of the course is not 
included. 
 
1.3.4 Research Methods  
Considering the breadth of the thesis, the objectives of 
the thesis could not be achieved through a single wave of data 
collection. Therefore, a series of studies, each addressing one 
objective was carried out over time, except for O3 where two 
studies were conducted to achieve the goal. The thesis is 
grounded in quantitative methods, except for O2 and O3 where 
the mixed-method and multi-method approach has been used 
respectively.  
 
9 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The research paradigm and design cycle  
(adapted from[1], [2]) 
 
 
The multi-method approach utilizes quantitative and qualitative 
methods to form independent parts of the study (Qual+Quan). 
Both methods (Qual and Quan) are used to answer different 
part of the research question. Whereas, in the mixed-method 
approach, both quantitative and qualitative methods are 
interconnected in a fashion that cannot be separated (For 
example, Qual->Quan or Quan->Qual). Both methods (Qual 
and Quan) used to answer the research question together. 
 
A literature review was conducted for each objective, 
focusing on ISA and security behaviour. Empirical data for the 
objectives were collected through cross-sectional surveys. For 
each study, data was collected using online surveys, except for 
O2 where qualitative data was collected as part of the course 
assignment. The data for O1, O2 and O3 were analysed using 
statistical techniques ranging from simple descriptive analysis 
to factor analysis in SPSS v24.0, and v25.0 whereas, data for 
O4 was analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM) in 
SmartPLS v3.0. Further detail on research methods is given 
separately in respective chapters. The research methodology 
used in this thesis is outlined in Table 1.1. 
As mentioned earlier, a single case study approach was 
used for the studies in this thesis. The organisation is located in 
Turku, a southwestern city of Finland.  The target population of 
the studies were undergraduate and post-graduate level 
10 
 
 
students. The target university had a population of about 17000 
students enrolled in seven different faculties at the start of this 
research (2014-15).  
 
Objective Method Unit of 
Analysis 
Unit of 
Observation 
O1 Quantitative ISA Students 
O2 Mixed  
(Qual->Quan) 
Concerns Students 
O3 Multi 
(Qual+Quan) 
Security 
Behaviour 
Students 
O4 Quantitative ISA & 
Behaviour 
Students 
Table 1.1: The research methodology used in the thesis 
 
1.5 Delimitation 
The studies presented in this thesis are focused on 
information security of higher education institutions and have 
some limitations. For example, only students are taken as the 
audience of the studies, leaving out employees (faculty 
members and other staff). Furthermore, the research was 
conducted in the Department of Future Technologies, previously 
known as the Department of Information Technology and, 
therefore, most of the respondents were from IT, computer 
science or computer engineering backgrounds. Although data 
were collected from students of non-IT disciplines as well, they 
may not represent the whole student population of students 
from other disciplines. Moreover, many students work in 
addition to studying. This study looks at the information 
security issue in the context of educational institutions only, 
and therefore the participants were asked to consider 
themselves as students while answering the surveys. 
The studies presented in this thesis are based on online 
(web-based) surveys. Such surveys are subject to self-selection 
bias [46] and may attract only those respondents who were 
comfortable with web-based surveys and have interest in the 
topic. Moreover, surveys provide a limited picture of what 
participants remember or what they are ready to share [47]. 
For the sake of this thesis, it is assumed that respondents of 
11 
 
 
the studies have accurately reported their information security 
awareness, concerns and behaviours. 
  Considering that information security is a broad topic (as 
we will see in chapter 4) and many areas should be taken into 
consideration while assessing awareness and behaviours. 
Including all the areas in awareness assessment and security 
behaviour could lead to long surveys. The lengthy surveys not 
only adversely affect the response rate but also cause 
respondents to response without due attention. Therefore, I 
have been selective in picking area(s) in awareness and 
behaviour studies (Chapter 3, 5 and 6). The selection was made 
considering the most common concerns of students and 
security advice suggested by the security experts. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 The remainder of this thesis is divided into seven 
chapters.  
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature where 
two main themes are discussed: (1) On the understanding of 
information security awareness, and (2) theories used in 
studying security behaviours. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce readers to the concept of information security 
awareness, how it is defined and assessed. Further, the popular 
theories used for studying information security behaviours are 
described. 
Chapter 3 describes an assessment study where 
information security awareness of students of different 
backgrounds is assessed, and a comparison of awareness is 
made among students divided based on their demographics, 
individual and cultural factors. This chapter covers objective 1. 
Chapter 4 presents a two-phase study where a mixed-
method (Qual->Quan) design is used for identifying and 
describing information security concerns of the students. 
Objective 2 of the thesis is covered in this chapter 
Chapter 5 describes a comparative study where a multi-
method (Qual+Quan) design is used to identify security 
measures taken by the students, along with data on their 
security practices. Next, a comparison of security practices was 
made with that of security experts to identify the gaps. The 
chapter starts with an introduction, followed by related work. 
The methodology of the study is explained next. Results 
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describe the comparison of practices related to system security, 
email security, web security and access control. The conclusion 
comes at the end. This chapter is related to Objective 3. 
Chapter 6 presents a study where the relationship of 
security awareness and security behaviour is empirically 
validated. Like previous chapters, this chapter is also organised 
into an introduction, related work, methodology, results and 
conclusion. Objective 3 of the thesis is covered in this chapter.  
Chapter 7 of the thesis provides a synthesis of findings 
and conclusion for the thesis. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review  
  
This chapter presents a review of literature related to this 
thesis. A holistic view of relevant research, starting from the 
concepts to the related work is given in this chapter. The 
chapter begins with introduction to the concepts of information 
security, information security awareness, what are the factors 
that precede ISA and what are the outcomes. Further, a theory 
based on an understanding of the role of concerns is provided. 
Next, most essential theories used so far for studying 
information security behaviours are discussed. Lastly, a new 
model (Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills Model) is 
described. 
14 
 
 
 
2.1 Understanding Information Security 
Awareness 
Security education, training and awareness (SETA) 
programs have been suggested as a non-technical tool for 
information security [10], [48]. In this regard, information 
security awareness (ISA) is considered as an essential variable 
that influences the security behaviour of the users. The current 
literature on ISA can be divided into five categories [49]:  
 
1) Defining and conceptualisation of ISA,  
2) Studying the relationship between ISA and security 
behaviour,  
3) antecedents of ISA,  
4) SETA programs, and  
5) the assessment of ISA.  
 
However, before describing existing research on ISA, lets 
first clarify the terms information security and cybersecurity, 
that are most often used interchangeably. 
 
2.1.1 Information Security vs Cybersecurity 
The five basic needs drive human behaviours: 
psychological, safety, social, esteem and self-actualisation [50]. 
These needs exist in hierarchal form, where once the first need 
is fulfilled, the person tries to meet the next need. When 
Maslow presented his famous model [50], the safety was 
related to real-life safety. However, since the advent of the 
Internet, the need for safety also exists in the online world. 
Since the Internet is a big system where human is presented 
through the digital footprint (information) s/he shares, the 
concept of information security is of importance. 
Traditionally online safety is related to information 
security which has been defined differently in the literature. 
According to International Standard Organization standard 
ISO/IEC 27001, information security in an organisational 
context is defined as “the protection of the information from a 
wide range of threats to ensure business continuity, minimise 
business risk, and maximise return on investments and 
business opportunities”. Cherdantseva & Hilton [51] defined 
information security as “a multidisciplinary area of study and 
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professional activity which is concerned with the development 
and implement of security countermeasures of all available 
types (technical, organizational, human-oriented and legal) in 
order to keep information in all its locations (within and outside 
the organization’s perimeter) and, consequently, information 
systems, where information is created, processed, stored, 
transmitted and distributed, free from threats.” In addition to 
term information security, the online safety has been covered 
using terms such as computer security, IT security, ICT 
security, data security and the most recently the term 
cybersecurity (or it's variant cyber-security) is somewhat 
popularly used [52]. Researchers often use information security 
and cybersecurity interchangeably, however, there is a 
difference. For example, von Solms & van Niekerk (2013) 
discussed both information security and cybersecurity and 
provided a theoretical understanding as to what is the 
difference between the two concepts. According to them, the 
purpose of information security is to security assets 
(information assets) from a variety of threats that exploit 
vulnerabilities in the system (ICT). Whereas, cybersecurity 
ensure the safety of a broader set of assets (including humans 
and their interest) from a variety of threats that may exploit 
vulnerabilities that may exist due to the system (ICT) or the 
information itself. The relationship between the concepts above 
is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The relationship between information security and 
cybersecurity (adapted from [53]) 
Information 
Security 
Information  
and 
Communication 
Technology 
Security 
Cybersecurity 
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2.1.2 Defining Information Security Awareness  
There is no generally agreed-upon definition of 
information security awareness (ISA), and perhaps this is 
mainly due to informal and socially constructed nature of the 
concept [54]. The reviews of the literature on ISA [34], [49] 
suggest that ISA is not just a representation of the cognitive 
state of mind (that is being aware of information security 
problems). Some researchers do not differentiate between ISA 
and the behaviour, while others consider it a procedure to 
achieve the cognitive state of mind. 
Firstly, ISA is considered as a cognitive state of mind has 
defined and used ISA differently. For example, some regards it 
as knowledge of security measures that users should have for 
their individual as well as organisational security [55]–[58]. 
While others believe ISA is about improving the consciousness 
of users by highlighting information security issues and the 
strategies/measures to deal with such problems [19], [59], 
[60]. Another group of researchers, consider ISA makes users 
conscious about the significance and importance of information 
security for individuals as well as an organisation [15], [18], 
[61]. 
Secondly, there are several definitions of ISA found in 
ISA literature where ISA does not depict a state of mind but 
connects ISA with security behaviour so tightly that it is hard to 
differentiate between ISA and behaviour. For example, ISA is 
considered as acting or responding to organisations’ security 
policies [10], [62]–[65] to “bring committed to the security 
mission” [15], [26], [66]. And sometimes, it is regarded as one 
type of security behaviour [60]. 
Thirdly, ISA is considered a process by some of the 
researchers. The researchers who consider ISA as a process 
regards ISA as a process of awareness-raising activities and 
their management [54]. Lim et al., (2010) defined ISA as a 
method “to teach employees to be conscious about information 
security policies and procedures”, whereas, Peltier [67] stated 
ISA as a tool “to stimulate, motivate, and remind the audience 
what is expected of them.” According to Tsohou et al. [54], it is 
“an inter-functional process (check, act, plan, do) that crosses 
different divisional units or departments of organisations.” 
In this thesis, ISA is used as an awareness of security 
measures and knowledge of security threats. Moreover, it has 
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been regarded as a cognitive state of mind (Chapter 3, 5) and 
as a process (in Chapter 4). 
 
2.1.3 Information Security Awareness Assessment 
Considering the importance of information security 
awareness (ISA), researchers have conducted quite a few 
studies using different methods in different contexts. A review 
of the literature suggests that researchers have used as many 
as ten distinctive assessment methodologies to assess ISA, 
which is: value-focused, survey-based questionnaire, 
vocabulary test, observation, interviews, game tools,  
E-learning, focus groups, document reviews and responses to 
email [68]. The target audience is the end-users in 
organisations, whereas, few studies were found to be focused 
on users from educational institutions, novice internet users 
and social media users. The researchers have assessed general 
security awareness, level of security awareness, knowledge, 
attitude, behaviour, information assurance, information security 
management awareness and reporting awareness in such 
studies (For detail consult [68]).    
Some of the studies where ISA of the users has been 
assessed are tabulated in Table 2.1. The detail includes the 
purpose, scope of the study, assessment methodology, and 
target audience where users’ information security awareness 
has been assessed.  
The examination of the literature on ISA reveals that 
researchers have created tools for ISA assessment. For 
example, Kruger & Kearney [69] proposed a value-based 
assessment method, where knowledge, attitude and behaviour 
or employees was assessed in six focus areas based on 
vocabulary testing approach [70]. Building on work of Kruger & 
Kearney [69], Parsons, Cormac, Butavicius, Pattinson and 
Jerram [38] proposed a Human Aspects of Information Security 
Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) to determine information security 
awareness of organisational employees. This questionnaire 
assesses users’ awareness in six focus areas with the help of 63 
statements measuring knowledge, attitude and behaviour on 5-
point Likert scale measurements. The areas are password 
management, email use, internet use, social networking site 
use, incident reporting, mobile computing and information 
handling.  
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Ref Purpose of the 
study 
Scope Method Target 
User 
[71] To identify   internet 
users’ awareness of 
cyber threats and 
their understanding 
of the methods for 
protecting and  
safeguarding data 
and systems over 
the internet 
Awareness 
level  
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Home 
users 
[26] To explore the level 
of information  
security awareness 
Security in 
general, 
the 
Awareness 
level 
Observation,  
Document  
review, 
Interview,  
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[72] To determine the 
role of learning in 
the workplace and 
home on information 
practice in general 
Awareness 
level 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
& 
Home 
users 
[10] To assess the role of  
information security 
awareness and its 
relationship to  
human behavioural 
elements 
Information 
assurance 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[73] To identify the status 
of information  
security awareness 
for developing  
effective security 
awareness training in 
the future 
Awareness 
level,  
Attitude 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Students 
[74] To assess the  
characteristics of 
security practices, 
level of awareness, 
countermeasure 
strategies as well as 
the compliance level 
of student 
Security in 
general 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Students 
Table 2.1: Previous literature on information security  
awareness, depicting the purpose, scope, method and target 
user (Adapted from [68]) 
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Ref Purpose of the 
study 
Scope Method Target 
User 
[75] To determine the 
level of security  
culture among  
employees 
Awareness 
level,  
Reporting 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[76] To determine a 
methodology that 
can be adapted to 
evaluate security 
awareness programs 
Knowledge, 
Attitude 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[77] To identify cyber 
threats in the real 
estate industry,  
assess the security 
awareness level of 
real estate 
employees and the 
risk management 
standards adopted 
by the real estate 
industry 
Security in 
general 
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[37] To assess the risks, 
threats, risky assets 
and the on 
sequences of 
Security Breaches. 
To gain a deep  
understanding of the 
knowledge, attitude 
and behaviour  
related to security 
practices 
Knowledge, 
Attitude, 
behaviour 
Interview,  
Survey-based 
questionnaire 
Employees 
[78] To identify critical 
areas of concern to 
address in the ICT  
security awareness 
program and the 
result of this 
assessment was 
used in security 
planning 
Security 
manage-
ment 
Value-focused Employees 
Table 2.1 (continued): Previous literature on information  
security awareness, depicting the purpose, scope, method and 
target user (Adapted from [68]) 
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Ref. Purpose of the 
Study 
Scope Method Target 
User 
[69] To test the 
proposed prototype 
in assessing 
security awareness 
Knowledge, 
Attitude, 
Behaviour 
Value-focused Employees 
[38] To identify  
information security 
awareness my  
examining 
information security 
vulnerabilities 
Knowledge, 
Attitude, 
behaviour 
Value-focused, 
Vocabulary 
test 
Employees 
[79] To assess the level 
of awareness my 
employing method 
from education 
discipline 
Knowledge, 
Attitude, 
behaviour 
Vocabulary 
test 
Students 
[80] To examine the 
level of employees’  
experiences about 
their security role 
and management in 
the workplace 
Security in 
general 
Interview Employees 
[71] To provide a rich 
source of users’  
experiences and 
views regarding  
internet security 
and issues of online  
protection 
Security in 
general 
Interview Internet 
users 
[81] To identify the  
correct perception, 
myths and potential 
misperceptions 
about computer 
security 
Security in 
general 
Interview Internet 
users 
[82] To change the 
behaviour and work 
practices of  
employees 
Security 
manage-
ment 
E-learning Employees 
[83] To change users’ 
behaviour via action 
research 
Security in 
general 
Focus group Employees 
Table 2.1 (continued): Previous literature on information  
security awareness, depicting the purpose, scope, method and 
target user (Adapted from [68]) 
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Ref. Purpose of 
the Study 
Scope Method Target 
User 
[84] To use the game  
technology to 
build stimulation 
systems that 
may help users 
understand  
information  
assurance  
concepts 
Information 
assurance 
Game Employees 
[85] Use of 
hypermedia, 
multimedia and 
hypertext to  
provide 
awareness and  
assess security 
awareness 
among the social 
networking 
community 
Security in 
general 
Game Social  
Media  
users 
[86] To increase  
awareness and 
enforce home 
users to abide by 
security practices 
while accessing 
online  
applications 
Security in 
general 
E-learning Home  
users 
[87] To assess the  
changes in 
knowledge, 
learning and 
behaviour 
Knowledge, 
behaviour 
E-learning Employees 
[88] To explore the 
effectiveness of 
the embedded 
training by  
examining the 
number of clicks 
from the spear 
phishing e-mail 
Awareness 
level 
Email  
experim-
ent 
Employees 
Table 2.1 (continued): Previous literature on information  
security awareness, depicting the purpose, scope, method and 
target user (Adapted from [68]) 
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2.2 Information Security Perceptions and  
Concerns 
Perceptions are part of human intellect and have an 
undeniable role in fostering human behaviours [89]. Individuals 
evaluate external factors based on their perceptions and react 
to different situations. Computer and internet users respond to 
different kind of threats according to their perceptions. 
Therefore, if a person is overestimating the risks associated 
with threats, s/he may stop using a particular service or 
technology [90]–[92]. For example, people may stop using e-
banking app if they overestimate the risks involved. At the 
same time, if a person is underestimating the risks, s/he may 
engage in risky behaviour and practices [93]–[95]. For 
example, people may share everything about their everyday life 
proceedings assuming they have got nothing to hide or they do 
not have money to lose. Thus, it is of utmost importance to 
understand what people perceived about information security, 
why they perceive what they perceive, and how they will react 
subsequently.  
Aytes & Connolly ([96], [97]) divided users’ perceptions 
related to information security in two groups: (1) knowledge of 
security risks and consequences, and (2) knowledge of security 
measures (also known as countermeasures). According to 
them, users’ decision making is affected by the awareness of 
possible adverse outcomes and the probability of such 
outcomes. Moreover, awareness of safe practices, resources 
available to learn such practices and the cost involved in 
learning and employing such practices also influence their 
decision making. As the users are found to be the weakest link 
in the information security, it is essential to understand how 
they view information security threats, privacy threats and what 
are the defences they use against information security 
threats[16], [98]. 
  Students are an important users’ group when it comes 
to information security of HEIs. While online activities of 
students and staff members in HEIs differ, the risks of getting 
exposed to an information security threat may also differ [99]. 
It has been found that students are more exposed to security 
threats. To improve students’ security awareness, it is crucial to 
understand their perceptions and concerns. This understanding 
will allow identifying the knowledge gaps that HEIs 
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management may like to tackle to improve overall information 
security of the HEIs.  
 
2.3 Theories in Information Security  
As the user has been found as the weakest link in 
information security, researchers have been trying to find a way 
to improve their security behaviours. In this regard, researchers 
have made use of theories from social psychology and 
criminology to predict and explain users’ security-related 
behaviours [100], [101].To have a comprehensive picture, 
researchers have conducted systematic reviews of the 
literature. For example, Lebek, Uffen, Breitner [102] conducted 
a review to identify the theories that have been used most 
often for explaining employees’ information security behaviours 
literature. They found as many as 54 theories that have been 
used in information security behaviour literature. However, they 
found that four of the theories had been used most often. These 
were: Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB), General Deterrence Theory (GDT), and 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM). Another review conducted 
by  Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm & Bengtsson [103] found 
that in addition to aforementioned theories, theories such as 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) and Theory of Moral Decision 
Making are used in understanding information security policy 
compliance-related research. In this study, they found as many 
as 60 psychological constructs that influence policy compliance 
of the users. Another recent review study conducted by Mayer, 
Kunz & Volkamer [104] identified the 11 most reliable 
behavioural factors in information security contexts. However, 
they suggested keeping all 14 factors in mind in security 
behaviour related research. These factors and the respective 
theories are shown in Table 2.2. 
A closer examination of existing research shows that PMT 
and TPB are the two most often theories used in different 
contexts (organisational and home-users). In both theories, 
security-related behaviours are predicted through behavioural 
intention, which is further influenced by some factors given in 
Table 2.2. Both theories are introduced in coming sub-
sections.  
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Theory Factors/Constructs 
Theory of Planned Behaviour 
(TPB) 
Attitude1 
 
Subjective Norms 
 
Self-efficacy2 
 
Behavioural Intention 
Protection Motivation Theory 
(PMT) 
Response Efficacy 
Response Costs 
Self-efficacy2 
 
Perceived Severity of threats 
Perceived Vulnerability 
Maladaptive Rewards 
 
Behavioural Intention 
General Deterrence Theory 
(GDT) 
Perceived Certainty of  
Sanctions 
Perceived Severity of  
Sanctions 
 
Behavioural Intention 
Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM) 
Perceived Usefulness 
Perceived Ease of Use 
 
Attitude1 
(1,2 overlapping constructs in more than one models) 
Table 2.2: Reliable Behavioural Factors from Research 
(adapted from [104]) 
 
2.3.1 Protection Motivation Theory 
Rogers proposed protection Motivation Theory (PMT) in 
1975. This theory is based upon fear appeals. According to 
PMT, individual’s security behaviour is influenced by their 
beliefs about the threat and the countermeasures they can take 
against the threat. The beliefs about threats are termed as 
threat appraisal whereas the beliefs related to countermeasures 
are termed as a coping appraisal. Both, threat appraisal and 
coping appraisal, influence protection motivation (assessed as 
intention). Threat appraisal is measured through the severity of 
the threat (Perceived Severity) and the likelihood that a threat 
would occur (Perceived Vulnerability). The latter revolves 
around how effective the protective action is (Response 
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Efficacy), how capable a user is of performing that action (Self-
efficacy), and what cost the user must pay for implementing 
the protective action(s) (Response Cost). PMT posits that user’s 
security behaviour is determined by a cost-benefit analysis 
where users calculate risks associated with an effort and 
compare them with the cost associated with the attempt to 
reduce the risks. The result of cost-benefit analysis motivates 
or demotivates (protection motivation shown as behavioural 
intention) a user to take precautionary measures (security 
behaviour). Figure 2.2 shows the PMT model and its 
constituent beliefs. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: The Protection Motivation Theory, its constructs 
and their relationship 
 
2.3.2 Theory of Planned Behaviour 
Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) is evolved from the 
Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) proposed by Martin Fishbein 
[105], [106]. TRA revolves around the Intention to behave in a 
certain way. Intention depicts the likelihood that a person will 
act in a particular way given the situation. The intention is 
predominantly influenced by the Attitude of the person or 
population towards that specific behaviour. In addition to that 
Subject Norms also affect the behaviour. 
TPB was an extension of TRA where in addition to 
attitude and subjective norms, the concept of perceived 
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behavioural control was introduced [107]. TPB identifies 
intention as the driving force for a specific behaviour which is 
influenced by three motivational factors: attitude, subjective 
norms and perceived behavioural control. The first two are the 
same as in TRA, while perceived behavioural control depicts the 
degree to which an individual thinks s/he can perform a specific 
behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is an important factor 
as even when a person has the means to act, her/his perceived 
inadequacy (perceived confidence in her/his capability to 
perform a behaviour) may prevent her/him from acting. TPB as 
a model is shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Theory of Planned Behaviour, its constructs and 
their relationships 
 
2.4 Information Security Awareness and  
Behaviour 
As discussed in the previous sections, information 
security awareness (ISA) is one of the important measures that 
could improve the security behaviours of the users. Moreover, 
we also saw the different behavioural factors that influence 
security behaviours of the users. The important thing is to 
understand how ISA affect security behaviours of the users. 
A review of the literature showed that the relationship 
between ISA and security-related behaviours had been studied 
with the help of theories, and mostly there has been an indirect 
relationship between the security awareness of the behaviours. 
Such studies along with the context are discussed in this 
section.  
In an organisational context, most studies are focused on 
awareness and behaviours related to information security 
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policies (ISP). Al-Omari, El-Gayar & Deokar [108] used TAM to 
study the relationship of users’ awareness of information 
security, security policies, and SETA programmes and intention 
to comply with security policies among 350 bank employees 
(managerial level) in Jordan. They found that users’ awareness 
influence intention to comply with security policies indirectly 
through perceived usefulness of protection and perceived ease 
of use (follow) policies. 
Bauer & Bernroider [109] studied and the indirect 
relationship of ISA (awareness of information security issues, 
risks and threats) with ISP compliant behaviour among 600 
employees of a European bank help of Theory of Reasoned 
Action (TRA). They found that ISA positively affects attitude 
and Social Norms (includes both subjective and descriptive 
norms) which further are associated positively with the 
intention to comply with ISP. Also, the intention has a positive 
relationship with actual behaviour. They also found that ISA has 
a negative relationship with neutralisation techniques (the 
degree to which users violate ISP of the organisation due to 
several reasons). Neutralisation techniques are further 
negatively associated with intention to comply with ISP. 
Bauer & Bernrodier [110] in another studied effect of ISA 
programs on information security compliant behaviours of bank 
employees using PMT. They found while there is a strong 
relationship (R2=0.56, f=0.45) between intention for compliant 
security behaviour and actual compliant security behaviour, ISA 
programs do not affect intention directly. The impact of ISA 
transfers through perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, 
response efficacy, and self-efficacy. ISA programs, except for 
perceived vulnerability, have a positive relationship with other 
mentioned constructs. All the above-mentioned constructs have 
a positive relationship with intention. 
Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu & Benbasat [62] conducted a study 
among employees (N=464) to examine the relationship of ISA 
with the intention to comply with ISP using TPB. They found 
that ISA affects behavioural intention through attitude and 
perceived fairness of requirements. ISA is positively associated 
with both attitude and perceived fairness of requirements. In 
another study [10] the same group of authors examined the 
relationship of ISA with beliefs about outcomes (intrinsic 
benefits, safety, rewards, work impediment, intrinsic cost, 
vulnerability and sanctions) and beliefs about the overall 
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assessment of consequences (benefit of compliance, cost of 
compliance and cost of non-compliance). They further 
examined the relationship of the above-mentioned beliefs with 
the intention to comply with ISP using TPB. They suggested 
that ISA indirectly affect the intention to comply with ISP. ISA 
changes beliefs about outcomes, and these beliefs then affect 
beliefs about the overall assessment of consequences. Then, 
the beliefs about the overall assessment of consequences affect 
the attitude of the users. And finally, attitude affects the 
intention positively. 
Putri & Hovav [111] conducted a study to examine the 
effect of ISA programs on intention to comply with ISP related 
to bring your own device(BYOD) among employees in Indonesia 
(N=230). For this purpose, they used PMT theory. They found 
that BYOD security awareness programs influence the intention 
to comply with ISP through perceived response efficacy and 
perceived response cost. the awareness program has a positive 
connection with both perceived response efficacy and perceived 
response cost.    
Yazdanmehr & Wang [112] studied the relationship of 
ISP related awareness of consequence and ISP compliance 
behaviour using Norm Activation Theory [113]. They used a 
sample of working professionals in the USA (N=201). They 
found that ISP related awareness of consequence has an 
indirect relationship with IS compliance behaviour. ISP related 
awareness of consequence positively affects ISP-related 
personal norms, a combination of subjective and descriptive 
norms, which in turn affects the behaviour. 
Torten, Reaiche & Boyle[36] studied the impact of 
security awareness on the security behaviour of IT professionals 
(N=400) in the USA using PMT. The found that threat 
awareness affect security behaviour through perceived severity 
and perceived vulnerability, whereas, countermeasures 
awareness affect security behaviour through self-efficacy, 
response cost, and response efficacy. The relationship between 
awareness and constructs of PMT model was positive. Study of 
Torten et al [36] was based upon another study [35], which 
was conducted to examine the relationship between ISA and 
security behaviour among business students (N=241). The 
result of this study [35] was similar to results from [36] to 
some extent. For example, there was a positive relationship 
found between threat awareness and perceived severity. 
29 
 
 
 
Moreover, the relationship between countermeasure awareness 
with self-efficacy and response efficacy was also found positive. 
However, there was a negative association observed in case of 
threat awareness-perceived vulnerability, and countermeasure 
awareness – response cost.  
In home-users’ context, Kumar, Mohan & Holowczak 
[114] examined the relationship between intention to use 
firewalls (behaviour) and awareness of security measures (ISA) 
with the help of TAM among 130 students who were used as a 
proxy for home-users. They found that awareness of security 
measures positively influence intention to use a firewall; 
however, this relationship is not direct. Awareness of security 
measures is positively associated with perceived ease of use 
and perceived usefulness which further positively affects the 
Attitude of the users. And, Attitude influences the intention. 
Dinev & Hu [19] examined the relationship of awareness 
of anti-spyware with the intention to use anti-spyware a using 
combination of TPB and TAM using a sample of 339 university 
students. They found that awareness of protective technology 
predicts the intention to use protective technology both directly 
and indirectly. Indirectly, awareness of protective technology 
positively influences attitude and subjective norm which then 
predict intention. Detail of constructs/variables which are 
positively associated with ISA is given in Table 2.3, whereas, 
the beliefs that have a negative association with ISA are given 
in Table 2.4.  
From the review, it was found that the relationship 
between ISA and security behaviours had been studied mostly 
using different models such as PMT, TPB and TAM. It was also 
found that in all the mentioned studies, ISA was studied as an 
antecedent to the models. According to Meichenbaum & Turk 
[115], a behaviour is operated by four independent factors: 
Knowledge and Skills, beliefs, motivation and action. If any of 
these factors are deficient, the behaviour may not as it is 
required. Here knowledge and skills refer to the necessary 
information of the problems, solutions, importance and self-
regulatory behaviour. Beliefs are related to threat appraisal 
(perceived severity, perceived vulnerability) and coping 
appraisal (self-efficacy, response cost, response efficacy). 
Motivation is value and reinforcement as well as internal 
attribution of success. Motivation can be intrinsic or personal or 
extrinsic or social. And, lastly, the actions which are stimulated 
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by cues, and steered by information recall. Existing theories 
and models used in security behaviours literature take some of 
these factors into account. For example, TPB takes attitude, 
subjective norms and self-efficacy into account which covers 
motivation and beliefs. PMT is based upon beliefs (coping 
appraisal and threat appraisal) whereas TAM and GDT also deal 
with the belief system. So, we need a model or theory that 
takes all four factors, as suggested by [115], into account.   
 
 
S# Constructs/Variables Theory References 
1 Perceived usefulness TAM [108], [114] 
2 Perceived ease of use TAM [108] 
3 Attitude TAM, 
TPB, PMT 
[10], [19], 
[62], [109], 
[114] 
4 Perceived vulnerability PMT [10], [36] 
5 Perceived severity PMT [35], [36], 
[110] 
6 Response cost PMT [36], [110], 
[111] 
7 Response efficacy PMT [35], [36], 
[110], [111] 
8 Self-efficacy TPB, PMT [35], [36] 
9 Subjective norms TPB [19] 
11 Social norms TPB [109]  
12 Perceived sanctions  
(includes perceived 
certainty of sanctions and 
perceived severity of 
sanctions)  
GDT [10], [57], 
[116], [117] 
13 Perceived fairness of  
requirements towards  
policies 
Others [62] 
14 Intrinsic benefits Others [10] 
15 Safety Others [10] 
16 Rewards Others [10] 
17 Policy-related personal 
norms 
Others [112] 
18 Intrinsic cost Others [10] 
Table 2.3: List of Constructs/Variables affecting  
Users’ Security Behaviours and having positive Relationship 
with Information Security Awareness 
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S# Constructs/Variables Theory References 
1 Perceived vulnerability TPB [35], [110] 
2 Response cost TPB [35] 
3 Work Impediment Others [10] 
4 Neutralisation Techniques Others [109] 
Table 2.4: List of Constructs/Variables affecting  
Users’ Security Behaviours and having negative Relationship 
with Information Security Awareness 
 
2.5 Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills 
Model 
In 1992, Fisher & Fisher [118], [119] proposed a model 
to change AIDS-related risky behaviours. It covered all the four 
essential factors that were needed towards adherence 
behaviour, that is, knowledge, beliefs, motivation and actions. 
The model was named Information-Motivation-Behavioural 
Skills (IMB) Model. This model has been used in Health-related 
studies and showed promising results in improving behaviours 
[120]–[122]. IMB Model has also been used for studying voting 
behaviours [123] and recycling behaviours [124]. Moreover, 
few security researchers also proposed its utility in the context 
of security and privacy. However, it has not yet been tested 
empirically [125]–[127].  
The IMB Model consists of two predictors (information 
and motivation), one proposed mediator variable (behavioural 
skills) and one outcome variable (behaviour) (Figure 2.4).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills Model 
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2.5.1 Information 
The first is information. Information is a prerequisite to a 
correct and consistent enactment of given behaviour [118], 
[119], [122]. In the health context, information depicts the 
basic knowledge of the medical condition. It may include how a 
disease is developed, how it progresses and the effective ways 
to mitigate the disease. An individual can hold accurate 
information (that will help in the performance of the desired 
behaviour) and inaccurate information (that may impede the 
desired behaviour).  
 
2.5.2 Motivation 
Motivation is considered a critical component for 
engaging in and maintaining required behaviours [128]–[130]. 
It is the second predictor to behaviour in the IMB model and 
includes both personal and social motivation. In the health 
context, Motivation is composed of personal attitudes towards a 
behaviour, and social motivation comes from the norms. The 
norms can be perceived social support for the behaviour, and/or 
the patient’s perception of how others might behave in similar 
circumstances (descriptive norms) and perception of what 
others think the patient should do (subjective norms). While 
Fisher & Fisher [118], [119] originally considered social support 
as a proxy for social motivation. There has been no explicit 
agreement on how social motivation will be measured. 
One can engage in the desired behaviour if the person is 
highly motivated and have a positive attitude towards the 
desired behaviour. Motivation may increase or decrease based 
on the individual’s perceptions of social support to engage in 
specific behaviour.  
 
2.5.3 Behavioural Skills 
Behavioural skills are proposed as a mediator variable 
between the two predictors and security behaviour. In the 
health context, behavioural skills ensure that the patient has 
necessary skills, tools and measures or strategies to perform 
behaviour, for example, the patient knows how to take 
medicine, or use condoms. Skills include both objective and 
perceived abilities (self-efficacy) to deal with the challenges. 
Like social motivation, there is no one agreed-upon construct to 
measure the behavioural skills. Some considered self-efficacy 
33 
 
 
 
as a way to measure behavioral skills [120], [131], [132], 
others measured with help of perceived ease of use [133], 
intention to perform an action related to the behaviour [134], 
perceived difficulty to enact a behaviour [135], and even by 
just by the assessment of knowledge that is needed toward 
enacting a behaviour [124].  
Considering the usefulness of the IMB model in other 
contexts, and that it covers all four factors (discussed in the 
previous section) related to behaviour, we decided to use the 
IMB model to examine the relationship of ISA with the security 
behaviour of the students. The operationalisation of the 
constructs is discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter, a review of existing literature related to 
this thesis has been provided. The chapter starts with providing 
an understanding of ISA as a concept, followed by a synthesis 
of existing studies on ISA highlighting the purpose, scope, 
method and respondents of those study. Importance of 
perceptions and concern is also discussed. I have also provided 
an overview of most often used theories in information security 
behaviour research followed by an introduction of IMB Model. In 
next chapter, we will describe the relationship of different 
individual factors with ISA of the students. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Assessment of 
Information Security 
Awareness among 
Students  
 
 
 
 
This chapter presents a user study to assess and relate 
information security awareness of 614 Finnish university 
students with their demographic factors to identify the student 
groups which lack security awareness. This study relates to O1 
of the thesis. 
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The importance of information assets has been widely 
accepted, and companies spend huge capital on information 
security to ensure business continuity and disaster recovery 
[14], [136]. For this purpose, usually a security plan is 
designed wherein not only common technical tools and 
solutions are considered, but the focus is given to the human 
factor as well; sole focus on technological solutions is not an 
answer to the problem[137]–[139]. People are trained and 
educated so that they have sufficient knowledge of security 
threats and their role in the whole security scenario[140]. The 
literature suggests information security policies, security 
education, training and awareness programs[10]–[12], [58] for 
educating people. The significance of information security 
awareness (ISA) has been acknowledged by the researchers not 
only in the previous     century [13], [14], [141], [142] but also 
in recent times,  and several studies have focused on ISA (for 
example, [48], [54], [69], [79], [143]). 
The use of Internet-based information systems and 
related services such as online social networks among the 
students is on the rise amid rapid growth in the technology, 
introduction of online courses and digital libraries [144], [145]. 
Research shows that the educational institutions, especially 
universities, have been hot targets for cybercriminals due to 
two main reasons; 1) vast computing power and 2) open access 
to the public and its constituencies [146]. The importance of 
information security in the context of educational institutes has 
been recognised, and Educause Review [147] has ranked it 
number one or number two among areas of concerns for 
educational institutions in the USA over last several years. 
Although the importance of ISA in educational institutions is 
increasing, the studies related to ISA in the context of 
educational institutions are scarce, and those available are 
focused on issues other than students’ ISA assessment and 
training. The issues focused on the available studies are the 
adoption of information security in higher education institutions 
[148], assessing employees’ ISA [149] and information security 
strategies [150]. However, ISA in context of students was 
discussed while providing guidelines and recommendations for 
ISA training for college students [144]. Because most of ISA 
related studies related to students were conducted in the USA, 
Australia, and that in most of the cases students from one or 
two backgrounds (disciplines) were subjects of the studies, we 
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decided to conduct an ISA assessment among students from 
different backgrounds.  
In this regard, we, first, examined the relationship of 
demographics (such as gender, age, educational background), 
cultural factors (nationality, the area of living), and individual 
factors (job experience and previous ISA training) with 
students’ perceived as well as actual ISA. Here perceived ISA 
(termed as PISA in this chapter) was the subjective measure of 
students’ ISA and was directly measured from the respondents 
on a 5-point scale (1: very low to 5: very high), whereas, 
actual ISA (termed as AISA) was a combination of knowledge 
and behaviour test score (objective knowledge and 
competency-based questions) of the students. In this regard, 
we employed a t-test, Pearson’s correlation and one-way 
ANOVA with posthoc, depending upon the type of independent 
variables (individual cultural, job experience and previous ISA 
training). A cross-section survey was conducted to collect data 
on variables described above for students of seven faculties of 
the University of Turku, Finland. Information security 
awareness, security awareness and ISA have been used 
interchangeably in this chapter.   
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: In section 
3.2 we discuss related work on ISA. Section 3.3 describes the 
methodology used in the study, followed by Results and 
Discussion in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 provides our concluding 
remarks and future recommendations. 
 
3.1 Related Work 
Information is defined as a resource, commodity, 
perception of pattern and constitutive force in our lives [151]. 
Information has some characteristics that make it valuable to 
its owner and its intended users. Some believe that 
confidentiality, integrity and availability are the important 
characteristics that should be fortified [152], whereas, for 
others availability, accuracy, authenticity, confidentiality, 
integrity, utility and its possession are the important 
characteristics of information [153]. However, in any case, 
information security ensures that the information is not 
accessed, used, disclosed, disrupted, modified, seen, recorded 
or destructed by an unauthorised entity [154]. To improve 
information security, ISA has been suggested as a tool by 
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researchers [62], [86]. In literature, ISA has been 
conceptualised differently in different contexts and this diversity 
at times frustrates information security researchers, 
practitioners and security managers [155]. Some believe ISA is 
only seeking and directing the attention of individuals to 
information security and that they should be concerned about it 
[156]–[158], while others believe that it is not just a matter of 
directing, but it is also ensuring compliance of the individuals 
[48]. 
There are several studies related to ISA assessment 
targeting the general public and the employees of 
organisations. These studies include both proprietary[159], 
[160] and academic with specific objectives. For example, 
Herath & Rao [161] discussed the role of penalties, pressures 
and perceived effectiveness in enhancing ISA in an 
organisation, Stanton et al. [162]  conducted a survey-based 
passwords related behavioural study, focused on mobile 
computing, Furnell et al. [137] assess users’ view of security 
features within different applications and Siponen, Pahnila, & 
Mahmood [163] studied information security policy related 
normative beliefs and intentions. All these studies have used 
different methods for assessing ISA. Since our context was 
higher education institutions, it was not deemed appropriate to 
use any of the methods used in the studies mentioned above. 
At the time of this study, there were students of 84 different 
nationalities studying at undergraduate and postgraduate 
degree programs in eight different faculties of our target 
university. Therefore, a questionnaire was required that should 
be easily understandable by the students from different 
educational and cultural backgrounds. Education, ISA related 
training and working experience are considered as intervening 
factors and demographics as individual factors while designing a 
human element of information security model [38]. This model 
has been developed keeping in view the employees of an 
organisation, whereas, in our case, the target population was 
university students. In another study, the roles of mother 
tongue and area of living in ISA of students are assessed [164]. 
As the first step in our investigation, we decided to examine the 
direct relationship of factors such as age, gender, nationality, 
educational level, field of study, area of living, working 
experience and information security-related training to ISA and 
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its constituent dimensions, knowledge and behaviour. In this 
paper, we call such factors as individual factors.  
Furthermore, our perusal of literature revealed that no 
single method fits all situations. However, the vocabulary test 
[79] was found most appropriate for our study. Like Kruger et 
al.’s work [79], we also considered knowledge and behaviour as 
two dimensions of ISA. Knowledge is an essential element in 
the cognitive learning process [165]. Perceived knowledge may 
not be the same as actual knowledge, but it shows how 
confident users feel regarding a phenomenon. According to 
[70], cognitive, metacognitive, affective, conative and cross-
cultural factors impact personal learning. The cognitive factor 
refers to acquiring and implementation of the knowledge. In 
[165], it is suggested that there are three cognitive skills 
necessary for effective learning experience; (1) knowledge of 
facts, processes and concepts (2) ability to apply the knowledge 
(3) ability to reason. So if a person has sufficient knowledge of 
a concept she/he can use that knowledge. Kruger & 
Kearney[69] argue that if a person is not aware of the basic 
concepts of information security, s/he is more prone to 
information security threats than the others.  
 
3.2 Methodology of ISA Assessment 
3.2.1 Objective of Study 
The objective of this study was to examine information 
security awareness among university student. For this purpose, 
two variables were defined to understand ISA:  
 
1) Perceived ISA which explains the subjective measure of 
ISA among the students (denoted as PISA in this study) 
 
2) Actual ISA which depicts the objective measure of 
awareness (denoted as AISA in this chapter) 
 
PISA was directly measured from the respondents 
whereas, AISA was computed by taking mean of knowledge and 
behaviour scores a respondent got after answering knowledge 
and competency-based questions depicting behaviour. Next, the 
respondents were divided into groups based on their 
demographics, cultural factors and individual factor and 
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examined the differences in perceived ISA, knowledge, 
behaviour and attained ISA among those groups. 
 
3.2.2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
Following are the research questions of the study: 
 
RQ1: What is the overall security awareness level among 
the students? 
 
RQ2: Who has better in security awareness among the 
students if divided based upon their demographics,  
cultural and individual factors? 
 
RQ3: What are the common sources of security 
awareness among the students?  
 
To answer RQ2 following hypothesis are created: 
 
H1: There is no gender difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) among the students 
 
H2: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) among the students 
due to the age difference. 
 
H3: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) among the students 
from a different educational level.  
 
H4: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) among the students 
from different educational discipline. 
 
H5: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) between Finnish and 
international students.  
 
H6: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) among students 
coming from rural, urban and metropolitan backgrounds. 
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H7: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) between students 
having ISA training previously and students without any 
training. 
 
H8: There is no difference in knowledge, behaviour, and 
security awareness (perceived and actual) between students 
having working experience and students having no working 
experience. 
 
3.2.3 Survey Design 
A simple descriptive case study survey design was 
adopted for this study. This design was deemed suitable as it 
allows the researcher to identify the characteristics of the 
population by asking a question(s) without studying the whole 
population. At the same time, it will enable the collection of a 
large amount of data within the particular case [166]. 
 
3.2.4 The Instrument 
A questionnaire was developed based on previous work 
[79], [167]. However, additional questions were added keeping 
in mind the target audience. While structuring the 
questionnaire, the principles of survey methodology suggested 
by Dillman (2011) were kept in mind. The full questionnaire is 
available at Appendix-A. Here the structure of the 
questionnaire is succinctly described. 
There were three major parts of the questionnaire. Part 1 
consisted of categorical questions related to age, gender, 
working experience, educational discipline, educational level, 
ISA training, country of origin and type of living area before 
joining the existing university. Measurement scales are 
described later in Section 3.3.6 (Data Analysis). 
A question was added to record the PISA of the 
respondents. PISA was measured on a 6-point Likert scale (1: 
very low to 5: very high, 6: unsure). Another question asking 
about preferred sources of information security awareness was 
also asked. The respondents could select one option from the 
academic material, family & friends, informal discussion with 
peers,  formal training, newspaper or magazine, and websites & 
search engines. 
Part 2 of the questionnaire consisted of 10 multiple 
choice questions that tested the objective knowledge of the 
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respondents regarding different threats and security incidents. 
The threats include worms, Trojan horses, spam, social 
engineering, phishing, pharming, botnets, denial of service 
attacks, zero-day attacks and security incidents. Snippet 3.1 
shows an example of a vocabulary test for the term spam. 
 
Spam is: 
a) Another word for e-mail or electronic 
messages 
b) A marketing technique 
c) Any unsolicited electronic mail 
d) All of the above 
e) I do not know what spam is 
f) I did not understand the question due 
to language 
 
Snippet 3.1: Knowledge test example for Spam 
 
It was expected that someone with a good understanding 
of the concept of spam would select option ‘c’ as the most 
appropriate answer. Unlike the work of Kruger et al. [79], we 
added the 6th option, which could be selected if the responder 
is unable to understand the question due to the language 
barrier. This question was added as English is not an official 
language in Finland and it was speculated that there could be 
issues due to language. However, there were only 12 
respondents who selected this option for some questions and 
hence their responses were excluded from data analysis. 
Part 3 of the questionnaire consisted of 10 scenario and 
competency-based questions aimed at the testing behaviour of 
the students against the threats mentioned in Part 2 as well as 
incident handling, information sharing habits in online social 
networks, email practices and password management practices. 
Snippet 3.2 shows a question, as an example, that was used 
to test behaviour for password management. According to 
Mansfield [169], behavioural questions are used as an effective 
way to discover an individual’s behaviour in a quick and precise 
manner. However, most of the behavioural questions are scale-
based and are prone to social desirability bias. To overcome this 
bias, we used scenario-based and competency-based questions. 
The instrument validity was checked through a content 
validation and reliability test. Once the questionnaire was 
designed, an expert penal consisting of three persons having a 
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background in information security and psychology examined 
the questionnaire for its content validity. Also, the successful 
use of a similar instrument in previous work by other 
researchers supports the content validity [79], [167]. Reliability 
of the instrument was measured through the Cronbach alpha 
coefficient, the value of which was found acceptable (0.61). 
 
Once a password is allotted for your 
university’s email account, you do the 
following: (Select One most suitable) 
a) I never change my default password 
b) I change it when the system asks me to 
change it 
c) I usually change it 
d) I always change it 
 
Snippet 3.2: Behaviour Test example for “Password  
Management.” 
 
3.2.5 Data Collection 
The questionnaire was uploaded online using Google 
Docs, and the link to the survey was forwarded to educational 
program coordinators in different faculties. Every faculty has its 
student mailing list, in which email addresses of all the students 
are added at the time of registration and removed upon the 
completion of their studies. The program coordinators then 
forwarded the questionnaire’s link along with an introductory 
statement to these mailing lists. In this way, the questionnaire 
link reached all the registered students in the university. At the 
time of this survey, there were 17069 students enrolled at 
undergraduate and postgraduate level (female: 60,19%, 
International students: 11,52%) [170]. The data collection 
process continued for 22 days during January 2013, and as a 
result, a sample of 614 usable responses was collected. The 
response rate from different faculties is shown in Table 3.1. 
 
3.2.6 Data Analysis 
After the data collection, data analysis was conducted to 
find out answers to the research questions. Statistical Package 
for Social Sciences (SPSS 25.0) was used for this purpose. Data 
was first coded into numerical form for the analysis in SPSS. 
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For analysis, as a first step, knowledge and behaviour 
scores were calculated. Each correct answer to knowledge and 
behaviour questions were coded as 1, whereas, a wrong answer 
was coded as 0. In certain cases, response to a knowledge and 
behaviour question was partially correct. In such cases, 
responses were coded as 0.5. So, the theoretical range of 
knowledge and behaviour scores was between 1 and 10. To 
compute actual security awareness (AISA), we took mean of 
the knowledge and behaviour scores. The theoretical range of 
AISA was also between 1 and 10. The theoretical range of PISA 
was between 0 and 5. Following scale was used for 
interpretation of knowledge, behaviour and AISA: 0-2 = very 
low, >2-4=low, >4-6=average, >6-8=high, >8-10=very high. 
The statistical tests used for testing hypothesis are shown in 
Table 3.2. 
 
Disciplines Population Sample Response 
Economics 3060 65 2.12% 
Education 1969 77 3.91% 
Humanities 3960 142 3.59% 
Law 1165 17 1.46% 
Medicine 1768 68 3.85% 
Mathematics & Natural 
Sciences  3478 203 5.84% 
Social Sciences 1669 42 2.52% 
Total 17069 614 3.60% 
Table 3.1: Student population at the time of the survey 
 
Variable Name Variable Type Test Used 
Gender Nominal (dichotomous) t-test 
Age Nominal (multi-group) ANOVA 
Educational Level Nominal (multi-group) ANOVA 
Nationality Nominal (dichotomous) t-test 
Area of Living Nominal (multi-group) ANOVA 
ISA Training Nominal (dichotomous) t-test 
Working Experience Nominal (dichotomous) t-test 
Table 3.2: Statistical test used for analysis 
3.3 Results and Discussion 
Table 3.3 shows the complete sample characteristics. 
Most of the respondents were female (57 %), which was in line 
with the overall population: females constituted 60 % of the 
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target population at the time of the study. 23.50 % of the 
respondents were international students, while at the time of 
this survey they made up 11.52 % of the total student 
population at the university. Most respondents (46.90 %) came 
from urban areas of living such as big towns and small cities. 
Surprisingly, the response rate from the bachelor’s and 
master’s students was equal and constituted the major portion 
of the sample (96.40 %). Overall, the lowest response rate was 
recorded from the students of law and social science, whereas, 
the highest number of respondents were from the humanities 
and information technology (IT). Around one fourth (24.30%) 
of the respondents have undergone information security related 
training in the past. Almost half of the students (52.60%) have 
full time or part time working experience in their field of 
studies. 
 
Factors Sample  (n=614) 
Population 
(N=17069) 
Gender  
 
Female 57 % 60.10% 
Male 43 % 39.90% 
Age  + 
Under 21 9.90 %  
21-25 48.00 %  
26-30 29.50 %  
31-40 9.40 %  
41-50 2.10 %  
Above 50 1.00 %  
Education level   
Bachelor 48.20 % 58.15% 
Master 48.20 % 31.21% 
Doctoral 3.60 % 10.64% 
Nationality   
Local (Finnish) 76.50 % 88.48% 
International 23.50 % 11.52% 
  (*IT student’s population is included in Other Natural Sciences.  
     + data for the population is not available.) 
Table 3.3: Sample Statistics of respondents for ISA study 
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Factors Sample  (n=614) 
Population 
(N=17069) 
Discipline   
Economics 10.60 % 17.93% 
Education 12.50 % 11.54% 
Humanities 23.10 % 23.20% 
Information Technology (IT) 17.30 % * 
Law 2.80 % 6.83% 
Medicine 11.10 % 10.36% 
Other Natural Sciences 15.80 % 20.38% 
Social Sciences 6.80 % 9.78% 
Living Area  + 
Rural (Small town) 33.22 %  
Urban (Big Town/small Cities) 46.90 %  
Metropolitan (Big Cities) 19.87 %  
Training  + 
Yes 24.30 %  
No 75.70 %  
Experience  + 
Yes 52.60 %  
No 47.50 %  
     (+ data for the population is not available.) 
Table 3.3 (continued): Sample Statistics of respondents for 
ISA study 
 
3.3.1 Overall Awareness 
Frequency distributions of PISA, knowledge, behaviour, 
and AISA were computed to have an overall assessment of 
knowledge, behaviour and awareness, and are shown in 
Figures 3.1 to Figure 3.4 respectively.  
 Examination of the frequency distribution of PISA 
showed that the actual range of PISA scores was the same as a 
theoretical range (that is between 1 and 5). About half of 
respondents (43%) believed that they had an average level (3) 
of ISA. 23% of the respondents thought that they had at least 
low PISA (1: very low, 2: low). Around 26% and 7% of the 
respondents believed that they had a high (4) and very high 
level (5) of PISA, respectively (for the frequency distribution of 
PISA consult Figure 3.1). The mean of PISA was 3.15 with an 
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SD of 0.92 (Min:1, Max:5). There were only 1% of respondents 
who were unsure about their security awareness level. 
 
 
      (1: very low, 5: very high) 
Figure 3.1: Frequency distribution of respondents’ PISA  
 
The frequency distribution for knowledge score is shown 
in Figure 3.2. Both theoretical range and the actual range of 
knowledge score were between 1 and 10. About 13% of the 
respondents had very low, 34% had low, 26% had an average, 
22% had high, and only 5% had very high-level security 
knowledge. 1.6% of the respondent scored 0. The most 
occurring scores were 3 (10%), whereas, the least occurring 
score was 10 (0.50%). The mean score for knowledge was 4.72 
with SD: 2.21 (Min:0, Max:10).  
 
Figure 3.2: Frequency distribution of respondents’ knowledge 
score (theoretical range 1-10) 
47 
 
 
 
Like knowledge score, the behaviour score had a 
theoretical range of 1 to 10. However, the actual range was 
found to be between 1.5 and 9.5 (consult Figure 3.3). About 
4% of respondents were of low level, 46% were average, 45% 
were high, and 4% were very high regarding security 
behaviour. Less than 1% of respondents scored very low for 
behavioural test scores. The most occurring score was 
6(14.80%), whereas the least occurring score was 1(0.20%). 
The mean for behaviour score was 6.23 with SD:1.22 (Min:0, 
Max:10). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Frequency distribution of respondents’ behaviour 
score (theoretical range: 1-10) 
 
AISA was computed by taking the mean of the 
knowledge and behaviour score, and thus, AISA’s theoretical 
range was also between 1 and 10. In AISA, 16% of the 
respondents scored low, 51% scored average, 30% scored 
high, and only 3% scored very high. The most occurring score 
was 5 and 5.25 (about 8% each), whereas, the least occurring 
score was 2.25 and 9 (0.20% each). For frequency distribution 
consult Figure 3.4. The mean AISA score was 5.48 with 
SD:1.36 (Min:0, Max:10). 
Based on the above results, we can conclude that most 
respondents perceived to have average or higher security 
awareness. Regarding objective knowledge, about half of the 
respondents (53%) score average or higher. In the behavioural 
test, respondents had a better score as compared to the 
objective measure of knowledge. 95% of the respondents had 
an average or higher score for the behaviour. In actual ISA, 
which is a combination of knowledge and behaviour, 84% of the 
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respondents were average or higher regarding security  
awareness. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Frequency distribution of respondents’ AISA  
(theoretical range: 1-10; AISA mean score on x-axis) 
 
3.3.2 Gender Differences 
To examine gender differences in PISA, knowledge, 
behaviour and AISA, we ran a series of t-tests. The results for 
gender-differences are shown in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 shows that males were found to be better 
regarding information security knowledge, behaviour, PISA and 
AISA. The differences were statistically significant (at p<0.001) 
in all the cases. Thus, our hypothesis (H1) could not be 
supported, as there is a significant difference in knowledge, 
behaviour and awareness (perceived and actual) between male 
and female students.  
 
Variables 
Male  
(N=264) 
Female 
(N=350) t p* 
M SD M SD 
PISA 3.53 0.96 2.86 0.79 9.071 <0,001 
Knowledge 5.79 2.14 3.91 1.90 11.246 <0,001 
Behaviour 6.43 1.23 6.07 1.19 3.664 <0,001 
AISA 6.11 1.32 4.99 1.17 10.868 <0,001 
     (* at p<0.05) 
Table 3.4: t-test statistics showing gender differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA  
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3.3.3 Differences due to Age 
The age of the respondents was measured in 6 groups: 
Under 21, 21-25, 26-30, 31-40, 40-50 and Above 50. Table 3.3 
shows that some respondents in “40 and above” groups were 
very few (about 3%) and thus removed from the analysis. We 
compared students of four groups only. ANOVA was run to 
ascertain if there are differences among the different groups, 
whereas, a post-hoc test was also employed to pinpoint where 
exactly the difference is coming. The descriptive, as well as 
ANOVA statistics, are shown in Table 3.5. From the table, we 
can conclude that there is a statistically significant difference in 
knowledge and perceived awareness (PISA) among student 
belonging to different age groups, however, no difference was 
found in case of behaviour or actual awareness (AISA). 
 
Variables Age Group N Mean SD f p* 
PISA 
U 21 60 2.95 0.77 
3.358 0.019 
21-25 290 3.08 0.90 
26-30 179 3.26 0.95 
31-40 58 3.36 1.07 
Total 587 3.15 0.92 
Knowledge  
U 21 61 4.11 2.21 
3.474 0.016 
21-25 295 4.65 2.22 
26-30 181 5.02 2.13 
31-40 58 5.15 2.35 
Total 595 4.76 2.22 
Behaviour  
U 21 61 6.10 1.12 
0.742 0.528 
21-25 295 6.27 1.20 
26-30 181 6.22 1.20 
31-40 58 6.05 1.34 
Total 595 6.22 1.21 
AISA 
U 21 61 5.11 1.27 
2.402 0.067 
21-25 295 5.46 1.37 
26-30 181 5.62 1.32 
31-40 58 5.60 1.43 
Total 595 5.49 1.35 
       (* p<0.05) 
Table 3.5: ANOVA statistics showing differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA due to age  
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In Table 3.5, we can see that there is a significant 
difference in perceived awareness (PISA) between the groups 
(F (3, 3.583) = 3.358, p=0.019). An LSD post hoc test revealed 
that “under 21” students significantly differ in PISA from 
students of age group “26-30” (Mean difference=-0.313, 
p=0.02), and students of age group “31-40” (Mean 
difference=-0.412, p=0.016). No significant difference was 
found between students of “under 21” and “21-25” age groups. 
Moreover, students of age group “21-25” significantly differ 
from students of age group “26-30” (Mean difference=-0.180, 
p=0.04), and students of age group “31-40” (Mean 
difference=-0.279, p=0.03). The difference between students 
with age group “26-30” and “31-40” was statistically 
insignificant. So, we can conclude that students of age “under 
21 to 25” were different in perceived awareness from students 
of age group “26-40”.  
The difference of knowledge among the groups was also 
found significantly different (F (3, 3.591) = 3.474, p=0.016). 
An LSD post hoc test showed that “under 21” students were 
significantly different in knowledge from students of age group 
“26-30” (Mean difference: -0.91, p=0.005) and students of age 
group “31-40” (Mean difference: -1.04, p=0.01). No significant 
difference was found between students of age group “under 21” 
and “21-25”. Moreover, students belonging to age groups 21-
25, 26-30 and 31-40 were not different from one another 
regarding knowledge. No significant differences were found 
among students of the different age group in behaviour or 
AISA.  
Based upon above results, we may conclude that 
students, if divided into age groups (under 21, 21-25, 26-30 
and 31-40), differ significantly in PISA and knowledge and not 
in behaviour or AISA. Younger students (age under 21 to 25) 
perceived to have significantly lesser awareness (PISA) as 
compared to older students (age 26 to 40). Regarding 
knowledge, the younger students (aged under 21) found to 
have lesser security knowledge as compared to elder groups 
(21 to 40).  
 
3.3.4 Difference due to Educational Level 
As shown in Table 3.3, students’ educational level was 
measured regarding their class: Bachelor, masters and 
doctoral. However, for the sake of analysis students of master 
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and doctoral levels were merged and two groups: 
undergraduate and post-graduate were created. a t-test was 
employed to test the hypothesis. The results from the t-test are 
shown in Table 3.6. 
 
Variables 
Undergraduate 
(N=296) 
Post-
graduate 
(N=318) t p 
M SD M SD 
PISA 3.13 0.87 3.16 0.98 -0.398 0.69 
Knowledge 4.59 2.16 4.84 2.25 -1.434 0.15 
Behaviour 6.26 1.23 6.20 1.21 0.597 0.55 
AISA 5.42 1.34 5.52 1.37 -0.900 0.36 
(* p<0.05) 
Table 3.6: t-statistics showing differences in PISA, knowledge, 
behaviour and AISA due to educational level 
 
From the results in Table 3.6, we can see that our 
hypothesis H3 is supported, that is, there is no difference in 
knowledge, behaviour, perceived and actual awareness due to 
educational level.  
 
3.3.5 Differences due to Educational Disciplines 
As shown in Table 3.3, students from eight faculties 
responded to the survey. However, the number of responses 
was not uniform across the disciplines. Among the respondents, 
6.80% belonged to social sciences whereas only 2.80% 
belonged to the law faculty. Because we were applying ANOVA 
test, a small sub-sample may not yield any important results 
and, therefore, we did not include students from social sciences 
and law in the ANOVA test. The results of the ANOVA test are 
shown in Table 3.7. 
Based upon statistics given in Table 3.7, hypothesis H4 
is rejected, as there are significant differences in knowledge 
(F(5, 549)= 31.008, p<0.001)), behaviour (F(5, 549)=2.906, 
p=0.013)), PISA (F(5, 541)= 13.908, p<0.001)) and AISA (F(5, 
549)= 26.446, p<0.001))) among the students belonging to 
different disciplines. 
The highest PISA was found among IT students 
(Mean:3.79, SD:0.89). The difference in PISA was significantly 
different from PISA of students from other disciplines at p<0.05 
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(IT>Economics=Medicine>NaturalSci.>Humanities>Education). 
PISA was not found statistically significantly different among 
students of other disciplines.  
 
Variables Disciplines N Mean f p 
PISA Economics 65 3.09 13.908 <0.001 
Education 76 2.84 
Humanities 139 3.02 
IT 105 3.79 
Medicine 67 3.09 
Natural Sci. 95 3.03 
Total 547 3.16 
Knowledge Economics 65 4.90 31.008 <0.001 
Education 77 3.56 
Humanities 142 4.19 
IT 106 6.77 
Medicine 68 4.41 
Natural Sci. 97 4.75 
Total 555 4.80 
Behaviour  Economics 65 5.97 2.906 0.013 
Education 77 6.09 
Humanities 142 6.15 
IT 106 6.60 
Medicine 68 6.16 
Natural Sci. 97 6.26 
Total 555 6.23 
AISA Economics 65 5.44 26,446 <0.001 
Education 77 4.82 
Humanities 142 5.18 
IT 106 6.69 
Medicine 68 5.29 
Natural Sci. 97 5.50 
Total 555 5.52 
(* p<0.05) 
Table 3.7: ANOVA statistics showing differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA due to educational discipline 
 
The knowledge score for IT students was also found 
significantly higher (Mean difference ranges from 1.86 to 3.20) 
than students from other disciplines (at p<0.05). However, in 
the case of knowledge, a statistically significant difference in 
mean score was also found between economics and education 
students (Mean difference: 1.34, p<0.01), economics and 
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humanities students (Mean difference: 0.71, p=0.016), 
Education and humanities students (Mean difference: -0.63, 
p=0.02), Education and medicine students (Mean difference:  
-0.84, p=0.01) and humanities and natural sciences students 
(Mean difference: -0.55, p<0.01). 
Like knowledge scores, the behaviour score of IT 
students was also found significantly higher than the rest of the 
students (Mean difference ranges from 0.34 to 0.63 at p<0.05). 
However, no statistically significant difference in behaviour was 
found among students from other disciplines.  
IT students were also found better than students from 
other disciplines in actual awareness (AISA) (Mean difference 
ranges from 1.18 to 1.86, at p<0.05). Among other disciplines, 
students of economics were found different from education 
students (Mean difference=0.61, p=0.003). Education students 
were also found different from humanities (Mean  
difference = -0.35, p=0.046), medicine (Mean  
difference=-0.46, p=0.026) and natural sciences students 
(Mean difference=-0.68, p<0.01). Moreover, students of 
Humanities were found different from natural sciences students 
(Mean     difference=-0.33, p=0.044).  
In short, there was a statistically significant difference in 
PISA, knowledge, behaviour and AIA of students from a 
different discipline. The difference was mainly because of the 
high scores of IT students in all four variables. However, 
regarding knowledge differences were found among students of 
other subjects as well. 
 
3.3.6 Differences due to Country of Origin 
Our case university is an international country where 
students of different nationalities are studying in various 
disciplines. To examine, if there is a difference of knowledge, 
behaviour, perceived and actual awareness in local and 
international students, a t-test was run. The results from the t-
test are shown in Table 3.8. 
Based on results given in Table 3.8, it can be concluded 
that there was only a statistically significant difference in case 
of behaviour (p<0.05). No statistically significant difference in 
PISA, knowledge and AISA of local and international students. 
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Variables 
Local 
(N=470) 
International 
(N=144) t p 
M SD M SD 
PISA 3.19 0.89 3.02 1.02 1.897 0.06 
Knowledge 4.72 2.20 4.72 2.27 -0.042 0.97 
Behaviour 6.29 1.23 6.05 1.15 2.014 0.04 
AISA 5.50 1.37 5.39 1.31 0.870 0.39 
    (* p<0.05) 
Table 3.8: T-statistics showing differences in PISA, knowledge, 
behaviour and AISA due to the country of origin 
 
3.3.7 Differences due to Area of Living 
In addition to country of origin, students were also asked 
to provide information on the type of area they had been living 
at the time of schooling before joining the current university. 
They could select one option from “rural”, “urban” and 
“metropolitan”. To examine the difference in knowledge, 
behaviour, perceived and attained behaviour that may arise due 
to the difference in areas of living, ANOVA test was conducted. 
The results of the ANOVA test are shown in Table 3.9. 
The results of the ANOVA test show that no significant 
difference in knowledge, behaviour, perceived and actual 
awareness was found among students coming from rural, urban 
or metropolitan areas (significance at p<0.05). Therefore, we 
accept our hypothesis H6. 
 
3.3.7 Differences due to Previous Training 
To ascertain if a previous ISA related training affects 
knowledge, behaviour, perceived and actual awareness of the 
students, we ran an independent sample t-test. The groups 
were: students who have previously undergone ISA related 
training and students who have not undergone any ISA related 
training. The results of the t-test are shown in Table 3.10. The 
t-statistics show that students who previously had ISA training 
were better regarding knowledge, behaviour, perceived and 
actual awareness, and the difference between training and 
untrained students was statistically significant. Therefore, 
hypothesis H7 was rejected. 
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Variables Area N M SD f p 
PISA 
Rural 202 3.12 0.88 
1.978 0,139 Urban 284 3.11 0.91 Metro. 120 3.30 1.04 
Total 606 3.15 0.93 
Knowledge 
Rural 204 4.53 2.21 
2.829 0.060 Urban 288 4.68 2.15 Metro. 122 5.13 2.33 
Total 614 4.72 2.22 
Behavior 
Rural 204 6.20 1.30 
1.1330 0.265 Urban 288 6.31 1.19 
Metro. 122 6.10 1.17 
Total 614 6.23 1.22 
AISA 
Rural 204 5.37 1.39 
2.366 0.278 Urban 288 5.50 1.31 Metro. 122 5.61 1.42 
Total 614 5.48 1.36 
  (* p<0.05) 
Table 3.9: ANOVA statistics showing differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA due to the area of living 
 
 
Variables 
Trained 
 (N=149) 
Untrained 
(N=465) t p 
M SD M SD 
PISA 3.78 0.87 2.95 0.85 -10.274 <0.01 
Knowledge 6.15 2.08 4.26 2.05 -9.706 <0.01 
Behaviour 6.45 1.25 6.15 1.20 -2.593 <0.01 
AISA 6.30 1.34 5.21 1.25 -9.090 <0.01 
(* p<0.05) 
Table 3.10: t-statistics showing differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA due to previous ISA training 
 
3.3.8 Differences due to Work Experience 
University students usually work along with their studies, 
especially international students. Since organisations have 
information security mechanism emplaced, it is highly likely 
that a student who is doing a job has got some information 
security awareness at his/her job place. To ascertain if there is 
a difference of knowledge, behaviour, perceived and actual 
security awareness among students who are working beside 
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their studies, and the ones who do not work, we ran a t-test. 
The results of the t-test are shown in Table 3.11. 
The t-statistics show that students who were employed 
along with their studies were different from the students who 
were not employed in case of PISA only. In other cases, no 
significant difference was found. Since it was not asked what 
type of jobs was done by the students, it is difficult to ascertain 
if students have information security-related training at their 
workplaces.  
 
Variables 
Employed 
(N=323) 
Unemployed 
(N=286) t p 
M SD M SD 
PISA 3.23 0.94 3.06 0.90 2.288 0.023 
Knowledge 4.86 2.27 4.57 2.14 1.577 0.115 
Behaviour 6.19 1.24 6.28 1.19 -0.872 0.382 
AISA 5.52 1.41 5.42 1.29 0.896 0.370 
(* p<0.05) 
Table 3.11: T-statistics showing differences in PISA, 
knowledge, behaviour and AISA due to work experience 
 
3.3.9 Preferred Sources of Awareness 
We observed from the results of the study that there 
were significant differences in perceived ISA, knowledge, 
behaviour and actual ISA due to gender and educational 
discipline and previously taken ISA training. It was found that 
male was better than female students; IT students were better 
than non-IT students and already trained students were better 
than untrained students, it would be interesting to see if there 
is the difference in preferred sources of ISA among the student 
from different backgrounds. The respondents were also asked 
to mention the sources from where they have gained some 
form of ISA. Figure 3.5 shows students’ preferences of sources 
of ISA in percentage. 
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Figure 3.5: Preferred Sources of Security Awareness among 
the Students (in percentage). 
 
Application of the chi-square test was performed to 
explore the relationship between gender, educational discipline 
and Trained/untrained students. Educational disciplines were 
divided into two groups: IT vs Non-IT.  
The relationship between gender and preferred source of 
ISA was found statistically significant, X2(5, N=319) = 21.247, 
p=0.001. More male than female students (57% vs 34%) 
prefer to learn ISA from websites and search engines, whereas, 
more female than male students (29% vs 16%) prefer to learn 
through informal discussions with the peers.  
Moreover, the relationship between educational discipline 
(IT vs Non-IT) and preferred source of ISA was also statistically 
significant, X2(5, N=319) = 20.102, p=0.001.  More IT students 
than Non-IT students (14% vs 3%) prefer to learn ISA from 
academic sources such as books, journals.  
Lastly, the relationship between previous ISA training 
and preferred source of ISA was also found statistically 
significant, X2(5, N=319) = 20.858, p=0.00. A further 
examination showed that more untrained students than trained 
students (26% vs 15%) prefer to learn ISA through informal 
discussions with peers.  
 
3.3.10 Relationship of Perceived and Actual 
Awareness 
 Since we collected data to examine perceived as well as 
the actual awareness, it was decided to examine the 
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relationship of perceived security awareness with knowledge, 
behaviour and the actual security awareness. For this purpose, 
we ran a Pearson’s correlation tests and examined scatter plots. 
The relationship between PISA and knowledge, PISA and 
behaviour and PISA and AISA are shown in Figure 3.6, 3.7 
and 3.8 respectively. In the figures, the dotted lines depict 
mean confidence interval. The value of correlation coefficient 
(r), significance (p) and the coefficient of determination (R2) in 
each case are also given in the caption of the figures. 
 In Figure 3.6, we can see there is a positive relationship 
between perceived security awareness and security knowledge. 
The strength of association was moderate but significant 
(r=0.50, p<0.05). It means as the PISA of students increases 
(from very low to very high), the security knowledge of 
students also increases (from very low to very high). So, we 
can see that the students who perceived to have high perceived 
security awareness, had a high level of security knowledge. In 
this regard, 24% of the variance in knowledge is explained by 
perceived security awareness of the users (R2=0.24).  
 
 
Figure 3.6: Relationship between Perceived Security       
Awareness and Security Knowledge (r=0.50, p<0.05, R2=0.24) 
 
In the case of behaviour, the correlation between PISA 
and behaviour was found to be positive as well. However, the 
relationship was weak but significant (r=0.13, p=0.002). From 
the correlation coefficient, we can say that students having high 
perceived security awareness had better security behaviour. 
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However, the weak correlation suggests that the relationship 
between the variables above is weak. In other words, a student 
having high perceived security awareness may not behave 
securely as compared to students having low perceived security 
awareness. The scatterplot showing the relationship between 
perceived security awareness and security behaviour is shown 
in Figure 3.7.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Relationship between Perceived Security       
Awareness and Security Behaviour (r=0.13, p=0.002, R2=0.02) 
 
The relationship between perceived security awareness 
and actual security awareness was found to significant (at 
p<0.05). The correlation was moderate (r=0.46), whereas, 
21% of the variance in actual security awareness could be 
explained by the perceived security awareness. The scatter plot 
showing the relationship between perceived and actual security 
awareness is shown in Figure 3.8. This relationship indicates 
that the students who have high perceived security awareness 
have a high actual security awareness. It is pertinent to 
mention that since actual security awareness is a combination 
of knowledge and behaviour, probably it is the knowledge score 
that is the reason behind a high level of association. 
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Figure 3.8: Relationship between Perceived Security       
Awareness and Actual Security Awareness (r=0.46, p<0.05, 
R2=0.21) 
 
3.4 Summary 
In this chapter, we have presented the result of a study 
assessing Information Security Awareness (ISA) among the 
students in a multicultural, multidisciplinary Finnish university. 
The study was conducted using a questionnaire where 614 valid 
responses were collected from all the seven faculties of the 
target university. The target was to get a general 
understanding of ISA and to examine the relationship of 
different factors such as age, gender, educational level, 
disciplines, nationality, the area of living, working experience 
and information security training may impact ISA. In the study, 
ISA was measured both subjectively (Perceived security 
awareness) and objectively (actual security awareness). The 
actual security awareness consisted of two dimensions: security 
knowledge and security behaviour. Perceived security 
awareness was directly measured from the respondents on a 5-
point scale, whereas, the actual security awareness was mean 
of the knowledge and behaviour scores respondents received in 
the knowledge and behavioural test (questionnaire). 
In general, the measured knowledge correlated with 
security behaviour (r=0.18, p<0.05), but the actual impact was 
surprisingly low. Although the actual behaviour is difficult to 
measure using a questionnaire due to social desirability bias, 
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we tried to minimise this bias by using scenario-based 
questions measuring behaviour. During the analysis, we found 
that  
perceived security awareness correlates with security 
knowledge, security behaviour and actual security awareness of 
the respondents. While these relationships were statistically 
significant, perceived security awareness explained significant 
variance in security knowledge (R2=0.24) and actual security 
awareness (R2=0.21). So, we can assume that users considered 
perceived security awareness as a proxy of security knowledge. 
However, the same may not be right for the actual security 
awareness, as in our case, actual security awareness was a 
combination of security knowledge and security behaviour and 
thus the correlation of perceived and actual security awareness 
maybe because to moderate correlation between perceived 
security awareness and security knowledge. 
Overall, the majority (76%) of the students perceived to 
average or higher security awareness, whereas a large portion 
(47%) of respondents scored a low score in the knowledge 
testing. On the opposite, only 4% of the respondents had low 
scores in behaviour testing. From this we may conclude that 
perhaps students were not aware of the threats. However, they 
have learnt specific security-related behaviours from different 
sources and adopted as it is. 
 Among the demographics, gender had a substantial 
impact on ISA. Overall, the male students got better scores 
than the female ones, especially in the knowledge part. Age-
wise, the younger students (under the age of 25) perceived to 
have lesser security awareness, whereas knowledge-wise 
students of age 21 and below had less knowledge of security 
threats as compared to older students. No difference in security 
behaviour or actual security awareness was found due to age. 
Quite surprising no differences in perceived or actual security 
awareness (including security knowledge and behaviours) were 
observed due to the difference in educational level. The effect 
of the educational discipline in question was surprisingly low. 
The only exception was information technology (IT) students 
who performed better than the rest.  
To examine the impact of cultural diversity on ISA, we 
used two proxy variables: nationality and area of living. On 
average, Finnish students received a bit higher scores than 
international students. However, the only significant difference 
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was in case of security behaviours. This result was impacted by 
the fact that the number of international students was the 
highest in the IT Discipline. In many faculties, international 
students are in practice non-existent. Further, no difference in 
perceived or actual security awareness was found among 
students who came from a rural, urban or metropolitan 
background. 
Previous security awareness training was found to be 
another variable which has a substantial impact on the 
perceived and actual security awareness after gender. The 
students who had a security awareness training were found to 
be significantly better than untrained students in all the four 
variables under study. Highest impact was seen perceive 
security awareness and security knowledge. Moreover, working 
experience impacted only to perceive security awareness. 
Lastly, websites and search engines were found to be the 
most preferred source for security awareness among the 
students. However, there have been some differences in 
preferences among male and female students, IT and non-IT 
students, and previously trained and untrained students. 
Websites and search engines were the most preferred source of 
security awareness among the male students, whereas, female 
students prefer to learn through informal discussions with their 
peers. IT students prefer to learn from academic materials such 
as books and journals. And, the students who did not have any 
security-related training prefer to learn from informal 
discussions, just like female students. 
In next chapter, a sequential mixed method study for 
identifying students’ security concerns have been presented. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Identification of 
Students’ Information 
Security Concerns: A 
Sequential Exploratory 
Study  
 
 
In the previous chapter, we examined relationship of different 
factors with perceived awareness, actual awareness and 
security behaviour of the students. This chapter describes a 
two-phased study wherein using a mixed method sequential 
design, identifying students’ concerns related to their 
information security and unveiled the areas where students 
perceived to have information security risks. This chapter is 
related to O2 of the thesis. 
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Humans are often considered as the weakest link in 
security [5]. It has been found the time and again that 
adequate information security is not possible only by 
implementing technical measures and requires the users to be 
mindful of security threats and measures. A variety of technical 
[9] and non-technical measures [11], [12], [58], [62] have 
been suggested to safeguard organisational and individual 
security.  However, users often fail to take the necessary 
measures and actions [97]. Organisations invest heavily on 
their information security. For example, organisations have 
security policies in place, have dedicated staff looking after 
information security issues, and management employ variety of 
“stick and carrot” tactics, such are awareness training, 
incentives, monitoring and deterrence approach to motivate 
employees [171]. However, home-users or users who are not 
employed do not have the same facilities or resources and, 
thus, make decisions by themselves. While existing security 
literature has been predominantly focussed on organisational 
context [171], [172], security researchers have turned their 
focus to home-users [172]. In recent years, some studies have 
been published focussing on the information security of the 
home-users, for example, [98], [173]–[175].   
Like in any other organisation, information security is one 
of the concerns for the educational institutions [176]. 
Information security has been ranked as one of the top areas of 
concerns for educational institutions in the United States [147]. 
The availability of vast amounts of computing power and open 
access has attracted the attention of malicious entities towards 
higher educational institutions (HEIs) [146] (HEIs are referred 
as institutions imparting post-secondary education, such as 
universities and colleges). However, HEIs are considered to 
have inadequate protection regarding the security of their 
information assets [26]. 
A variety of technical [9] and non-technical measures 
[11], [12], [58], [62] have been suggested to safeguard 
organisational and individual security. Security education, 
training, and awareness (SETA) programs are suggested as a 
tool to improve information security awareness of the users 
[144]. ISA has been considered as one of the defences against 
continuously evolving threat landscape, and a way to mitigate 
security attacks [54], [177]–[179]. Information security 
awareness (ISA) enables a user to understand his role in the 
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security process and encourages her/him to take necessary 
measures for his, as well as his peers, information security 
[54], [155]. The importance of ISA is similar for a different type 
of users, be it employees of an organisation [37], [180], or 
home users [86], [98], or the students [73], [144], [181].  
According to the Concerns-based Adoption Model (CBAM) 
[182], having a concern is first to step towards change and to 
learn new behaviour. If a person is concerned about a 
phenomenon, s/he will try to get awareness about it leading to 
a stage where he will be able to adopt the change or learn the 
required skill. Keeping in view the importance of ISA, 
researchers have studied the concept thoroughly, including its 
antecedents as well as the consequences [34]. However, in 
most of the available studies, security experts identify an area 
where ISA is to be assessed and improved, based upon their 
expert knowledge, and end-users (employees, home-users, 
students) are involved in the assessment phase. Research 
shows that perceptions of threats play an important role toward 
(in)action of the end-users that would ensure or endanger the 
information security of users [183]. Users have different mental 
models related to information security threats [184], and 
resultantly threats are perceived differently. Therefore, we 
suggest that end-users’ concerns be taken into consideration at 
the time of identifying areas where ISA is to be assessed and 
improved. If we can understand the users’ security concerns, 
their prevalence and variation, the whole ISA process can be 
improved. 
In this regard, a two-phase study was conducted to 
explore students’ perceptions of information security threats 
systematically. In doing so, in the first phase, opinions on 
perceived security threats and countermeasures were collected 
from a group of forty-two master’s IT degree students. Using 
an inductive approach and content analysis seventy-four 
different concerns related to information were identified. In the 
second phase, a diverse group of students belonging to 
different educational backgrounds were asked to rate those 
concerns. Factor analysis was used to examine the underlying 
structure of the concerns. We found that students’ information 
security concerns can be divided into 11 factors, each depicting 
an area of concern. These areas are related to personal, social, 
institutional, technological and non-technological aspects of 
students’ lives.  
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Rest of the chapter is organised as follow: Section 4.2 
provides the importance of information security awareness 
among the students, followed by a review of current studies on 
information security of students in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 
narrates the methodology used in the study. Findings from the 
first and second phases are given in Section 4.5 and 4.6 
respectively. The conclusion is given in Section 4.7.  
 
4.1 Information Security Awareness and  
Students 
Like in any other organisation, information security is one 
of the concerns for the educational institutions [176]. 
Information security has been ranked as one of the top areas of 
concerns for educational institutions in the United States [147]. 
The availability of vast amounts of computing power and open 
access has attracted the attention of malicious entities towards 
higher educational institutions (HEIs) [146]. HEIs, university, 
institution and educational institutions have been used in this 
paper, all referring to institutions imparting post-secondary 
education (bachelor’s level and above). However, HEIs are 
considered to have inadequate protection regarding the security 
of their information assets [26]. To up-lift the information 
security defences of the HEIs, it is essential that both 
employees and students exhibit secure behaviour. 
Students make a large portion of HEIs and are at high 
risk and attractive candidates for information security attacks 
[185]. Students are a peculiar set of internet users. Students 
are although one sub-set of internet users groups, however, 
their access and usage of internet and computer may be 
dissimilar to other sub-groups such as non-home users (NHU) 
and home-users (HU) [86]. NHU are employees of an 
organisation and mostly access the internet and computers 
from their workplace. NHU’s use of the Internet is usually under 
a watchful eye of IT and security staff to ensure nothing is 
being done outside rules and regulations of the organisation, 
including information security.  
On the other hand, HU does not have any such oversight 
guaranteeing their information security. In a typical setting, 
some users share characteristics of a HU as well as NHU [86]. 
Students fall into a similar category (Figure 4.1). Like any 
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organisation, end-users’ of HEIs (employees and students) are 
provided with security tools and instructions and warned about 
the security issues. However, university management does not 
have the same level of control over students’ security practices 
as they have in case of employees [186]. 
In the quest for comprehensive security for HEI, a multi-
layered security approach is required where users are required 
to take more than one measure to safeguard their information 
security [187]. Missing one or more measures will leave the 
loophole in the defence. Therefore, an insecure behaviour on 
the part of students can expose them, their peers, and their 
HEIs to a variety of information security threats. Moreover, they 
are going to be work-force to different organisations. If they 
continue with their insecure behaviour, it will eventually create 
troubles for the organisations as well.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Home-users (HU), Non-Home Users (NHU) and 
Students (Adapted from [86]) 
 
4.2 Current Studies on Information Security of 
Students 
While literature is full of studies focusing on the 
information security of NHU, HU has also caught the eyes of the 
researchers. However, security issues of students, who have 
been used as proxies for both HU and NHU in the literature 
quite often, has not been examined as thoroughly as other user 
groups (For the definitions of NHU and HU, please consult 
previous). The researchers have studied ISA of students in 
isolation, that is, within one component or area such as 
password-related behaviour [162], application security in 
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computers [137] or smartphone security [188]; while others 
took a more holistic  approach where more than one 
components/areas were used for assessing ISA [38], [189]. 
There is a need to identify a set of areas related to the day-to-
day life of users where their information security can be 
jeopardised. Such areas then combined with areas identified by 
the security experts can provide a comprehensive set of areas 
where ISA of the users can be improved. 
The use of computers and the internet is probably more 
pervasive among students than the other two sub-groups. 
Students use computers and the internet for a wide range of 
activities including accessing emails, completing educational 
activities, performing financial transactions and socialising 
[190]. Like other internet users, also students’ information 
security is also at risk due to evolving information security 
threats. Students learn information security knowledge from a 
variety of sources such as websites and search engines, formal 
training, informal discussions with their peers, books and 
journals [181].  
Examination of existing literature on information security 
of students highlights the areas where, in security experts’ 
opinion, students’ information security is at risk. These areas 
include system security, email practices, password practices, 
threats/attacks knowledge, institutional policies, data security 
and privacy, cloud services, online social networks, network 
security, web/internet browsing, information sharing, device 
security, and mobile phones (refer to Table 4.1 for detail). The 
areas above are not mentioned as areas in all these studies. 
However, the areas are depicted by the statements and items 
used to study perceptions, knowledge, practices and behaviours 
of the users.   
From the review of the literature, we found that there 
was only one study where students’ perception was examined 
by collecting data directly from the students using interviews 
[191]. Otherwise, in all other studies, students were given 
statements regarding particular action (practices/ behaviours) 
and asked to respond on the ordinal or categorical scale. In the 
identified studies, the security experts/researchers identified 
the areas and actions within those areas and later on, students 
gave their opinions.  
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Areas Action Studied and References 
System 
Security 
Antivirus use/installation/updating and  
the frequency of scan; Ad blocker; Firewall use; 
Intrusion detection system use; computer  
security tools use; OS/software update;  
Patches and updates;  anti-spyware use; UPS 
use; Password use; log off behaviour; pen drive 
scanning [74], [144], [174], [186], [192]–[202]  
Email 
Practices 
 
Opening email from an unknown sender;         
reporting suspicious email; opening  
attachments from an unknown sender; opening  
attachments without scanning; open non-
suspicious email from strangers; opening 
interesting emails without concern; verifying 
sender before opening an attachment; use of a 
password on attachment; clicking on unknown 
email links; scanning email attachments before 
opening; delete suspicious emails without  
reading [144], [174], [193]–[195], [198], 
[201], [202]  
Threat/ 
Knowledge 
Knowledge concepts (worms, Trojan horse, 
spam, social engineering, phishing, pharming, 
botnets, denial of service attack, zero-day  
attack, security incidents) [73], [191], [193], 
[199], [203]–[207]  
Services Using cloud apps; awareness of security and privacy issues in cloud computing [74], [199] 
Passwords 
writing down password; sharing passwords; 
using of the multifaceted authentication  
system; changing passwords 
frequently/regularly; emailing passwords; strong 
password characteristics; using different 
passwords on different systems; password 
management  
practices (changing default password,  
changing with system asks, usually change it, 
always change); keeping password secret;  
creating passwords not easy to guess(strong 
passwords) [73], [144], [174], [193], [195]–
[197], [201], [202], [204]–[206], [208], [209]  
Table 4.1: Existing Studies on Students’ Information 
Security 
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Areas Action Studied and References 
Policies 
Opinion on college policy (password length,    
complexity,  changing and reusability); 
Awareness of university’s policy on  
(safeguarding passwords, virus protection, 
VPN, authentication on a university network) 
[193], [209] 
Data 
Use of encryption; taking backups;  
frequency of taking backups; data privacy; 
knowing risk of     peer-to-peer file sharing 
[73], [74], [192], [196]–[198], [206], 
[209], [210]  
Online  
Social  
Networks 
Risk acceptance in giving up privacy against   
convenience; impact awareness of giving up 
privacy against convenience; awareness of 
risk from the reduction of privacy for  
increased convenience; awareness of  
information breaches [74], [199] 
Network Awareness of WiFi security  [192] 
Web 
Browsing 
Risk awareness of downloading random  
programs or files; use of pop-up blocker; 
awareness of unsafe website [144], [194], 
[209]  
Device 
Awareness of personal devices, textbooks 
security; anti-theft/fraud; pen drive  
scanning [196], [211] 
Smart 
Phone 
Harmful behaviour; protection through  
add-on and mobile phone settings; disaster 
recovery; viruses; use of anti-virus; 
knowledge of encryption; enabling sim pin 
code; screen password, Bluetooth disable; 
phone sharing; not saving passwords on the 
phone; not saving personal data on the  
phone; software update; installing third-
party software; responding to email/SMS 
[73], [206], [210], [212], [213]  
Info  
sharing Sharing credentials online [196], [207] 
Table 4.1 (Continued): Existing Studies on Students’ 
Information Security 
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4.3 Methodology for Identifying Concerns 
4.3.1 Research Question 
The purpose of this study was to identify information 
security concerns of the students and to examine if there is a 
difference in concerns among students from different 
backgrounds. Following questions were defined for the study: 
 
RQ: What are information security concerns among 
the students in HEI context? 
 
4.3.2 Study Design 
End user’s point of view can be gathered using qualitative 
or quantitative methods. However, rather than using either 
qualitative or quantitative approach, data from the students 
were collected and analysed using both qualitative and 
quantitative approaches. The mixed method approach provided 
us with rather rich data for the analysis. A sequential mixed 
method design consisting of two phases (qualitative and 
quantitative) was used for data collection and analysis.  
With the help of this design, we first collected the data 
from a group of forty-two master’s degree IT security students 
enrolled in a course focused on the human element in 
information security, using open-ended question. The 
qualitative approach allowed the researchers to gather rich and 
detailed explanations of complex phenomena and help in 
revealing the context  [214]. Data collected through such 
approaches also provide an understanding of the experiences, 
the attitudes and, aims at answering “what?” questions about a 
phenomenon [215]. Researchers often use a group of field 
experts to identify different issues within a domain, for 
example, Kraemer, Carayon, & Clem [216] used the same 
methodology to identify and describe human and organisational 
factors related to computer and information security. However, 
since we wanted to keep this study free from expert opinion, we 
selected a group of master’s degree IT security students. 
Master’s degree IT security students are trained in the security 
and privacy domain, and soon they are supposed to assume 
responsibilities as security professionals. Thus, we assumed 
that master’s degree IT students would have better knowledge 
of information security and privacy threats as compared to 
other disciplines. Two researchers in information security 
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examined the collected data. The examination resulted in 
identifying seventy-four students’ perceived threats and 
vulnerabilities, hereafter called concerns. 
In the second phase, a survey was conducted among 
students of higher education to ascertain if the identified 
concerns were valid for a broader population of the students. 
The students were recruited from a multidisciplinary Finnish 
University. Views of four hundred and seventeen students 
(N=417) were collected in this regard. The collected data was 
checked for the quality and reduced to a usable sample of 
N=354. The usable sample was then analysed using the 
descriptive statistics (mean, median, mode and standard 
deviations). Principal Component Analysis using principal axis 
factoring with oblique rotation was used to identify underlying 
factors in the data [217]. These factors depicted the focus 
areas where students perceived to have information security 
concerns. In this way, we identified 14 focus areas. The 
sequential study design, showing the phases, the procedure 
and the outputs, is shown in Figure 4.2. 
 
4.3.3 Material and Method 
In the second phase, an online survey was sent to 
students of a Finnish University situated in a southwestern 
province of Finland during January 2017. The invitation to 
participation was shared using different mediums such as notice 
boards and distribution through faculty members. We did not 
use the mailing lists of the university as we conducted another 
survey in the recent past and it was envisaged that inviting 
students to another study might not catch the attention of the 
students. There was no benefit, monetary or otherwise, offered 
to survey participants. 417 responses were collected until 
September 2017. However, after removing the incomplete 
responses and the responses depicting response bias, we were 
left with a usable sample of 354 respondents. The survey took 
25-30 minute on an average.   
The questionnaire for this phase was developed using the 
list of concerns identified in the first phase. The students were 
asked to rate these concerns against the statement “How 
concerned you are for…” on a 7-point scale (1: not at all 
concern to 7: extremely concerned). Another option (I don’t 
know) was added so that if a respondent is not aware of stated 
issue s/he could select it. The final survey included 74 Likert 
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scale items and five items measuring gender, educational level, 
discipline, and previous information security related training 
(categorical) and age (continuous). 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Sequential Study Design explaining Phases,  
Procedures and Products 
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4.3.4 Data Analysis 
This qualitative data was collected from 42 Master ’s 
degree IT security students (male=39, Female=3) during 
March-April 2015. The collected data were analysed using the 
content analysis technique.  
Two researchers coded the concerns and grouped them 
based upon the functional areas. Here functional area is a 
synonym to the focus area. Following rules were adopted during 
the examination:  
 
1) The threats will be examined concerning the function 
and/or service is at risk. For example, one of the 
students mentioned that “…Also, some unintentional 
personal details can be sent to the wrong email if for 
example an automatic signature in use.” Since the 
threat was related to emails, we put it in functional 
area “emails”. 
  
2) The threats related to the same function and/or 
service will be put into one category. 
 
3) The threat will be put into the relevant category 
based upon cause but not the effect. For example, 
the participants mentioned that weak passwords for 
payment services are a threat to students’ IS&P. So, 
the cause is the weak password and not the payment 
service, and hence this threat was categorised into 
category “Passwords” and not into “Online Services”. 
 
Once the content analysis had been done by the experts 
separately, they sat together and cross-checked the extracted 
concerns and the categories. After discussions and 
deliberations, seventy-five identified perceived threats were put 
into fourteen categories. Each category was constructed 
keeping in view the principles of classification [218]. The 
categories were given meaningful names based on the function 
and service. List of concerns along with the categories is 
available at Table 4.2. 
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S# Category Code Concern 
1 
Web Access 
WA1 Click Jacking 
2 WA2 Local browser history and search history 
3 WA3 Local storage of password in the browser 
4 WA4 Ads and malware embedded in websites 
5 WA5 Unwanted backend downloads 
6 WA6 Cheap and free online services 
7 
Proximity 
and 
Interaction 
PnI1 Unintentional data disclosure during presentation on projector 
8 PnI2 Shoulder surfing in classroom 
9 PnI3 Shoulder surfing in a cafeteria 
10 PnI4 Lending devices to Friends 
11 PnI5 Lending Devices to Family 
12 PnI6 Misuse of personal data by boy/girlfriend 
13 PnI7 ID theft due to group work 
14 
Personal 
Belongings 
PB1 Theft/Loss of Student ID 
15 PB2 Theft/Loss of banking cards 
16 PB3 Theft of wallet 
17 PB4 Theft/Loss of multipurpose Student card 
18 
Personal 
Electronic 
Devices 
PED1 Theft/Loss of PEDs 
19 PED2 Malware and Virus in PEDs 
20 PED3 Over-reliance on antivirus suites in PEDs 
21 PED4 Use of pirated software and apps in PEDs 
22 PED5 Ransomware in PEDs 
23 PED6 Loss of device due to natural calamity 
24 PED7 Loss of unencrypted flash drive 
Table 4.2: List of Students’ Information Security  
Concerns grouped by the Researchers 
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S# Category Code Concern 
25 Student 
Information 
System 
SIS1 Study record leakage because of cyber-attack 
26 SIS2 Data loss from student’s information system due to natural calamity 
27 
Smart 
phones 
SP1 Theft/Loss of smartphone 
28 SP2 Malware/Infected Apps in smartphones 
29 SP3 Weaker security/pin codes for  banking apps 
30 SP4 GPS Photo metadata in smartphones 
31 SP5 Unauthorised Bluetooth/Wi-Fi connection to smartphones 
32 SP6 Location disclosure services in smart phones 
33 SP7 Apps access to phone content 
34 SP8 Periodic vendor's data backups in smartphones 
35 
Policy  
Issues 
PI1 Improper disposal of students' data 
36 PI2 Inadequacy of school's privacy  policies 
37 
Network  
Administration 
NA1 Access to the history of students'  activity online by IT Staff 
38 NA2 IT staff access to students' profile data 
39 
University 
Communication 
Networks 
UCN1 Unauthorised access to university login 
40 UCN2 Malware and virus from shared media 
41 UCN3 Insecure wireless networks at  University 
42 UCN4 Hardware skimmers and keyloggers at university workstations 
43 UCN5 Cyberattack on University network 
44 UCN6 Use of online banking on the university network 
45 UCN7 Compromised university workstation 
46 UCN8 Leaving workstation unlocked/without logging off 
47 UCN9 VPN access to infected machine to  university network 
Table 4.2 (continued): List of Students’ Information Security 
Concerns grouped by the Researchers 
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S# Category Code Concern 
48 
Emailing 
EM1 Malware and virus through emails 
49 EM2 Spam through emails 
50 EM3 Emails Signature shared with the unintended recipient 
51 EM4 Phishing/Targeted Phishing through emails 
52 
Online 
Services 
OS1 Search String collection and targeted  advertisement 
53 OS2 Data leakage from cloud services 
54 OS3 Excessive data collection by service  providers 
55 
Passwords 
PW1 Reuse/one password multiple accounts 
56 PW2 Single Sign-On 
57 PW3 Weak passwords 
58 PW4 Brute force attack 
59 PW5 Weak passcodes for payment services 
60 
Online 
Social 
Networks 
OSN1 Phishing attack on the online social  network 
61 OSN2 Malware and virus in social networks 
62 OSN3 Inter-platform connectivity among social networks 
63 OSN4 Scam messages in social networks 
64 OSN5 Hacking in social networks 
65 OSN6 Excessive Information Sharing in social networks 
66 OSN7 Info sharing by others in social media (SM) 
67 OSN8 Family tree leakage in social networks 
68 OSN9 ID theft in social networks 
Table 4.2 (continued): List of Students’ Information Security 
Concerns grouped by the Researchers 
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S# Category Code Concern 
69 
Other 
Concerns 
OC1 Ignorance of local cyber laws 
70 OC2 Bugs in software and hardware 
71 OC3 Unintentional release of student’s info by the teacher 
72 OC4 Carelessness towards reading terms and conditions 
73 OC5 Government access to individual data 
74 OC6 University staff's negligence toward students' data 
Table 4.2 (continued): List of Students’ Information Security 
Concerns grouped by the Researchers 
 
The data (N=354) collected during Phase-2 was analysed 
using IBM’s Statistical analysis software package, SPSS (version 
25).  The sample characteristics of the sample used in phase 2 
are given in Table 4.3.  
 
Variables Characteristics % 
Gender 
Female 54.20 
Male 45.80 
Age group 
<21 26.60 
21-25 68.40 
>26 5.10 
Educational 
Level 
Bachelor (UG) 65.00 
Masters (PG) 35.00 
Educational 
Discipline 
Economics 34.20 
Education 12.40 
Humanities 2.50 
IT/CS/Engineering 28.80 
Medicine 1.10 
Natural Sciences 19.50 
Social Sciences 1.40 
Previous  
Training 
Yes 30.00 
No 70.00 
Table 4.3: Sample Characteristics of participants (Phase-2) 
 
In the qualitative phase, we identified security concerns 
of the IT security students and grouped them based on the 
subjective judgement of the researchers. To understand the 
security concerns of students from a diverse background, we 
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asked 417 students to rate their concern level for the identified 
concerns on a 7-point scale. Unlike the first step, we ran a 
factor analysis to uncover the underlying factors of the 
concerns. In this regard, PCA was used. PCA is an established 
technique used for deducing factors robust to correlation and 
has been extensively used in psychology and human-computer 
interaction literature [219]–[222]. PCA was conducted using 
principal axis factoring with the oblique rotation, as 
recommended by [217].  
Initially, we identified 14 factors using the Kaiser 
Criterion, having eigenvalues greater than 1 [223], allowing 
item loading greater than 0,4, explaining a total variance (TVE) 
of 69.90%. We repeated the same step by removing items 
having loadings less than 0,4; no or few item cross-loadings; 
items; items with cross loading difference more than 0.15 or 
loading heavily (0.40) on more than one factors were removed; 
and, items loading on the different components measure 
different constructs. Haywood cases were removed (item 
loading higher than 1.0). We also kept in mind the face validity 
of the factors, that is, similar items should be loaded under one 
factor, and if not, such items were removed. Once the final 
eight factors were reduced after a couple of iterations, we 
observed that one of the factors contains items each explaining 
three different concepts. At this point, to minimise the data 
loss, we relaxed our criteria (no fewer than three items per 
factor) and divided the factor into three factors explaining three 
different concepts. In this way, we came up with a solution 
consisting of 11 reliable and stable factors, explaining 68.87% 
of the variance (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy:0.946, Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity: 13580.86, 
df:1275, p<0.001). 
4.4 Results of Qualitative Study 
The examination of data collected from the group of 
students reveals that they mentioned seventy-five different 
IS&P threats. In this study, the focus was to identify the 
perceived threats and not to prioritise them. Furthermore, we 
did not inquire about the consequences of these threats and 
possible countermeasures against them. Identified threats were 
then classified using content analysis. Most of the identified 
threats were related to security and privacy. However, there 
were a few related to surveillance, and they were not 
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considered for this study. The participants showed their 
concerns regarding a wide range of threats, from online social 
networks (OSNs) to the university’s communication network 
and from smartphones to their wallets.  
 
4.4.1 Subjectively Categorized Areas of Concern 
Students’ perceived information security concerns were 
grouped into fourteen areas. Each area along with the concerns 
is shown in Figure 4.3. Next is a succinct description of each 
area and corresponding concerns as mentioned by the 
students:  
 
1. Personal Belongings. Respondents identified non-electronic 
items such as the student ID card, banking cards (debit and 
credit cards) and the wallet as essential items regarding their 
information security. Nowadays, students have a 
multipurpose student ID enabling them to access different 
facilities within the university, such as printing services and 
the library as well as using it as a payment card in the 
cafeteria. The theft/loss of such cards can deprive the 
students of these services, and if fallen in the wrong hands, 
the information stored in the cards can be misused.  The 
respondents also mentioned that their wallets contain 
important items that can compromise their privacy if the 
wallets are fallen into the hands of a malicious party. Losing 
a banking card can result in financial loss to the students. 
Therefore, theft/loss of the personal belongings was 
considered a privacy threat by the students.  
 
2. Proximity/Interaction. The respondents mentioned that 
they feel their information security at risk while interacting 
with their peers and class fellows at the university. One 
respondent suggested that someone peeping onto the 
laptop’s screen can steal his passwords for university login or 
even for online banking credentials. Other mentioned that a 
similar peeping at the university’s cafeteria could disclose 
banking card details (cardholder name, card number and the 
customer verification code (CVC)). Another respondent 
mentioned someone is looking at laptop screen from the back 
row in class may know what she is doing or even copying her 
assignment(s). 
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Figure 4.3: Students’ Concerns related to their Information 
Security  
[Header contains the title of the functional area followed by concerns 
mentioned by the students. Semicolons separate the concerns.] 
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Other concerns included:  connecting a laptop to a 
multimedia projector in a classroom and accidentally 
revealing their passwords on the big screen. In addition to 
that, the respondents also mentioned possible threats that 
could come from connections such as friends and 
boy/girlfriend. For example, lending their devices (mobile, 
laptop etc.) to their friends is a potential risk as their friends 
may explore their devices – accessing SMS messages, emails 
or even pictures; boy/girlfriend gets to know their passwords 
and upon breakup, may access their account(s), change 
password(s) or even blackmail them. One of the female 
participants considered making a group on a social media 
platform and working together for class assignments as a 
potential privacy risk. 
 
3. Smart Phones. Some reports have shown smartphones as 
one of the most significant information security threat to an 
organisation [145], [224]. A perusal of the respondents’ 
responses revealed that they were also concerned about 
threats related to smartphones. The number of concerns 
related to smartphones was more than concerns identified for 
any other focus area. Theft, loss, malware and infected apps 
were among the information security concerns. Furthermore, 
weak security codes for mobile banking (four digits) were 
also considered as a security threat. The respondents 
considered unauthorised Bluetooth or WiFi connections as a 
security threat. Regarding privacy, location disclosure to 
apps, GPS photo metadata, an app’s access to phone 
contents and periodic backups by app vendors were also 
among the concerns. 
 
4. Other Personal Electronic Devices. All the perceived 
threats (concerns) related to the laptops, computers, mobile 
phones, tablets and flash drives were put into the category of 
personal electronic devices (PEDs). The concerns particular 
to smartphones have already been discussed above. The 
respondents considered malware and viruses, use of pirated 
software, over-reliance on anti-virus suits and ransomware 
as information security threats and noted them as concerns. 
The loss/theft of any of the devices mentioned above, the 
theft/loss of an unencrypted flash drive, and device losses 
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due to a natural calamity such as fire, earthquake or an 
accident were among other identified concerns. 
 
5. Network Administration. The respondents showed their 
concerns over authorised and unauthorised access to 
students’ profile information, browser’s browsing history and 
activity log on the university network by IT staff. There 
seemed to be a trade-off between effective network 
management and students’ perceived information security 
threats. 
 
6. Policy Issues. Respondents of the study also identified 
policy-related issues that can be possible            information 
security threats for the students; for example, the 
inadequacy of privacy policies at the university. They also 
considered the school’s information retention policies, 
wherein students’ information (personal and educational) is 
kept for a certain number of years before disposal, as a 
potential privacy threat to the students. 
 
7. University Communication Network. The respondents 
mentioned some concerns related to university 
communication networks, for example, malware and virus 
infections from the university’s shared storage media, an 
insecure wireless network, a compromised workstation on 
the university network, hardware skimmers and keyloggers. 
Using an online banking service on the university network 
was considered a potential financial risk. Students log into a 
university workstation in the library and forgetting to log off 
was mentioned by several participants as well.  Access to the 
university network via VPN from an infected machine was 
also perceived as a threat. 
 
8. Students’ Information Systems. The respondents 
mentioned a couple of concerns related to students’ 
information systems. The respondents believed that an 
attack on the university network could result in leakage of 
students’ records which is a privacy threat to them. 
Furthermore, any unauthorised access to students’ records in 
the university can expose the students to security and 
privacy threats. Destruction of devices containing students’ 
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information due to natural calamities was another 
information security concerns. 
 
9. Email. Email is one of the most often tools used for 
communication these days. It is also used as a medium to 
phish users’ credentials. Like other users, students are prone 
to a wide range of security threats while using email. The 
respondents mentioned malware, viruses, spam, 
phishing/targeted phishing as information security concerns. 
Nonetheless, unintended use of email signature was 
considered as a privacy risk by a couple of respondents. 
 
10. Online Social Networks. A previous study on online social 
networks suggests that the use of OSNs among students is 
on the rise [145]. The participants in our study mentioned 
some information security concerns related to online social 
networks. They cited phishing, malware, viruses, spam 
messages, hacking and inter-platform connectivity as their 
concerns. Excessive information sharing by themselves, 
personally identifiable information (PII) shared by their 
connections and the leakage of family tree information were 
among the top concerns mentioned by more than one 
respondents. One of the participants said that his lack of 
social media presence makes impersonation easier for a 
malicious intent entity and since he does not have any social 
media account, someone can create a fake account and 
impersonate him.  
 
11. Online Services. According to Kim[144], the use of online 
services is on the rise amongst students due to online 
resources such as MOOCs and digital libraries. Students use 
search engines and cloud services for both learning and 
recreational purposes. The participants in our study 
mentioned data leakage from cloud services, search string 
collection by search engines and targeted advertising, data 
collection by service providers (websites and web services) 
and insecure connections while using online banking or user 
authentication as some of the concerns related to online 
services.  
 
12. Web Access. Students access the internet for different 
educational and recreational purposes. Therefore, it was  
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interesting to see what of their concerns are related to the 
Internet or web. From the data of this study, we found that 
respondents were concerned with threats related to 
browsers, malware and unwanted download. The 
respondents considered the browsing history and the search 
history saved in the browsers as a threat to their information 
security and privacy. Furthermore, they also mentioned local 
storage of passwords (remember my password option) as a 
perceived IS&P threat. Click-jacking, Ads that install malware 
and unwanted application downloads were the other concerns 
mentioned by the participants. They also perceived cheap 
and free online services as a threat because it leads to 
potential spamming.  
 
13. Passwords. Passwords are a cost-effective and easily 
implemented method for authentication yet poor password 
management practices lead to security issues [225]. Some 
participants in our study mentioned that poor management 
of passwords, such as the reuse of a password pose a severe 
threat to their information security. Among other concerns, 
the study participants mentioned the use of weak passwords 
and inherent weakness of passcodes for payment services 
(mostly four digits), brute force attacks against passwords 
and single sign-on (SSO) as information security concerns. 
 
14. Others. From the data that we collected from the 
participants, there were some concerns which could not be 
put under one of the thirteen categories mentioned earlier. 
So, we put them into the “others” category. Examples of 
such concerns were: ignorance of students resulting in 
possible malicious action that is punishable under certain 
laws,  
carelessness towards reading terms and conditions of the 
apps and services, government access to a private 
company’s data on an individual, negligence of university 
staff that results in privacy issues for the students, 
unintentional release of students’ records that are searchable 
through search engines, threats caused because of bugs in 
the software and hardware and sharing links to unencrypted 
files in Dropbox to unintended recipients by mistake. 
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4.5 Results of Quantitative Study 
As described in Section 4.3.4, PCA was employed to 
identify the underlying factors of the data. The 11-factors 
solution was found to be a stable solution. Items abbreviations, 
item loadings and the abbreviation for factor title are shown in 
Table 4.4. For item description consult Table 4.2.  
23 items were dropped while attaining reliable and stable 
factors. List of such items is shown in Table 4.5. 
The 11-factors solution has 2-9 items. We examined each 
factor and given a title based on the items loaded on the 
respective factor. Each factor depicted an area where students 
had shown concerns related to their information security. To 
assess the reliability of the factors, we calculated Cronbach’s 
alpha for each factor and found all factors to be above an 
acceptable level (0.70). 
Factor 1 (F1) consists of concerns related to online social 
networks and thus given the title “Online social networks use” 
[OSN] (α=0,922). Factor 2 (F2) depicts concerns related to 
lapses by university staff and named “Staff members lapses” 
[STAFF] (α=0,853). Factor 3 (F3) shows students’ lack of 
awareness towards reading terms & conditions of application 
and knowing about local cyber laws and termed as “Legal 
awareness” [LEGAL] (α=0,762). Factor 4 (F4) depicted the 
concerns related to the university’s network and termed as 
“University networks” [UNET] (α=0,916). Factor 5 (F5) 
consisted of concerns related to web browsing and emails and 
named “Web browsing and email” [B&E] (α=0,909). Factor 6 
(F6) consists of concerns that may arise due to interaction with 
family members, friends, classmates or while working with the 
class fellows and thus termed “Sociality” [SOC] (α=0,862). 
Factor 7 (F7) consists of concerns that may arise while using 
smartphones and termed “Smartphone Use” [SPH] (α=0,901). 
Factor 8 (F8) shows concerns that are related to theft or loss of 
non-technical items, such as cards and wallets, losing which 
may result in a threat to information security of the students. 
This factor was named “Cards and Wallets security” [C&W] 
(α=0,927). Factor 9 (F9) consists of concerns related to 
conventional threats such as phishing and brute force attack 
and, thus, named “Conventional threats” [CTHR] (α=0,817). 
Factor 10 (F10) related to personal electronic devices (PEDs) 
and named “PED Use” [PED] (α=0,822). The Factor 11 (F11) 
consists of concerns that may arise due to  
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service/application providers and named as “Intrusive Service 
Providers” [SPRV] (α=0,725). (The abbreviations mentioned 
after each factor title are used in the Figures and Tables and 
are discussed here for better readability) 
 
S# CC F1 F2 F3 F4 F5  
OSN STAFF LEGAL UNET B&E  
1 OSN7 0.78      
2 OSN6 0.78      
3 OSN5 0.76      
4 OSN8 0.74      
5 OSN9 0.63      
6 OC3  0.71     
7 OC6  0.67     
8 OC4   0.66    
9 OC1   0.51    
10 UCN3    0.67   
11 UCN4    0.67   
12 UCN7    0.66   
13 UCN2    0.64   
14 UCN6    0.62   
15 UCN5    0.61   
16 UCN1    0.60   
17 UCN8    0.60   
18 SIS2    0.57   
19 WA3     0.65  
20 EM2     0.64  
21 EM1     0.63  
22 WQ4     0.60  
23 WA2     0.59  
24 WA5     0.57  
25 WA6     0.56  
[CC: Concern codes; Factors are denoted by F1 to F6 along with  
abbreviations of factor titles] 
Table 4.4: Factors along with Item Loadings Depicting  
Information Security Concerns of Students 
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S# CC F6 
F7 F8 F9 F10 F11 
SOC SPH C&W CTHR PED SPRV 
26 PnI6 0.80      
27 PnI5 0.78      
28 PnI3 0.75      
29 PnI2 0.74      
30 PnI7 0.73      
32 SP4  0.75     
33 SP6  0.70     
34 SP5  0.68     
35 SP7  0.62     
36 SP3  0.58     
37 SP8  0.54     
38 PB4   0.86    
39 PB3   0.85    
40 PB2   0.84    
41 PB1   0.77    
42 OSN1    0.78   
43 PW4    0.74   
44 EM4    0.68   
45 OSN3    0.51   
46 PED4     0.71  
47 PED2     0.69  
48 PED3     0.67  
49 OS1      0.76 
50 OS3      0.70 
51 OS2      0.64 
[CC: Concern codes; Factors are denoted by F1 to F6 along with  
abbreviations of factor titles] 
Table 4.4 (continued): Factors along with Item Loadings  
Depicting Information Security Concerns of Students 
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S# Code Concern 
1 WA4 ClickJacking 
2 PnI4 Lending devices to Friends 
3 PED1 Theft/Loss of personal electronic devices (PEDs) 
4 PED5 Ransomware in PEDs 
5 PED6 Loss of device due to natural calamity 
6 PED7 Loss of unencrypted flash drive 
7 SP1 Theft/Loss of smartphone 
8 SP2 Malware/Infected Apps in smartphones 
9 PI1 Improper disposal of students' data 
10 PI2 Inadequacy of school's privacy policies 
11 NA2 IT staff access to students' profile data 
12 UCN7 Compromised university workstation 
13 PW1 Reuse/one password multiple accounts 
14 PW2 Single Sign-On 
15 PW3 Weak passwords 
16 PW5 Weak passcodes for payment services 
17 OSN2 Malware and virus in social networks 
18 OSN4 Scam messages in social networks 
19 OSN5 Hacking in social networks 
20 OSN6 Excessive Information Sharing in social networks 
21 NA1 Access to the history of students' activity online by IT Staff 
22 OC2 Bugs in software and hardware 
23 OC5 Government access to individual data  
Table 4.5: List of Security Concerns Removed During the  
Analysis 
 
4.5.1 Connecting Concerns to Students 
To clarify the connection between students and areas of 
concern, we employed an affinity diagramming technique [226] 
to group the related areas. An affinity diagram is a tool that is 
used to organise data (ideas, opinions, issues) into groups 
based on their natural relationship. Each group is given a 
header that captures the essential links among the concepts. 
The titles of all 11 areas were written on sticky notes, and two 
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researchers grouped them based on their natural connections 
separately. 
Once grouping was completed, both researchers shared 
their grouping, and finally, they come across an affinity diagram 
consisting of 5 groups covering 11 areas of concern. Each group 
was given a title and represented one of the day-to-day facets 
of a student’s life. Figure 4.4 depicts areas of concerns and 
how they relate to students’ everyday life.  
 
 
Figure 4.4: Areas of Concerns and Different Aspects of 
Students’ Life 
 
The Personal dimension contained concerns related to 
awareness of cyber laws (legal awareness). The Social 
Dimension includes concerns that may arise due to interactions 
with family, friends and peers at educational institutions 
(sociality). The Institutional Dimension includes concerns 
related to educational institutions such as the university 
network and staff members. Technological Dimension has 
concerns related to online social networks, smartphones, 
conventional threats, electronic devices, and online surfing; and 
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non-technological dimension contains concerns about theft or 
loss of cards and wallets. 
The dimensions mentioned above were formulated based 
on the subjective judgement of the researchers. One may argue 
that university networks, an area which is part of the 
institutional dimension can be part of the Technological 
dimension. Logically, it is correct. However, keeping in mind the 
day to day life of students, the area was more suited to 
Institutional dimension rather than the technological dimension. 
 
4.5.2 Prevalence of Concerns 
Once areas of concern were identified, we next examined 
how prevalent are concerns among the students within the 
identified areas. For this, we divided the area concern score into 
three groups, 1) Absence of Concern, 2) Presence of Concerns, 
and 3) Lack of awareness. The 7-point ordinal scale was 
converted to the nominal scale using the following coding. We 
encoded “not at all concerned (1)”, “low concern (2)”, “Slightly 
concerned (3)” and “Neutral (4)” as absence of concern (0); 
and “moderately concerned (5)”, “very concerned (6)” and 
“extremely concerned (7)” as presence of concern (1). 
Moreover, the originally coded “I don’t know (0)” was coded as 
2. Although there has been quite a debate in the literature on 
reducing the ordinal scale to a nominal scale among the social 
scientists, our purpose of examining the prevalence was well 
served using this technique. This approach was also employed 
by [220] while quantifying users’ beliefs about software updates 
and putting them into three factors. We, then, calculated the 
percentage of prevalence of concerns within an area.  
Figure 4.5 shows the prevalence of concerns in different 
areas. Further, we employed chi-square test to test and found 
that the difference in the prevalence of concerns was significant 
(depicted by * with area code in the figure) for all the areas 
(p<0.05). In comparison, the highest number of respondents 
(66%) have concerns related to online social networks (OSN), 
whereas, the area for which least number of respondents 
(40%) have concerns was sociality (SOC). Except for SOC, 
more than half of respondents (at least 54%) have concerns 
within all the areas. 
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 (p<0.05) 
Figure 4.5: Prevalence of Concerns within Areas with  
significant differences (p<0.05)  
[Legal Awareness (LEGAL), Sociality (SOC), Cards and Wallets  
Security (C&W), Staff Members Lapses (STAFF), University Networks 
(UNET), Online Social Networks (OSN) Use, Electronic Devices Use 
(PED), Web Browsing and Email (B&E), Smart Phones Use (SPH),  
Intrusive Service Providers (SPRV), Conventional Threats (CTHR)].  
 
4.5.3 Level of Concerns 
While the prevalence of concerns shows if concerns are 
present or absent within an area among the students, the level 
of concern enables us to see how concerns vary among the 
students. Descriptive of the concern scores within each area 
was examined to assess the level of concerns. While taking the 
mean, mode, median and standard deviation, we did not 
include the responses depicting awareness of concern (the 
originally coded “I don’t know (0)) and considered them missing 
for this phase. Table 4.6 shows descriptive for 11 identified 
areas in descending order of mean scores. 
From Table 4.6, we can see that the average (mean) 
concern level for most of the areas was higher than “neutral” 
(4) and close to “moderately concerned” (5), except for 
Sociality where mean score was less than 4. The highest level 
of concern was found related to intrusive behaviour by service 
providers such as search string collection by search engines, 
targeted advertisement, excessive data collection by service 
providers for marketing purpose and data leakage from the 
cloud services. The lowest level of concerns was related to  
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Sociality. The concerns within this area were mostly connected 
to family members, close friends and peers in the classroom 
and university. Intrusive Service Providers, Cards and Wallets 
security, Online Social Networks, Smart Phones and Staff 
Lapses turned out to be the top 5 areas where students have a 
higher level of concerns.  
 
Table 4.6: Result of Means, Medians, Modes, Standard 
Deviations for the level of concerns for different areas  
[Intrusive Service Providers (SPRV), Cards and Wallets Security 
(C&W), Online Social Networks Use (OSN), Smart Phone Use 
(SPH),Staff Members Lapses (STAFF), Electronic Devices Use (PED), 
University Networks (UNET), Conventional Threats (CTHR), Legal 
Awareness (LEGAL), Web Browsing and Email (B&E), Sociality (SOC)] 
 
4.6 Summary 
Existing information security awareness (ISA) studies are 
either narrowly focused regarding studied areas or merely 
based on suggestions of security experts. To have “in-depth 
defence” for higher education institutions a comprehensive ISA 
approach is required where ISA is assessed holistically, covering 
all aspects of users’ life, and involve end-users’ input from the 
very beginning of the ISA process. This study investigated 
students’ concerns about information security and identified 11 
areas. Further, analysis of prevalence suggested that almost 
half of the students had information security concerns in all the 
aspects, except for the social expect where only 44% of the 
students showed concern. The examination of the level of 
concern provides evidence that the identified areas are existent 
# Areas N Mean Median Mode SD 
1 SPRV 343 5.02 5.33 7 1.48 
2 C&W 350 5.01 5.50 7 1.95 
3 OSN 349 5.00 5.60 7 1.79 
4 SPH 350 4.95 5.17 7 1.70 
5 STAFF 347 4.93 5.50 7 1.78 
6 PED 345 4.83 5.00 7 1.74 
7 UNET 349 4.82 5.00 7 1.60 
8 CTHR 339 4.76 5.00 7 1.70 
9 LEGAL 346 4.75 5.00 7 1.85 
10 B&E 347 4.74 4.86 7 1.62 
11 SOC 352 3.82 3.83 1 1.76 
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among students of different gender, age and educational 
backgrounds. A small percentage of students showed a lack of 
awareness in areas such as legal awareness, staff members 
lapses, electronic device use, web browsing and email, intrusive 
service providers and conventional threats. 
The study shows that students perceive to have 
information security concerns in both online and offline threats. 
Offline concerns stem from theft and loss of documents 
containing personal information, as well as from social 
interaction with classmates and friends. Quite surprisingly some 
offline security concerns also dealt with family members. While 
concerns prevailed in all the areas, the top three highest levels 
of concerns were found to be related to Intrusive service 
providers, cards and wallets, and online social network use. 
Gender, age and educational background turned out to 
influence concerns, whereas, the effect of previous information 
security training and educational level could not be ascertained.  
Apart from the concerns, we also found that most of the 
students were aware of different types of information security 
issues about a student. However, in certain areas, a handful of 
students (about 10%) showed lack of awareness in areas such 
as legal awareness, staff member lapses, electronic device use, 
web browsing and email, intrusive service providers and 
conventional threats. 
In the next chapter, we compare security practices of 
students with that of security expert to ascertain the connection 
of ISA with the security practices. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Experts vs Students: 
Comparing Security 
Measures and 
Practices  
 
In the previous chapters, the information security awareness of 
the students (Chapter 3) and their information security 
concerns (Chapter 4) have been examined.  In this chapter, we 
compare the security behaviours of students with the security 
professionals to ascertain if there is a difference between their 
security behaviours. This chapter relates to the O3 of the thesis. 
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Like in any other organisation, information security is one 
of the concerns for the educational institutions [176]. The 
availability of vast amounts of computing power and open 
access has attracted the attention of malicious entities towards 
higher educational institutions (HEIs) [146]. Students make a 
large portion of users in HEIs and are attractive candidates for 
online threats [185]. The Internet is an integral part of 
university students’ daily life. They use computers and internet 
for a      variety of purposes [190] such as accessing email, 
completing course assignments, accessing course materials, 
using online course management systems, retrieving grades, 
purchasing books and other stuff, paying fees and conducting 
other transactions that involve their personal information. 
Students leave a significant amount of their sensitive 
information online. This dependency can expose students to 
different information security threats that can not only 
compromise their information security but also of the others 
around them, such as family members, peers and even their 
educational institutions. For example, an unaware student can 
download malware into their home computer by clicking on the 
ad which may collect critical information from all those who use 
the computer. Moreover, “bring your own device” (BYOD) 
policies makes students responsible for the security of the 
device. However, an incompetent device owner can compromise 
the security of the educational institutions.  
Despite this fact that students use the university network 
and follow the IT policies of an HEI, they are not as bound as 
an HEI employee [186]. Students are the future workforce who 
upon completion of their degrees will serve in different 
organisations in different roles. Some of them will be future 
security experts while others will take roles of ordinary 
employees. It is of paramount importance that students be 
trained so that they exhibit secure behaviour online. 
Information security education, which includes security training 
and awareness programs, can be used to make computer and 
internet users security conscious [66]. Such training should 
introduce students to different security concepts as well as offer 
advice which is realistic as well as practical.  
 Researchers suggest a multi-layered “defence in depth” 
approach, where users are required to perform more than one 
security behaviour [189]. Security experts recommend a 
variety of security measures and advice to the end-users for 
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their safety online [227]. Most of the advice was given in the 
area of system security, account security, email security and 
web security. However, a recent study showed that non-home 
users differ in security practices from what security experts do 
or recommend [228]. However, there is no comparative study 
where security practices of students are compared with that of 
security experts.   
Building upon the work of Ion et al. [228], this study 
aims at identifying the security measures taken by HEI students 
and compare their security practices with that of experts. In 
this regard, data of students’ security practices were collected 
using an online questionnaire, whereas data related to experts’ 
security practices were taken from [228]. For analysis, we ran 
Pearson’s Chi-square with post hoc test, and effect size 
(Cramer’s V) was calculated to examine the differences. Ion et 
al. only looked at Chi-square tests without a post hoc test. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 
5.2 explains the methodology used in this study, followed by 
the results presented in Section 5.3. The conclusions are given 
in section 5.4. 
 
5.1 Methodology for Comparative Study 
5.1.1 Research Questions 
This study aims to 1) identify which security measures 
students consider most important towards protecting their 
security online, and 2) compare their security practices with 
that of security experts. For this purpose, the following research 
questions were used: 
 
RQ1: What are the top security measures taken by 
the students for their security online? 
 
RQ2: Are there any differences between the 
security practices of students and security experts? 
 
In this study students are university-level students, 
enrolled in a Bachelor or Master level program, and the security 
experts are people “having at least five years of experience 
working or studying computer security” [228]. 
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5.1.2 Instrument 
The instrument consisted of questions adapted from the 
previous work [228]. The questionnaire was divided into two 
parts.  
The first part asked participants about their gender, age, 
nationality, educational background, degree major and current 
level of education. Gender was asked on dichotomous scale 
(Male/Female). The participants were asked to enter their age 
in number of years (continuous). Like gender, nationality was 
also asked using a dichotomous scale (Finnish/International). 
Participants were asked to mention their educational discipline 
by selecting one of the following: Business/Economics, 
Education, Humanities, Information Technology/Computer 
Science, Other Engineering, Law, Medicine, Natural Sciences 
including Mathematics, Social Sciences and Others. For current 
educational level participants could select from one of the 
followings: Bachelor, Masters, Doctoral/Licentiate, Other. In 
addition to above participants were also asked to mention their 
degree major in form of free text. This information was 
necessary for comparison (detail in section 5.1.4). 
Part II of the questionnaire consisted of one open-ended 
question about security measures and 13 questions (multiple-
choice) about security practices of the participants. At the 
beginning of Part II, the participants were asked to state, “the 
three most important things they do to protect their information 
security online”. The participants had free space to give their 
answer. Out of 13 questions, two were about system security, 
three each for web security and email security, and five for 
access control (password creation and management). The 
statements of these questions are given in Table 5.1, whereas, 
their measurement scales are described in the result section. 
5.1.3 Data Collection 
Using Google forms, an online questionnaire consisting of 
20 items was distributed as a pre-course survey amongst 400 
university students in four cybersecurity-focused courses (two 
each at bachelor and master levels) at a Finnish university. The 
courses were mandatory for IT and information security major 
students while students from other disciplines could voluntarily 
take these courses. No financial benefit was given to the survey 
participants. 
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Security Measures [Open ended] 
Q1. What are the 3 most important things you do to protect your 
security online? 
Practices 
System Security [MCQ] 
Q2. How soon after you discover that a new version of the 
operating system (OS) is available, do you (or somebody else 
managing your computer) install it? 
Q3. Do you use anti-virus software on that computer?  
Web Security [MCQ] 
Q4. Do you look at the URL bar to verify that you are visiting 
the website you intended to?  
Q5. Do you check if the website you’re visiting uses HTTPS? 
Q6. Do you visit websites you have not heard of before? 
Email Security [MCQ] 
Q7. Do you open emails you receive from people or companies 
you don’t know? 
Q8. Do you click on links that people or companies you don’t 
know send you? 
Q9. Do you enter your password to the website, to which you 
have reached by clicking a link in an email?  
Access Security 
Q10. Do you use two-factor authentication (e.g., 2-Step 
Verification) for at least one of your online accounts? [MCQ] 
Q11. How do you keep track of your passwords for your online 
accounts? [MCQ Grid] 
i)  Remember them  
ii) Write them down on paper 
iii) Have my password manager (e.g., 1Password, 
LastPass) remember them  
iv) Use the same password on multiple accounts 
Table 5.1: Questionnaire (Part II) with items description  
 
Data related to experts was collected from an already 
published study where security practices of experts and non-
experts were compared [228]. Additional information and the 
necessary permission were received from the first author of the 
mentioned study. 
 
5.1.4 Data Analysis 
 Most of the respondents were male students (73% of 
354). Ages of respondents ranged from 18 to 53 (Mean:23.64, 
SD:5.46), with 70% in the 18-24 age range, 25% in the 25-34 
age range, and 5% in the 35-53 age range. 90% of the 
students were Finnish whereas 10% were international  
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students. 75% of the students were from IT, including 
computer engineering, discipline, whereas the rest were from 
disciplines such as humanities, natural sciences and social 
sciences. 23% of the students were enrolled in a Master’s 
degree program in cybersecurity (termed as semi-experts), 
whereas the rest had different majors at bachelor level degrees 
(termed as novices). Explanation of grouping into semi-experts 
and novices is given in section 5.5. 
Among the experts (N=231), 4% were female. Age 
ranged from 18 to over 65, with 30% in the 25-34 age range, 
32% in the 35-44 age range, 18% in the 45-54 age range. 
Almost half of the experts were American (47%) and the rest 
from other countries. 73% of the experts held a Bachelor’s 
degree or higher. 69%  of the experts were working in the 
industry, 15% in academia, 13% were self-employed, 11% in 
government and 7% in corporate research labs [228]. 
The respondents were asked to state the three most 
important things they do to protect their digital security. The 
responses from the students were analysed by two researchers 
using the quantification technique [229]. The security measures 
were identified as mentioned from what was mentioned by the 
respondents. The security measures were coded and compared 
between two coders for reliability. Percentage (to a nearest 
whole number) of each category of practices questions (Q2 to 
Q11) was calculated. Pearson’s Chi-square was used for 
comparison of practices. p-values were corrected for multiple 
testing using the Holm-Bonferroni method. The effect size was 
calculated using Cramer’s V. Further, to identify the source of 
difference between the students’ and the experts’ practises, we 
divided the students into two groups: Semi-experts and 
novices. Semi-experts were the students having formal 
cybersecurity-related education and novices were the students 
who were without formal education in cybersecurity or a related 
field. A post hoc test was conducted to pinpoint the differences. 
The following interpretation of the effect size was used: Weak 
(0-0.20), Moderate (0.20-030), Strong (0.30-0.50) [230]. The 
acceptable range of effect size is 0.20 to 0.50. 
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5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Top Security Measures 
The content analysis of the responses to the open-ended 
question (Table 5.1: Q1) revealed that altogether as many as 
64 things are done by students for their online security. There 
were ten practices which were followed by at least 5% of the 
students including limiting the digital footprint/avoiding the 
sharing of personal information(PI) (36%), using strong 
passwords (33%), using anti-virus/anti-spyware software 
(29%), being critical and suspicious/using common sense 
(27%), updating Operating System (16%),    using unique 
passwords (15%), avoiding the clicking Ads and links (7%), 
using incognito mode (6%), not using specific apps & services 
(5%) and avoiding suspicious/harmful sites (5%).  
On the other hand, the security measures adopted by at 
least 5% of the experts were: updating the system (35%), use 
unique passwords (25%), using a two-factor authentication 
(20%), using strong passwords (19%), using a password 
manager (12%), avoiding the sharing of PI (10%), checking for 
HTTPS (10%), using verified software (8%), using Anti-
virus/anti-spyware software (29%), using Linux (6%) and being 
critical and suspicious (5%).   
A comparison of experts’ and students’ security measures 
mentioned by at least 5% of each group is given in Figure 5.1. 
5.2.2 Practices related to System Security 
Updating the operating system and using anti-virus/anti-
spy software were among the top 5 security measures taken by 
the students for their online security (Figure 5.2). Both 
measures are related to system security. To further investigate 
students’ behaviour towards system security we asked two 
questions (Q2 and Q3 in Figure 5.1).  
Figure 5.2a and 5.3b show the comparison of 
responses from students and security experts related to system 
security along with Chi-square statistics.  
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   The Chi-square statistics showed that students and 
experts differ significantly in how soon after do they install 
updates become available, they install them (effect: strong), 
and in the number of anti-virus software users (effect: 
moderate). Fewer students than experts (46% vs 64%) 
immediately update the operating system when becoming 
available. More students than experts (16% vs 4%) never 
install an operating system update. In the case of anti-virus 
software, more students than experts (85% vs 63%) use such 
software for their security. 
 
 
Figure 5.2a: Comparison of Security Practices -How 
soon after do you install updates? (X2(5)=73.59, p<0.05, V=0.36) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2b: Comparison of Security Practices -Do you 
use Anti-virus software? 
(X2(3)=32.53, p<0.05, V=0.27) 
 
5.2.3 Practices related to Web Browsing 
Web browsing is one of the primary functions that an 
internet user performs. It is typically done for a collection of 
information through known and unknown information spaces 
(like websites and forums). However, due to the increased 
number of hoax and phishing sites, web browsing poses threats 
such as identity theft, losing credentials, financial frauds and 
loss of data. Students regarded the limiting of their digital 
footprint or avoiding the sharing of their personal information 
(36%) and being critical and using common sense (29%) as the 
top 3 measures they take for their security online. However, 
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other measures such as verifying the URL (1%), checking for 
HTTPS (3%), and visiting only known/trusted sites (3%) were 
not quoted among the most repeated measures for security 
online.  
To further examine students’ security practices related to 
web browsing, we asked three questions (Q4 to Q6 in Table 
5.1). The responses were taken on six categories; “often”, 
“sometimes”, “rarely”, “No”, “I don’t know” and “others”. 
Figure 5.3 shows the students’ and experts’ responses for each 
of the questions mentioned above, along with Chi-square 
statistics.  
 
 
(a) Do you check the URL? 
(X2(3)=82.54, p<0.05, V=0.43) 
 
(b) Do you check for HTTPS? 
(X2(3)=133.46, p<0.05, V=0.54) 
 
(c) Do you visit new websites? 
(X2(3)=32.53, p<0.05, V=0.27) 
Figure 5.3: Comparison of Security Practices related to Web 
Browsing, between Students and Experts 
 
Chi-square statistics show that students and experts 
have significant differences in checking the URL (effect: strong), 
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checking for HTTPS (effect: strong) and whether they visit new 
websites (effect: moderate). Fewer students than experts often 
check the URL (46% vs 86%), check for HTTPS (33% vs 83%), 
and visit new websites (16% vs 39%). 
 
5.2.4 Practices related to Email Security 
Figure 5.1 shows that none of the security measures 
taken by at least 5% of the students was related to email 
security. Although passwords are linked to emails, we will 
discuss them separately in the next section.  
We inquired about security practices related to email 
security using three questions (Q7 to Q9). The students had 
options to select from the following six categories; “often”, 
“sometimes”, “rarely”, “No”, “I don’t know” and “others”. 
Figure 5.4 shows a result in percentage. 
 
a) Do you open emails from strangers? 
(X2(3)=37.99, p<0.05, V=0.29) 
 
(b) Do you click on links from strangers? 
(X2(3)=31.48, p<0.05, V=0.27) 
 
(c) Do you enter a password to the website…? 
(X2(3)=6.19, p=0.10, V=0.13) 
Figure 5.4: Comparison of Security Practices related to Email 
Security, between Students and Experts 
106 
 
 
 
Chi-square values show that students and experts differ 
in their practices related to (Q7): opening emails (effect: 
moderate) and (Q8): clicking on links from the strangers 
((effect: moderate)). However, no significant difference was 
found in the case of Q9 (p=0.10). Fewer students than experts 
at least sometimes open emails from strangers (21% vs 45%), 
whereas, more students than experts never click on the links 
received in emails from the strangers (79% vs 55%). 
 
5.2.5 Practices related to Access Control 
Using strong passwords was one of the top 3 security 
measures taken by the students (Figure 5.1). On the other 
hand, experts prescribe measures such as the use of unique 
passwords, two-factor authentication and a password manager 
as the top security measures [227], [228]. To examine 
behaviour related to account access (passwords), we asked five 
questions from the students and compared their responses with 
those of the security experts.  
One of the questions (Q10) was about the use of two-
factor authentication for which students were to reply by 
selecting one option from the following: “yes”, “no”, “I don’t 
know” and “other”. Other four questions (item i to iv of Q11) 
were measured on a grid format question having the following 
options: “For ALL of my accounts”, “For MOST of my accounts”, 
“For SOME of my accounts”, and “For NONE of my accounts”.  
Students’ responses for each category of Q10 and Q11, 
as a percentage along with a comparison to the experts’ 
responses are shown in Figure 5.5(a-e). Chi-square statistics 
with effect size are also provided in all cases. The comparison of 
student and expert responses showed significant differences in 
all five cases with effect size ranging from moderate to strong 
(p<0.05).  
 
Figure 5.5a: Comparison of Password Management 
Practices - Do you use two-factor authentication? 
(X2(2)=41.20, p<0.05, V=0.30) 
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There were fewer students than experts (68% vs 89% in 
Figure 5.5a) use two-factor authentication, whereas, 14% of 
the students did not know about two-factor authentication. 
More students than experts (80% vs34%) remember passwords 
for most of their accounts (Figure 5.5b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5b: Comparison of Password Management 
Practices - Do you remember passwords? 
(X2(2)=104.48, p<0.05, V=0.48) 
 
More students than experts (38% vs 20%) write down at 
least some of their passwords on paper (Figure 5.5c). Fewer 
students than experts (22% vs 74%) use a password manager 
(Figure 5.5d), and more students than experts (81% vs 45%) 
use same passwords for at least some of their accounts (Figure 
5.5e). 
 
 
Figure 5.5c: Comparison of Password Management 
Practices - Do you write your passwords on paper?) 
(X2(2)=20.82, p<0.05, V=0.21) 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5d: Comparison of Password Management 
Practices - Do you use a password manager? 
(X2(2)=133.10, p<0.05, V=0.54) 
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Figure 5.5e: Comparison of Password Management 
Practices - Do you use same password for multiple accounts? 
 (X2(2)=80.96, p<0.05, V=0.42) 
5.2.6 Comparing Experts, Semi-Experts and 
Novices 
Since we had two types of students in our sample, semi-
experts and novices, we ran a 3xY (where Y represents the 
number of categories against given practices) Chi-square test 
to identify the different student group (from the experts).  
We also conducted a post hoc analysis with a p-value 
corrected for Holm-Bonferroni adjustments, to identify the 
exact origin of difference(s). The results are shown in Table 
5.2. The first column tells the practice under consideration 
(description in Table 5.1). X2 is Chi-square statistics; df is a 
degree of freedom, V is Cramer V for effect size. Sig. 
(significance) The column shows if there is a significant 
difference in practices of semi-experts and novices with 
experts. Post hoc findings show the exact origin of the 
difference between each student group and experts. The last 
column describes if a     difference of practice could result in 
security risk for the students. 
5.3 Discussion and Summary 
Students employ a variety of security measures for their 
security and privacy. However, not all the measures are 
foolproof. Security experts recommend several security 
measures for the security and privacy of internet users. Using 
an online survey, we identified the security measures and 
practices of 350 university students and compared the practices 
with those of security experts. The data for security experts 
were collected from previous research [228].  
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Chi-square test was conducted to compare the security 
practices of the students and the experts. The comparison 
showed that security measures taken by students differ from 
the measures taken by security experts.  
Top three measures taken by students were avoiding of 
sharing of personal information/limiting the digital footprint, 
using a strong password and using of anti-virus/anti-malware 
software, whereas, as the top 3 measures experts update their 
system more often, use unique passwords and use two-factor 
authentications. Moreover, the comparison of students’ security 
practices with security experts showed a significant difference. 
For example, fewer students than security experts immediately 
update their operating systems, check the URL, check for 
HTTPS, visit new websites, open emails and click on the links in 
the emails, use two-factor authentication and a password 
manager. Also, more students than experts use anti-virus 
software, remember passwords for at least most of their 
account, write down passwords and use the same password for 
at least some of their accounts.  
A post hoc analysis showed that semi-expert (students 
having cybersecurity as their degree major) behave similarly to 
experts and even when they behave differently, their behaviour 
may not jeopardise their security. On the other hand, novices 
(students without a formal security education) not only differ 
from experts more often in their practices but also, their 
deviating behaviour can put their system security, web security 
and password security at risk.  
While we have examined the differences in practices 
between students and experts thoroughly, this study is not 
without limitations. IT students dominated our student sample. 
A bigger sample of non-IT students might have caused more 
deviant behaviours to surface. The items used to measure 
practices were, in fact, pieces of security advice from experts. 
In the future, we will examine the connection between 
perceived goodness (perceived effectiveness and likelihood to 
follow) and the practices. It will help us identify the advice 
which students consider useful are willing to follow. It will also 
be interesting to assess the role of the source of advice towards 
the perceived goodness. We may have to investigate other 
disciplines, too, to identify the factors affecting perceptions of 
the advice receiver. In this study, we have considered only 
three areas for measuring and comparing security practices.
112 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
The Relationship 
between Security 
Awareness and 
Security Behaviour: An 
Explanatory Study  
 
This chapter presents explanatory study explaining the 
relationship of information security awareness and security 
behaviour using IMB Model. This chapter relates to O4. 
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The pervasiveness of the Internet has provided a variety 
of technical and social benefits to us. The numbers of internet 
users are multiplying with each passing day. It is estimated that 
54% of the world population will be using the internet by the 
end of 2018 (Internetworldofstats.com). While at one end, the 
internet has brought a variety of benefits to us, we are also 
exposed to the dark side of the Internet due to different 
information security threats [4]. To mitigate these security 
threats, organisations implement not only technical measures 
[9]but also, non-technical or educational measures, such as 
information security policies and security education, training 
and awareness programs (also known as SETA programs) [10]–
[12], [57].  
Like other businesses, information security has been an 
issue for educational institutions in the past [176]. And today it 
has become one the of biggest challenges for the  
educational institutions especially higher educational institutions 
(HEIs) [29], [147], [231]. The importance of HEIs has 
increased manifold for a nation in the era of the knowledge-
based economy. Educational institutions, especially higher 
education institutions (HEIs), serve large populations of 
students but also maintain the technological infrastructures to 
support the learning and research activities. HEIs often manage 
large computer centres which collect private information of 
students and staff, and crucial research information [146]. If 
compromised, these resources can be misused by malicious 
entities. For example, leveraging denial of service attack, 
identify theft of staff and students, and selling products 
information for financial gains.   
Unlike other organisations, HEIs have two distinct groups 
of human resource, employees and students, both of which are 
subject to information security policies. As users are regarded 
as the weakest link in the information security [5], measures 
should be taken to improve the security behaviour of both staff 
and students in HEIs. In this regard, it is important to 
understand users’ (both staff and student) security behaviours 
in the HEI context. Some theory-driven approaches have been 
used in information security research to explore which factors 
influence security behaviour to identify ways in which the 
security behaviours of users may be improved. To date, 
researchers have utilised as many as 54 theories in the context 
of information security [98], [102], [104]. Some researchers 
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have studied the relationship between security behaviour and 
information security awareness using theories such as 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) and Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) [34]–[36].  
This study presented in this chapter seeks to contribute 
to the existing body of research in two ways. First, a new 
theory-based model, Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills 
(IMB) Model [118], [119] has been tested to study security 
behaviour of the users in the context of HEIs. Second, we 
empirically validate the relationship between security 
awareness and security behaviour. 
The IMB Model posits that information and motivation are 
the key prerequisites towards a given behaviour. These 
prerequisites connect to behaviour through the behavioural 
skills of the person. This model has not been tested empirically 
in the context of information and cybersecurity to date except 
for Crossler and Belanger’s work [127] who used IMB model to 
propose a conceptual framework highlighting the mobile 
privacy-security knowledge gap model.  
To achieve our objectives, that is checking the 
applicability of IMB model in the context of information security 
behaviours and empirically validating relationship of information 
security awareness and security behaviour; data was collected 
from a set of Finnish University students in 2017 using an 
online survey. The data was then analysed in SmartPLS 3.0 
using structural equational modelling.  
The rest of the chapter is structured as follow: Section 
6.2 provides the theoretical background and an overview of 
different theories used in a security context, followed by a 
description of the IMB Model, the research model constructed 
on the basis of this model and other theory components. 
Section 6.3 outlines the methodology and data analysis. Section 
6.4 describes the results, followed by the discussion in Section 
6.5.  
 
6.1. Theories Related to Security Behaviour 
Security researchers have been using different theories 
borrowed from other disciplines to study security behaviour. 
However, four behavioural theories have been used 
predominantly. These are Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), Technology Acceptance 
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Model (TAM), and General Deterrence Theory (GDT). Among 
these theories(and models) PMT [128], [232] and TPB [107] 
has been used predominating in the security literature[98], 
[102], [104], [129], [233]. 
TPB was proposed in 1991. According to TPB [107], 
intention predicts behaviour and intention are predicted by 
three motivational factors: Attitude, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioural control. Here attitude is a person’s 
feelings to perform certain behaviour, for example, using two-
factor authentication to improve password security. Subjective 
norms depict a person’s perception of what is expected of him 
and her environment about a certain behaviour (e.g., such as 
information sharing on social media). Perceived behavioural 
control refers to the extent to which a person can engage in a 
behaviour, given the circumstances and consists of two 
components, self-efficacy and perceived controllability. Self-
efficacy captures the degree to which one feels capable of 
performing the behaviour. It captures the extent to which 
control is within reach of the person (e.g., securing a system 
from viruses). Perceived controllability may reflect the extent to 
which a person feels they have the available resources to 
perform a given behaviour, such as keeping a system clear of 
malware. 
PMT theory was proposed originally in 1975 [232]. The 
purpose was to understand how fear appeals influence 
behaviour. This theory is composed of two parts: Threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal. Threat Appraisal determines the 
adaptability of coping behaviour regarding perceived severity, 
vulnerability and maladaptive rewards. Here perceived severity 
refers to the degree that a threat will generate negative 
consequences (e.g., the result of somebody accessing an 
unlocked space to steal data). Perceived vulnerability reflects 
the perceived likelihood that one will fall a victim of a threat if 
no action is taken (e.g., perceived risk of becoming a victim of 
a phishing attack when clicking on a link in an email). 
Maladaptive rewards represent intrinsic and extrinsic motivation 
(more precisely the benefits) that one perceives to have by 
evading the desired behaviour (e.g., evading a system update 
to avoid having to learn to use a new user interface). Coping 
appraisal in PMT captures the person’s sense of how efficient, 
manageable and costly their risk-reducing behaviour is given 
the situation the person faces [128]. Coping appraisal in PMT 
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theory consists of three components: Self-efficacy, response 
efficacy, response costs. Self-efficacy is similarly constructed 
and defined as in TPB. Response efficacy is a belief that a 
certain action will reduce the threat, for example, verifying URL 
may prevent a phishing attack. Response costs refer to the 
perceived cost associated with a coping action (e.g., learning to 
use password manager is time-consuming).  
As we saw in the above discussion the two most 
preferred theories (TPB and PMT) in information security 
behaviours research deal with motivation and beliefs. TPB has 
constructs such as attitude and subjective norms that measure 
the motivation, whereas, the constructs such as perceived 
behavioural control in TPB and constructs related to threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal are related to an individual’s 
beliefs. According to Meichenbaum & Turk [115], the behaviour 
is operated by four independent factors: Knowledge and Skills, 
beliefs, motivation and action. If any of these factors are 
deficient, the behaviour may not as it is required. Here 
knowledge and skills refer to the necessary information of the 
problems, solutions, importance and self-regulatory behaviour. 
Beliefs are related to threat appraisal (perceived severity, 
perceived vulnerability) and coping appraisal (self-efficacy, 
response cost, response efficacy). Motivation is value and 
reinforcement as well as internal attribution of success. 
Motivation can be intrinsic or personal or extrinsic or social. 
And, lastly, the actions which are stimulated by cues, and 
steered by information recall. Existing theories and models used 
in security behaviours literature take some of these factors into 
account. For example, TPB takes attitude, subjective norms and 
self-efficacy into account which covers motivation and beliefs. 
PMT is based on beliefs (coping appraisal and threat appraisal) 
whereas TAM and GDT also deal with the belief system. So, we 
need a model or theory that takes more than just motivations 
and beliefs into consideration.  
 
6.2 The IMB Model 
The IMB Model was proposed in 1992 to predict health-
related behaviours [118]. Initially, the model was used to 
predict adherence behaviour related to AIDS (HIV) through 
information, motivation and behavioural skills. This model is 
built upon the earlier work to construct a simple model to guide 
thinking in complex health behaviours. Since then it has been 
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applied to predict positive changes related to health behaviours 
(other than AIDS) [120]–[122], [234], drug use [235], cancer 
screening [134], [236]  voting behaviours [123] and recycling 
behaviours [124]. Although few of the security researchers 
have proposed the use of IMB model in the context of security 
and privacy, it has not yet been tested empirically [125]–[127], 
[130], not especially in the context of HEIs information 
security. 
The IMB Model consists of three variables: information, 
motivation and behavioural skills. According to the IMB model, 
behavioural skills directly predict the behaviour, and 
behavioural skill is influenced by both information and 
motivation of the individual. There is an association between 
information and motivation as well. Figure 6.1 shows the  
complete IMB model.  
 
  
Figure 6.1: Information-Motivation-Behavioural Skills (IMB) 
Model [118] 
 
Information is a prerequisite to a correct and consistent 
enactment of given behaviour [118], [119], [122]. An individual 
can hold accurate information (that will help in the performance 
of the desired behaviour) and inaccurate information (that may 
impede the desired behaviour). Information in the context of 
information security and privacy may, for example, refer to 
awareness of the risks related to their use of various devices 
such as mobile phones [127]. In the information security 
domain, the concept of information has been referred to as 
awareness. The assumption, therefore, is that if a person is 
aware of information security (risks and threats), he or she will 
have a more positive attitude and intention to comply with  
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security policies and behave securely. Threat perception plays 
an important role in the selection of appropriate security 
measures [16]. Crossler & Bélanger [127] suggest that IMB 
Model provides an important link between information 
(awareness of threats/risk), and development of knowledge and 
skills to behave securely. Therefore, we propose that 
information in the context of security behaviour may be 
assessed using threat awareness, as this would imply 
individuals have information (more or less) about threats in the 
security landscape.  
The second predictor of behaviour is motivation which is 
considered a critical component for engaging in and maintaining 
required behaviours [128]–[130]. Motivation includes both 
personal and social motivation and is influenced by different 
sources. One can engage in the desired behaviour if the person 
is highly motivated and have a positive attitude towards the 
desired behaviour. Motivation may also increase or decrease 
based on the individual’s perceptions of social support toward 
specific behaviour. For example, individuals may be more 
motivated to follow security advice if close others support and 
encourage this behaviour. Social support can be captured 
through social norms, which is the extent to which individuals 
follow shared behavioural guidance, which implies their belief as 
to which security behaviour others will support. Therefore, we 
propose that personal motivation to engage in secure behaviour 
is captured by the security attitude of individuals (as these 
would be strongly correlated), while social motivation may be 
captured by subjective norms to guide the behaviour in the 
context of security.  
Behavioural skills are proposed as a mediator variable 
between the two predictors and security behaviour. An 
individual needs to possess the necessary skills to engage in 
certain behaviours, in both the health and security domain 
[128]–[130]. Skills include objective skills and self-efficacy to 
deal with challenges. Lack of technical know-how (knowledge) 
limits an individual’s ability to perform securely [237]. “Knowing 
something and wanting to protect oneself is not sufficient if the 
individuals do not have the necessary skills to perform the 
required behaviour”. Self-efficacy has been extensively studied 
in the context of information security as it is one of the main 
constructs in TPB and PMT around which most of information 
security research revolves [5], [232]. There are mixed views on 
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how behavioural skills can be measured. While most of the 
others resort to self-efficacy to operationalise behavioural skills 
construct [120], [132], few others have used perceived 
difficulty[135], [234], and assessment of knowledge related to 
skills [124][127] to operationalise the same construct. 
Considering the fact that we were conducting a survey, 
measuring objective information security skills was not possible, 
we resort to measuring behavioural skills as a combination of 
self-efficacy and subjective assessment of security measures 
knowledge. “Measures knowledge” was measured by measuring 
respondents’ familiarity with security measures. According to 
Jeske & Schaik [239], “awareness may not necessarily indicate 
more than a fleeting degree of knowledge”, whereas familiarity 
can measure a deeper understanding driven by experience in a 
given context. Therefore, we propose that security knowledge 
in the context of security behaviour may be assessed using 
familiarity with security measures. 
Finally, like TPB, the dependent variable in the IMB Model 
is actual behaviour (rather than behavioural intention).  
In line with the above discussion, we propose the 
following modified research model (Figure 6.2), to examine 
the applicability of IMB Model in the context of information 
security. 
 
6.3. Methodology for Explanatory Study 
6.3.1. Sample and Procedure 
Participants were recruited from a large, public university 
in the Southwest of Finland. All 376 prospective participants 
were enrolled in a blended learning course related to 
cybersecurity at the time of the study. Of these, 169 students 
took the two-part survey (response rate = 45%).  
The first part of the survey included most IMB Model 
constructs (information, motivation and behavioural skills). The 
second part included an assessment of security behaviour. After 
removing incomplete responses, 159 responses were retained. 
While no financial or academic benefits were provided, 
participants were entered a prize draw for movie tickets. 
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6.3.2. Measures 
The questionnaire contained demographic queries 
(gender, age, education, discipline, work and Internet 
experience). Several existing measures were utilised to assess 
the constructs chosen for information, motivation, behavioural 
skills and security behaviour. Table 6.1 shows the IMB model 
constructs, constructs in our research model and the 
operational definition of each construct, followed by the 
description of the constructs. For description of constructs 
consult Appendix B.   
 
 
IMB Model 
Constructs 
Constructs in  
Research Model Operational Definition 
Information Threat Awareness 
The extent to which a participant is 
aware of security threats. 
Motivation 
Personal Motivation 
(Attitude) 
The extent to which a participant 
feels about security. 
Social Motivation 
(Subjective Norms) 
The extent to which participant feels 
that others motivate for engaging in 
a secure behaviour. 
Behavioural 
Skills 
Self-efficacy 
The extent to which participant  
believes he/she is equipped to deal 
with security threats and exhibit  
secure behaviour. 
Measures  
Familiarity 
The extent to which a participant is 
familiar with security measures. 
Behaviour Security behaviour The extent to which participant  follows prescribed security advice. 
Table 6.1: Constructs and operational definitions 
 
Information was measured in terms of “threat 
awareness”. To measure threat awareness, 20 security threats 
(taken from our work presented in Chapter 4 [238] and work of 
Jeske & van Schaik [239]) were presented to respondents to 
rate their awareness on 5-point scale ranged from 1=very poor 
to 5=excellent. The list consisted of the following threats: 
Trojan, botnet, identity theft, cookies, virtual stalking, internet 
surveillance, theft/loss of devices, malware, shoulder-surfing, 
rogueware, theft/loss of cards and wallets, spyware, 
information leakage in social network, social engineering, data 
harvesting (applications), keylogger, virus, phishing, zero-day 
attack and email harvesting.  
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Motivation was measured in terms of “personal 
motivation” (attitude towards security), and “social motivation” 
(subjective norms) [118], [119]. The attitude was measured 
using four items, adapted from [240]. Subjective norms was 
measured using three items adapted from [172], [240]. Both 
constructs were measured on a 7-point scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 7=strongly agree). 
Behavioural skills were measured in term of “self-
efficacy” and security measures knowledge (measures 
knowledge). Self-efficacy was measured using six items 
(adapted from  [172], [241]). The measurement scale was like 
the one used for measuring motivation. To assess “measures 
familiarity”, top 20 security measures prescribed by the security 
experts (taken from [227]) were presented to the respondents 
who rated their familiarity on a 5-point scale (1=not at all 
familiar to 5=extremely familiar). To make sure that 
respondents do not confuse familiarity with awareness, an 
explanation [239], differentiating awareness and familiarity, 
was presented to the respondents before introducing them to 
the security measures. 
Security behaviour was self-reported security behaviour 
of participants was measured with the help of self-developed 
scale consisting of 12 items. Each item represents advice given 
by the security expert. The items were taken from [228]. Given 
the fact that we were trying to measure behaviour through self-
reported items, we adopted a scale that measures the 
frequency of an action (1=never, 2=rarely, 3=sometimes, 
4=often, 5=always) and not (dis)agreement (strongly disagree 
to agree strongly). Egelman and Peer [45] used the same 
measurement scale for developing security behaviour intention 
scale (SeBIS).  
 
6.3.3. Data Analysis 
Data analysis was carried out in two phases. In the first 
phase, a measurement model was tested whereas, in the 2nd 
phase, a structural model was tested. For this purpose, we used 
partial least squares structural equation modelling (PLS-SEM, 
Smart PLS 3.2). This technique is estimating complex models 
when the sample size is small, and data is non-normally 
distributed [242]–[244]. 
Measurement model testing includes checking for 
construct reliability and validity. Our model consisted of 
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constructs which can be divided into two types: reflective and 
formative [245]. Reflective constructs consist of items that 
show a common cause where cause flows from constructs to 
items, whereas, formative constructs are a composite measure 
summarising a common variation through a set of items. In the 
case of the formative construct, the causal relationship flows 
from items to the construct (for further differences refer to 
[246]). According to Chin [246], in the formative construct, 
removal of a single item can affect the construct negatively. It 
is very important to decide a type of construct failing to which 
may result in findings which are not valid. Jarvis, MacKenzie, 
and Podsakoff [247] provide a set of guidelines which are 
helpful in deciding the type of construct. They suggest that 
researchers may decide type based upon the direction of 
causality, interchangeability of items, the covariance of items 
and the nomological view of the items. The direction of 
causality refers to the direction of a causal relationship between 
items and construct (like explained above); interchangeability 
of items means if items have similar content, if so then the 
construct is reflective otherwise its formative; reflective items 
co-vary with each other, whereas, formative items do not co-
vary; lastly, reflective items have a single nomological view 
where all indicators refer to the same idea and have same 
consequences, whereas, formative items may not single 
nomological view and may have different consequences. Based 
on the above guideline, the construct of information (threat 
awareness, measures familiarity) and security behaviour was 
treated as formative, while the remaining constructs were 
treated as reflective constructs. (Using a combination of 
formative and reflective constructs in one model is evident in 
different fields of research, for example, technology adoption 
[248] and knowledge management [249]. 
The quality of formative constructs was measured by 
assessing collinearity diagnosis and significance of formative 
items.  In this regards, guidelines of [242] were followed. As 
per guidelines, first, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for 
formative items be assessed and should be between 0.2 and 5. 
Secondly, the significance of formative items is tested with the 
help of significance of outer weights. In case, the outer weights 
are not significant, outer loadings of formative items are 
checked. The items, having outer-loadings greater than equal 
to 0.5, are retained, even if the outer weights are insignificant. 
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For the formative items having outer-loadings less than 5, the 
significance of outer-loading is checked. If the outer loadings 
are not significant for the items (having loading <0.5), such 
formative items are dropped from further analysis. The 
measurement statistics (VIF, outer-weight, outer-loadings and 
corresponding significance (p) are shown in Table 6.2. 
In our data, the VIF values for “measures familiarity” and 
“security behaviour” were between 0.20 and 3.0, which was 
within the suggested threshold. However, two items of “threat 
awareness” had VIF higher than 5.0 (TA3=6.41 and TA5=7.20). 
Removing of TA5 from the model brings VIF for TA3 to 3.38, 
which was acceptable as per guidelines [242]. TA5 was 
removed from further analysis. The VIF for the three formative 
constructs ranged from 1.24 to 3.82, which were smaller than 
the threshold of 5. Next to assess the significance of the 
formative items, the complete bootstrapping procedure with 
5000 sub-samples, no sign changes at significance level 0.05 
(p<0.05) was run (Step 2 in Table 6.2).  
  
Construct 
/ Items 
Step 1 Step 2 
VIF Weights  p Sig Loadings p Sig 
Threat Awareness (M=3.38, SD=0.64) 
TA1 2.42 0.283 0.183 NS 0.585 <0.01 ** 
TA2 2.54 -0.038 0.871 NS 0.552 <0.01 ** 
TA32  6.82       
TA4 2.92 -0.275 0.282 NS 0.548 0.002 * 
TA52 7.20       
TA6 2.71 -0.043 0.847 NS 0.553 <0.01 ** 
TA7 2.48 -0.046 0.810 NS 0.590 <0.01 ** 
TA8 2.75 0.335 0.144 NS 0.692 <0.01 ** 
TA9 1.58 -0.003 0.986 NS 0.508 <0.01 ** 
TA10 2.39 0.248 0.317 NS 0.651 <0.01 ** 
TA11 1.63 -0.015 0.934 NS 0.378 0.016 * 
TA12 2.19 0.170 0.372 NS 0.500 <0.01 ** 
TA13 2.00 0.075 0.674 NS 0.509 0.001 ** 
TA14 2.49 0.216 0.259 NS 0.691 <0.01 ** 
TA15 1.80 -0.013 0.946 NS 0.491 0.002 ** 
TA16 1.74 0.449 0.007 ** 0.702 <0.01 ** 
TA17 1.82 0.144 0.580 NS 0.486 0.004 ** 
TA182 2.79 -0.389 0.053 NS 0.198 0.148 NS 
TA19 2.82 0.107 0.622 NS 0.291 0.042 * 
TA20 2.08 -0.090 0.653 NS 0.423 0.004 ** 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, VIF = Variance inflation factor, t = t-test 
values, sig. = significance, NS = non-significant; * p≤0.05, ** p<0.01;  
1 Initially VIF was 6.41, 2 Removed from further analysis 
Table 6.2: Measurement statistics for formative constructs 
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Construct 
/ Items 
Step 1 Step 2 
VIF Weights  p Sig Loadings p Sig 
Measures Familiarity (M=4.15, SD=0.59) 
MF1 2.359 0.146 0.416 NS 0.492 0.001 ** 
MF2 2.262 -0.094 0.675 NS 0.492 0.001 ** 
MF3 2.194 0.052 0.815 NS 0.462 0.001 ** 
MF4 2.041 0.105 0.607 NS 0.564 0.000 ** 
MF5 2.779 0.018 0.927 NS 0.437 0.004 ** 
MF6 1.963 0.089 0.579 NS 0.534 <0.01 ** 
MF7 2.703 0.453 0.015 * 0.778 <0.01 ** 
MF8 2.413 -0.001 0.997 NS 0.504 <0.01 ** 
MF9 1.700 0.042 0.795 NS 0.444 0.002 ** 
MF10 2.302 0.060 0.756 NS 0.470 0.005 ** 
MF112  1.738 -0.150 0.349 NS 0.176 0.334 NS 
MF12 1.863 -0.049 0.777 NS 0.425 0.004 ** 
MF13 1.927 0.053 0.770 NS 0.389 0.008 * 
MF14 1.892 0.029 0.870 NS 0.395 0.006 ** 
MF15 2.493 0.462 0.014 * 0.826 <0.01 ** 
MF16 2.913 -0.096 0.673 NS 0.638 <0.01 ** 
MF17 1.922 0.029 0.877 NS 0.381 0.023 * 
MF18 2.306 -0.159 0.440 NS 0.575 <0.01 ** 
MF19 2.057 -0.004 0.984 NS 0.515 <0.01 ** 
MF20 1.487 0.330 0.014 * 0.645 <0.01 ** 
Security Behaviour (M=3.38, SD=0.47) 
SB11 1.214 -0.103 0.448 NS -0.059 0.733 NS 
SB2 2.131 0.150 0.491 NS 0.430 0.005 ** 
SB3 1.366 0.182 0.218 NS 0.561 <0.01 ** 
SB4 1.230 -0.024 0.853 NS 0.330 0.035 * 
SB5 2.098 0.079 0.679 NS 0.440 0.002 ** 
SB6 1.296 0.121 0.382 NS 0.387 0.007 ** 
SB7 1.240 0.521 <0.01 ** 0.761 <0.01 ** 
SB8 1.247 0.245 0.159 NS 0.530 0.001 ** 
SB9 1.326 0.270 0.091 NS 0.619 <0.01 ** 
SB10 1.141 0.028 0.835 NS 0.285 0.037 * 
SB11 1.257 0.113 0.423 NS 0.372 0.006 * 
SB121 1.333 0.030 0.861 NS 0.358 0.063 NS 
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, VIF = Variance inflation factor,   
t = t-test values, sig. = significance, NS = non-significant; 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
1Removed from further analysis 
Table 6.2(continued): Measurement Statistics for Formative 
Constructs 
 
  In total four items could not fulfil significance criteria: 
TA18 had an insignificant outer-weight (p=0.053), and outer-
loading less than 0.5 (0.198) and insignificant (p=0.14). MF11 
had an insignificant outer-weight (p=0.349), and outer-loading 
less than 0.5 (-0.059) and insignificant (p=0.733). SB1 had an 
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insignificant outer-weight (p=0.448), and outer-loading less 
than 0.5 (-0.059) and insignificant (p=0.733). SB12 had an 
insignificant outer-weight (p=0.861), and outer-loading less 
than 0.5(0.358) and insignificant (p=0.063).  
  In this way, five items were dropped from the 
measurement model, one due to high VIF and four, due to 
insignificant outer weights and loadings. 
The quality of reflective constructs was assessed in terms 
of constructs’ reliability (internal consistency and items 
reliability) and validity (convergent and discriminant validity) 
for which guidelines suggested by [242], [250], [251] are used. 
The threshold values for different measures are shown in Table 
6.3.  
 
Quality 
Measure Criterion Threshold with reference 
Reliability Internal consistency  
Cronbach’s alpha > 0.70 [250] 
OR CR > 0.708 (0.60-0.70 for 
exploratory reasons) [242] 
Items reliability Item Loadings > 0.70.1 
Validity 
Convergent validity AVE > 0.50 [242] 
Discriminant validity Heterotrait-Monotrait Ratio (HTMT0.85) [251] 
Note. CR = Composite Reliability, AVE=Average Variance Explained.  
1 0.40-0.70 are acceptable if removal of items does not improve AVE [242] 
 
Table 6.3: Threshold Values for the Reflective Measurement 
Model 
 
The reliability of the constructs was measured through 
internal consistency and item’s reliability, whereas, the validity 
of the constructs was measured through convergent and 
discriminant validity. The results of reliability and validity 
assessment for reflective constructs (attitude, subjective norms 
and self-efficacy) are shown in Table 6.4. 
Traditionally, Cronbach’s alpha (α) has been used as a 
measure of internal consistency. However, some researchers 
consider composite reliability (CR) a more suitable measure of 
reliability in PLS than Cronbach alpha [252]. Therefore, as 
suggested by [242], we have reported both α and CR. Both α 
and CR for three reflective constructs were higher than the 
suggested threshold (consult Table 6.3). 
 
 
127 
 
 
 
Construct / Items  Mean SD Item Loadings CR  α AVE 
Personal Motivation  
(Attitude) 
5.15 0.78  0.87 0.78 0.70 
ATT1   0.88    
ATT2   0.73    
ATT31   0.60    
ATT4   0.88    
Social Motivation 
(Subjective Norms) 
3.50 1.35  0.91 0.82 0.84 
SN1   0.87    
SN21   0.58    
SN3   0.96    
Behavioural Skills 
(Self-Efficacy) 
4.90 0.92  0.85 0.74 0.65 
SE1   0.83    
SE21   0.32    
SE3   0.78    
SE41   0.51    
SE51   0.47    
SE6   0.80    
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation, Loadings = Indicator loadings,  
CR = Composite Reliability, α = Cronbach’s αlpha, AVE = Average Variance Explained.  
1 excluded from further analysis due to loadings <0.70 
Table 6.4: Measurement Statistics of Reflective Construct 
Scales 
 
Item reliability determines the rate of the variance of an 
item that comes from the latent constructs and is assessed with 
the help of indicator loadings. All the items having loadings 
above 0.70 were retained. In sample, five items had item 
loading less than 0.70: ATT3 (0.60), SN2 (0.58), SE2 (0.32), 
SE4 (0.50) and SE5 (0.47). These items were removed from 
further  
analysis. The remaining items having loadings (from 0.73 to 
0.96) were retained. In the final model, both personal 
motivation and self-efficacy were measured with the help of 
three, whereas, social motivation was measured using two 
items.  
Convergent validity of the reflective constructs is also 
proved as AVE for all three reflective constructs was above the 
recommended value of 0.50. Discriminant validity (DV) is used 
to describe the extent to which constructs differ from others. 
Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) Ratio  [251] is considered as a 
more appropriate criterion for assessing DV as compared to 
Fornell-Larcker criterion [253] and checking cross-loading  
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criterion [242]. Table 6.5 shows, the HTMT ratio for the 
constructs. The HTMT ratio is below 0.85 for all the constructs, 
giving evidence of discriminant validity. 
Once the measurement model is tested, the structural 
model is tested. For this purpose, we examine the standardised 
path coefficients (β), the coefficient of determination (R2), 
effect size (f2), and significance is tested with the help of t-value 
and P-Value. Detail of structural model testing is given in 
results. 
 
 Construct 1 2 3 
1 Attitude    
2 Self-Efficacy 0.41   
3 Subjective Norms 0.11 0.17  
Table 6.5: HTMT0.85 Ratio Confirming Discriminant Validity of 
the Constructs 
 
6.4. Results   
6.4.1. Sample Characteristics 
About 65% of the participants were male. The average 
age of the participants was 24 years (ranging from 18 to 63 
years with SD = 6.94). Most of the respondents were bachelor 
level students (77%), while the rest were from a Master degree 
or above. Among the bachelor level students, 45% were the 1st 
year, 15% were 2nd year, 6% were 3rd year, and 11% were 
4th year students. About 69% of the participants were from 
computer science and information technology disciplines, 
followed by 23% from the natural sciences, whereas, the rest 
belonged to other disciplines. Also, 41% of the participants had 
full or part-time working experience. Their average working 
experience was 4.29 years. The internet experience (in years) 
of participants range from 2 to 27 years, with an average of 14 
years (SD=4.10).  
 
6.4.2. Validation of Structural Model 
The standardised path coefficients (β), the coefficient of 
determination (R2) and significance (p < .05) of the individual 
paths in the estimated path analysis are shown in Figure 6.3.  
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We also checked the collinearity of the structural model 
with the help of predictor construct’s tolerance (VIF) and found 
to be between 1.00 and 1.69. As per [172], [242], VIF 
coefficient between 0.2 and 5 shows lack of collinearity in the 
structural model. 
As shown in Figure 6.3, there were significant direct 
paths to security behaviour from personal motivation (β=0.24, 
p=0.005), self-efficacy (β=0.20, p=0.009), and measures 
familiarity (β=0.23, p=0.02). There were indirect effects of 
information and personal motivation on security behaviour 
through self-efficacy (β=0.41, p<0.01; β=0.28, p<0.01) as well 
as through measures familiarity (β=0.43, p<0.01; β=0.37, 
p<0.01). Social motivation did not have any direct or indirect 
significant path to security behaviour. Moreover, information 
significantly correlates with only personal motivation (r=0.155, 
p<0.05) and not with social motivation (r=0.04, p>0.05).  
For detail statistics on the structural model and 
correlation consult Table 6.6 and Table 6.7. Table 6.7 shows 
that information and motivation (personal and social) correlate 
with one and other.  
 
Path1 VIF β R2 Adj.R2 t p  Sig. f2 
TAàSE 1.02 0.41   3.313 <0.01 Y 0.23 
ATTàSE 1.02 0,28   4.003 <0.01 Y 0.11 
SNàSE 1.00 0,11 0.30 0.29 1.691 0.091 N 0.02 
TAàMF 1.02 0,43   5.099 <0.01 Y 0.29 
ATTàMF 1.03 0,37   3.861 <0.01 Y 0.21 
SNàMF 1.00 0,08 0.38 0.37 0.803 0.422 N 0.01 
TAàSB 1.47 0,15   1.404 0.160 N 0.02 
ATTàSB 1.30 0,24   2.614 0.005 Y 0.08 
SNàSB 1.03 0,02   0.326 0.744 N 0.01 
MFàSB 1.69 0,23   2.281 0.023 Y 0.05 
SEàSB 1.50 0,20 0.39 0.37 2.514 0.009 Y 0.04 
Note. [1TA=Threat awareness (information), ATT=Attitude (personal motivation),  
SN=Subjective Norms (social motivation), SE=Self-efficacy(behavioural Skills),  
MF=Measures familiarity (behavioural Skills), SB = Security behaviour, Sig=Significance 
(at p<0.05)] 
Table 6.6: Structural model statistics for IMB Skill Model  
constructs  
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constructs 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Measure Familiarity 1.00      
2 Security Attitude 0.43 1.00     
3 Security Behaviour 0.51 0.44 1.00    
4 Self-Efficacy 0.48 0.35 0.48 1.00   
5 Subjective Norm 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.14 1.00  
6 Threat Awareness  0.49 0.15 0.40 0.46 0.04 1.00 
Note. p<0.05. 
Table 6.7: Correlation matrix of IMB constructs 
 
6.5. Discussion 
This study examined the applicability of IMB Model in an 
HEI information security context, to study the factors affecting 
the security behaviours of the students. This study also studied 
the relationship of security awareness, which was measured in 
terms of threat awareness and familiarity with security 
measures, with security behaviour. Previously, this the 
relationship has been studied using PMT and TPB where only 
the indirect relationship of security awareness and security 
behaviours had been studied. 
 Our study showed that behavioural skills (both self-
efficacy and measures familiarity) and personal motivation 
(attitude) directly predicted the security behaviour of the 
students. Also, the variables in the model explained 39% of the 
variance in security behaviour in our student sample. 
Furthermore, information and personal motivation were 
positively associated with behavioural skills (self-efficacy as well 
as security knowledge). We also found that information and 
personal motivation (represented by security attitude) indirectly 
affected security behaviour - through the behavioural skills 
(which operated as a mediator). Social motivation (captured in 
the form of subjective norms) did not have a direct or indirect 
relationship with security behaviour. Information and personal 
motivation variables also correlated with each other. However, 
no correlation was found between information and social 
motivation. 
The results showed that threat awareness (information 
variable in the IMB model) directly predicted the security 
behaviour of the students. Threat awareness also turned out to 
be the most significant predictor for the self-efficacy and 
measures familiarity (both depicting behavioural skills). 
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Moreover, measures familiarity also had a significant 
relationship with security behaviour. 
To evaluate our contribution to the study of information 
security in an educational context, two points need to be 
clarified beforehand. Specifically, our results need to be 
interpreted in the context of existing theory and previous 
findings. First, the difference between IMB Model and other 
known behavioural theories (TPB and PMT) is that IMB Model 
tends to explain behaviours directly, whereas, constructs of TPB 
and PMT influence behaviour through behavioural intention. 
Accordingly, we measured the predictors and mediator 
variables first and later followed up with the security behaviour 
measure (two weeks later). The first round of data collection 
and the subsequent time interval between the two parts of the 
survey may allow for a behavioural intention to form, like TPB 
and PMT, but we did not assess whether or not this was the 
case.  
 Second, our modified model shared two constructs with 
TPB and PMT, self-efficacy and attitude. While searching for 
reliable behavioural factors, Mayer et al. [15] found that self-
efficacy has a reliable weak positive effect on behavioural 
intention in three different studies, whereas, in the case of TPB, 
the effect was medium. However, in the case of attitude 
measures, these have been shown to a reliable medium effect 
on behavioural intention in security studies.  The results of our 
study confirmed the previous findings: self-efficacy had a small 
effect size on security behaviour (f2=0.04). However, in 
contrast to the medium effect reported for attitude [19], we 
found that attitude in our sample has a small effect size 
(f2=0.11) as well. As our results pertain to behaviour rather 
than intention, it is difficult to compare these effects directly. 
However, given the often noted disconnect between behavioural 
intention and behaviour (as intention may not always lead to 
behaviour), higher effect sizes may be expected for intention 
rather than behaviour which may not always align with one’s 
intention. 
 
6.5.1. Recommendations  
The previous two points lead us to the following 
recommendations for those responsible for managing 
information security training in HEIs. According to our results 
based on the IMB Model, constructs related to information 
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(threat awareness) and motivation (based on attitudes and 
social norms) are crucial factors for students to acquire skills to 
engage in information security behaviours. However, practical 
knowledge is important in addition to information and 
motivation to employ security measures [17]. HEIs should focus 
on all three constructs, awareness, personal motivation and 
behavioural skills, simultaneously to improve the security 
behaviour of the students.  
Training and other interventions based on the IMB Model 
may improve students’ security-related knowledge by (a) 
increasing their access to information (e.g., through awareness 
campaigns), (b) raising their motivation (by increasing the 
perceived relevance and highlighting social norms supporting 
certain behaviours) and (c) providing them with opportunities 
to gain and test their behavioural skills. All three may then 
hopefully improve the security behaviours of the students in 
HEIs, reducing institutional vulnerability to threats while also 
giving the students the skills to act in a secure manner when 
they transition into the workplace and use employer  
systems. 
 
6.5.2. Limitations and Future Research 
The study is not without limitations. For example, our 
cross-sectional sample was recruited from a pool of students 
who enrolled in a security-related course. This suggests they 
may have been more interested in information security 
compared to those who selected other courses instead. 
Moreover, most of the students were bachelor level students 
belonging to computer science, information technology and 
engineering (STEM) disciplines. Therefore, our findings may not 
translate to students’ behaviour outside these STEM areas that 
may lack threat knowledge and behavioural skills.  
This leads us to three areas worthy of more investigation. 
One, more research is needed to establish the generalizability 
of our findings to other non-STEM samples. Two, it would be 
interesting to see the longitudinal effect of information, 
motivation and skills on security behaviour. We had a brief 
interval (two weeks) between our assessment of motivation, 
information and behavioural skill on the one hand, and security 
behaviour on the other. The relationship between the constructs 
may change over time, particularly if training is provided  
following the first round.  
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And three, security behaviour may be measured in 
numerous ways. A thoroughly designed construct may improve 
the predictability of the IMB Model. In this study, security 
behaviour was measured by asking participants to indicate 
which of the twelve security recommendations they follow (see 
also [44]). Moreover, information, knowledge and behaviour all 
were self-reported and may not depict the real level of threat 
awareness (information), knowledge (security measures) and 
behaviour. In future, the methods of measuring the actual 
information, knowledge and behaviour may be considered. If 
the study is replicated with the help of an IT support centre, for 
example, actual security behaviour may be captured by the IT 
system through the interaction of users with the system, 
circumventing the need for self-reported behavioural measures. 
The model may therefore also be of use to study security 
behaviour among other populations, such as employees and 
home-users. 
 
6.6 Summary 
In this study, we have examined the predictability of a slightly 
modified IMB Model in the context of security. The results of 
this study with 159 students showed that students with higher 
threat awareness, greater positive personal motivation, higher 
self-efficacy, and knowledge of security measures engaged in 
more secure behaviour. This work proves empirically that IMB 
model can be used to study security behaviours of the  
students.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
This chapter provides an overview of objectives as well as the 
key findings that are used to achieve the objectives and answer 
the research question. 
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The number of information security incidents reported in 
media and other sources is growing. To improve information 
security in organisations, both technical and non-technical 
measures are employed. Technical measures include (but not 
limited to) use of firewalls, backups, and anti-malware 
software, whereas, policies and security education, training and 
awareness (SETA) programs are used as non-technical 
measures to strengthen the users’ ability to cope with the 
information security threats. SETA programs aim at increasing 
information security awareness (ISA) of the users and improve 
their security behaviour. ISA helps users in decision making in 
the event of a security incident, enhance understanding of 
possible threats, and make users familiarise with the 
countermeasures that can be employed to safeguard 
information security. However, despite all the effort, the 
weakest link’s security behaviours are not improving.  
Examination of literature suggests a lax in current SETA 
program’s design. The SETA programs are designed as a one-
fit-all solution, without involving users in the designing of such 
programs. Moreover, the said programs lack theory grounded 
approaches. While ISA has been proven to be one of the 
significant factors for improving security behaviour, the 
relationship requires a theory-grounded explanation, so that 
SETA programs are designed accordingly. 
 The studies presented in this thesis set out to improve 
the design of SETA programs by producing the knowledge that 
can be used to design SETA programs for students of higher 
education institutions (HEIs). The first study presented in 
chapter 3 this thesis identifies the weakest link in the weakest 
link, that is the groups of students who have a lower level of 
ISA, and needs training for improvement, by describing the 
relationship of ISA with different individual factors of students 
(O1). The second study presented in chapter 4 of this thesis 
identifies the areas where students perceive to have security 
risks, by identifying perceived information security concerns of 
the students (O2), so that such areas can be used in design 
SETA programs. The third study (chapter 5) examine the role of 
ISA in security behaviour by describing difference between 
security behaviors of security experts, untrained students and 
trained students (O3); and finally, the fourth study (chapter 6) 
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identifying the factors that should reflect in design of SETA 
program by empirically testing a theoretical model explaining 
the relationship of ISA and security behaviour (O3). 
Considering the breadth of the thesis, the outlined 
objectives cannot be achieved through a single methodology or 
a single wave of data collection. Empirical data for the 
objectives were collected through cross-sectional surveys. For 
each study, data were collected using online surveys, except for 
O2 where qualitative data was collected as part of the course 
assignment. The data for O1, O2 and O3 were analysed using 
statistical techniques ranging from simple descriptive analysis 
to factor analysis in SPSS v24.0, and v25.0 whereas, data for 
O4 was analysed using structural equation modelling (SEM) in 
SmartPLS v3.0. 
7.1 Thesis Summary and Key Findings 
Each of the objectives as mentioned above is addressed 
in separate chapters. 
Chapter 2 provided a review of relevant literature where 
two main themes are discussed: (1) On the understanding of 
information security awareness, and (2) theories used in 
studying security behaviours. The purpose of this chapter was 
to introduce readers to the concept of ISA and how it has been 
defined and assessed in the literature. Further, the introduction 
to the most popular theories used for studying information 
security behaviours was described. The review showed that the 
survey had been most often used as a tool to examine ISA. 
Most of the studies have assessed security awareness in 
general, and few took knowledge, attitude and behaviour into 
consideration. The review also showed that most of the security 
behavioural studies are focused on employees and that Theory 
of Planned Behavior (TPB), Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), 
General Deterrence Theory (GDT) and Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM) has been used in this context. The studies focused 
on students’ security behaviour mostly made use of TPB and 
PMT. 
Chapter 3 describes an assessment study where ISA of 
students of different backgrounds was assessed, and a 
comparison of awareness was made among students divided 
based on their demographics, individual and cultural factors. 
The chapter provided insights on the ISA of the students. It was 
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found that students believed that they have higher ISA level. 
However, an objective test of knowledge and examination of 
behaviour showed a different picture. It was found that male 
students had better ISA level as compared to female students. 
Younger students (under 21) were found to have lesser security 
awareness as compared to older students (21-40). IT students 
were found to be better in ISA comparison to students from 
other disciplines. The knowledge level differed across the 
disciplines. Finnish students were found better in security 
behaviours as compared to international students, and previous 
training was found to be a significant factor in better ISA as 
well. Thus, it can be concluded that students’ awareness level 
different across different genders and educational disciplines. 
Moreover, young students and international students need 
improvement in their awareness as well.  
Chapter 4 presents a two-phase study where a sequential 
Qual-Quan design was used for identifying and validating 
information security concerns of the students. The review a 
literature presented in this chapter showed that students are 
hardly involved in design of SETA program, and the studies 
most often assess the areas such as system security, email 
practices, threats, online services (including browsing and social 
networks), passwords, security policies, data security, device 
security (including smartphones) and information sharing 
habits. However, the findings from the two-phase study showed 
that students are concerned about their awareness of cyber 
laws, the risks arise due to their sociality i.e., their relationships 
with family and friends, and lapses at their university by the 
staff members. However, system security, web security, email 
security and passwords were the most prominent areas 
students were found concerned about. 
Chapter 5 describes a comparative study where first 
security measures taken by the students are identified, along 
with data on their security practices. Next, a comparison of 
security practices was made with that of security experts to 
identify the gaps. Another purpose of this comparative study 
was to examine the role of ISA in security behaviours. While 
indeed students were found differences in their security 
practices in comparison with security experts, it was also found 
that students who had better awareness were somewhat similar 
in their practices to the security experts. And, even when 
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knowledgeable students differ from the security experts, their 
deviating behaviour was not much of security risk. 
Lastly, Chapter 6 presents an explanatory study where 
the relationship of security awareness and security behaviour is 
empirically validated. The results showed that information 
(awareness of threats), motivation (personal) and behavioural 
skills (self-efficacy and familiarity of security measures) are 
significant factors that affect security behaviour of the students.  
7.2 Contributions and Implications   
 
The research in this thesis makes significant 
contributions in information security research and has both 
theoretical and managerial implications.  
 
7.2.1. Theoretical contributions 
The objectives set for and achieved in this thesis are of 
interest to the researchers who are interested in understanding 
human behaviours related to information security. The work 
presented in this thesis extended the literature related to the 
human factor in information security in general and the role of 
students’ information security in HEIs’ information security, in 
particular.  
For security researchers, firstly, the research shows that 
researchers should take personal, social and institutional 
dimensions into consideration as well when it comes to ISA 
studies. Currently, as evident from the literature, the focus of 
researchers is on technological and non-technological 
dimensions. Secondly, the research model tested in chapter 6 
explains the relationship between ISA and security behaviours. 
Although the model used in the chapter mentioned above was 
not entirely supported (social support), it does prove the utility 
and applicability of a new behavioural model in information 
security research domain. Further research can use this finding 
as a starting point, test this model in different set up, on a 
different population, for example, to examine security 
behaviour of employees in the organisational set-up or that of 
home-users.  
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7.2.2. Managerial Implications 
The research presented in this thesis provides exciting 
insights for security professionals who are responsible for 
managing information security in HEIs, as well as for the faculty 
members who design information security curricula and teach 
the students. 
 For information security professionals, who are 
responsible for protecting organisational information assets, this 
research provides insights into what are students’ information 
security concerns, especially related to institutional dimension, 
and thus should take steps in ratifying them. This will, in turn, 
increase students’ trust in the security measures implemented 
in HEIs. Further, the research also provides insights that can 
improve security professional’s ability to tailor SETA programs 
by taking into account students’ concerns, diversity in ISA level 
among different student groups, and the factors (awareness, 
motivation and skills) that affect the security behaviour. 
For the faculty members, who design courses for the 
students, the research identifies the factors (awareness, 
motivation and skills) that can improve the security behaviour 
of the students. Thus, they can design a course focusing on 
improving their information, raising motivation and providing 
them with opportunities to gain and test their behavioural skills. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
The studies presented in this thesis are focused on 
information security of higher education institutions and have 
some limitations. A combination of previously validated 
instrument and self-designed instruments were used for the 
studies presented in this thesis. Reliability and validity of 
measures were checked where applicable. Moreover, attention 
check questions and quality checks were used to remove 
responses which could adversely affect the findings. Further, 
statistical analysis was used to remove incomplete responses 
and eliminate outliers. Despite all the efforts there exist some 
limitations to the work presented in this thesis. 
The data was collected from a single case, using 
convenience sampling, due to non-availability to funds to collect 
census-representative data. The research was conducted in the 
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Department of Future Technologies, previously known as the 
Department of Information Technology and, therefore, most of 
the respondents were from IT, computer science or computer 
engineering backgrounds. Although data were collected from 
students of non-IT disciplines as well, they may not represent 
the whole student population of students from other disciplines. 
Moreover, many students work in addition to studying. This 
study looks at the information security issue in the context of 
educational institutions only, and therefore the participants 
were asked to consider themselves as students while answering 
the surveys. 
The studies presented in this thesis are based on online 
(web-based) surveys. Such surveys are subject to self-selection 
bias [46] and may attract only those respondents who were 
comfortable with web-based surveys and have interest in the 
topic. Moreover, surveys provide a limited picture of what 
participants remember or what they are ready to share [47]. 
For the sake of this thesis, it is assumed that respondents of 
the studies have accurately reported their information security 
awareness, concerns and behaviours. 
Considering that information security is a broad topic and 
many areas should be taken into consideration while assessing 
awareness and behaviours. Including all the areas in awareness 
assessment and security behaviour could lead to long surveys. 
The lengthy surveys not only adversely affect the response rate 
but also cause respondents to response without due attention. 
Therefore, I have been selective in picking area(s) in awareness 
and behaviour studies (Chapter 3, 5 and 6). I did not ask 
questions related to data security while comparing students’ 
security practices with that of security experts due to non-
availability of data. Moreover, some of the findings related to 
password management may become outdated when compared 
with the most recent to NIST guidelines for password 
management [254]. New guidelines do not consider changing 
password frequently and complex passwords as good security 
practices.   
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Appendix A 
 
Questionnaire used for Assessing 
Information Security Awareness 
among University Students – Chapter 3 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess information security 
awareness (ISA) of the students and find relationship of 
different factors and ISA.  
 
There are four sections in this questionnaire; Demographic 
information, General questions, Knowledge testing and 
Behavior testing. None of your personal information has been 
asked for and it has been tried that your identity is not 
disclosed in any way. The survey will take 10-15 minutes in 
total.  
 
Thanking you for your time and interest in filling the 
questionnaire and your cooperation in this regard will be highly 
appreciated.  
 
Regards, Ali Farooq (alifar@utu.fi)  
Dept. of Future Technologies, 
University of Turku, Finland. 
 
Section I. Demographic Information 
1. Gender     M/F 
2. Age    
Under 21    21-25  26-30    31-40  41-50 
Above50  
3. Current Study Level (Select one) 
- Undergraduate (Bachelor) 
- Graduate (Masters) 
- Post Graduate(PhD)  
4. Field of studies (Select one)    
- Business Studies 
- Humanities 
- Law 
- Other Natural Science 
- Education 
- IT 
- Medicine/Medical 
Sciences 
- Social Sciences 
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5. Students background (Select one) 
- Local (Finnish origin/national)   
- International, please specify the 
country_________ 
6.    How would you categorize the place, where you were 
living before coming to University of Turku? (Select one) 
- Rural (Small/median Town) 
- Urban (big town/small city) 
- Metropolitan (Big City)  
 
Section II. General Questions 
1.  How do you rate your level of competency in IT?   
1(very low) 2(low)  3(Average)  4(high) 
 5(very high)  6(unsure)  
2.  What is your perceived level of Information Security 
knowledge? 
1(very low) 2(low)  3(Average)  4(high) 
 5(very high)  6(unsure)  
3.  Have you participated in some sort of training regarding 
Information Security.? Y/N 
3a.  If answer to previous question is YES, what was the 
nature of the training: 
- Degree obligatory course(s)  
- Non degree obligatory course(s)/Workshop(s)
  
- Voluntarily take course/workshop(s)  
4.  Do you have any work experience relevant to your field 
of study:   Y/N 
4a. If YES, type of work  
- Part time 
- Fulltime 
4b. Duration of work experience: 
- Less than 3 years 
- 3-5 years 
- More than 5 years 
5.  What is your source of information security knowledge, if 
any (Select all applicable)? 
- Websites & search engines 
- Journals 
- Books 
- Newspapers/Magazines 
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- Informal discussion with colleagues and 
professional contacts 
- Formal Trainings (workshops, degree or non-
degree courses)  
- Others, specify _____________ 
 
6. What is your preferred source of information security 
knowledge? (Select one) 
- Websites & search engines 
- Journals 
- Books 
- Newspapers/Magazines 
- Informal discussion with colleagues and 
professional contacts 
- Formal Trainings (workshops, degree or non-
degree courses)  
- Others, specify _____________ 
 
Section III. Knowledge Testing 
Read the following items and select the correct option as per 
your knowledge: 
1. Worm is: 
a. a computer program that replicates itself and 
spreads across a network  
b. dependent upon security failures on the target 
computer in order to access it  
c. created or designed only to spread and don’t 
attempt to change the systems they pass 
through.  
d. All of above 
e. I do not know what does it mean? 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
2. Trojan Horse is: 
a. a tale from Trojan wars in which a wooden horse 
was used to transfer soldiers into city of Troy 
b. a program that pretends to be legitimate but 
contains some harmful program inside which 
gives access to target computer to a remote 
malicious party 
c.  a special breed of horse raised in England 
d. All of above 
161 
 
 
 
e. I do not know what does it mean? 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
3. Spam is: 
a. Another word for e-mail or electronic messages 
b. A marketing technique 
c. Any unsolicited electronic mail 
d. All of above 
e. I do not know what spam is 
4. Social Engineering is: 
a. influencing society on a large scale  
b. obtaining confidential information by 
manipulating and/or deceiving people 
c.  a new type of society building measures 
d. All of above 
e. I do not know the term social engineering 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
5. Phishing is:  
a. The use of an email message, that appears, to 
be legitimate, to solicit personal details 
b. Part of social engineering which means that 
someone is persuaded to give away confidential 
information 
c. Also referred to as identity theft 
d. All of the above 
e. I do not know what the term phishing means 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
6. Pharming is: 
a. a hacker’s attack that redirects a website’s traffic 
to a bogus site without knowledge of the user 
b. phishing without a lure (trap)  
c. Both of above 
d. a technique used to create genetically modified 
organisms  
e. I do not know the term pharming 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
7. Botnets are 
a. Used for click frauds  
b. Collection of computers connected through 
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Internet, whose control is ceded by a malicious 
party that can use these computers without 
knowledge and consent of the owners of those 
computers.  
c. Often used for DDoS (Distributed Denial of 
Service) attacks 
d. All of above 
e. I do not know, what Botnet means 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
8. Denial of Service (DOS) attack is: 
a. to flood the target with bogus requests 
preventing it to provide services to legitimate 
requests.  
b. an incident in which user or organization is 
deprived of the services of a resource they 
would normally expect to have.  
c. All of above 
d. Related to disk operating system attacks 
e. I do not understand this term 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
9. Zero day attack is: 
a. an exploit in which someone takes advantage of 
a security vulnerability on the same day on 
which that vulnerability is detected  
b. an attack that never has happened 
c. an attack which is tried on an application the day 
it is released 
d. all of above 
e. I do not know this term 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
10. Security incident is: 
a. A type of viral attack that is transferred from 
person to person working in a closed 
environment 
b. An activity that may result in misuse, damage, 
denial of service, compromise of confidentiality 
of a network, computer, application, data. 
c. An attack where a burglar breaks into a building 
d. none of above 
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e. I do not know the term Security Incident 
f. I did not understand the alternatives well enough 
because of the language 
 
Section IV. Behavioral Questions 
Read the following items and select the options that best 
describe you: 
1. When receiving an e-mail that appears to be coming from 
your bank and asking you to go to a specific web link to 
confirm your personal details, what would you do? (select 
ALL that apply): 
a) If the bank’s logo, address and all other 
information on the e-mail and webpage are 
correct, I will provide the required information. 
b) I will simply ignore the request. 
c) If my colleagues received the same request and 
if they have provided their details, I will do the 
same. 
d) I will phone the bank to find out about the 
request. 
e) I will report it to our company’s IT department. 
 
2. In case of any security incident, I will report to(specify): 
________________________ 
3. You received an email with subject “You have won iPhone 
5”, what would you do? (Select ALL that apply): 
a) I will open the email and click on the link 
to see more information about the offer 
b) I will not open the email but simply delete 
it 
c) I will mark this email a “SPAM” in my 
email account without reading it 
d) I will open the email and will try to find 
the link from where I can unsubscribe my 
email to avoid any such email in future. 
e) I will open the email and analyze the 
content (sender email ID etc.) first. 
4. Which of the following information you have shared 
online (on social networking sites or any other public 
space) (Select ALL that apply): 
- Real Name,  
- Email 
- Real date of birth, 
- Photographs of  yourself,  
- Photographs of your 
family,  
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- Full address, 
- Phone number,  
- Special occasions, 
- Places you go to 
- Photographs of your 
friends, 
- Photographs of your 
office, 
- Photographs of your 
home 
- None of above 
5. Which of the following information related to you, have 
ever been sent by you through email to anyone?(Select 
all that applies) 
- Social Security 
Number (SSN) 
- Credit Card Number 
- Login and/or 
password of online 
banking accoun 
- Bank Account 
Number 
- Pin Code of your 
Credit Card 
- Medical Data 
6. Which of the following information related to you, have 
been sent to you through email? (Select all that applies) 
- Social Security 
Number (SSN) 
- Credit Card Number 
- Login and/or 
password of online 
banking account 
- Bank Account 
Number 
- Pin Code of your 
Credit Card 
- Medical Data 
7. In terms of a new password, how do you store your 
password if you don’t want to forget it? (Select one) 
a) I will simply write it 
down somewhere 
b) I write down a 
hint/reminder for the  
    password somewhere 
c) I write password/hint in 
a secure/locked  
   place 
d) I memorize it 
e) I use password 
management tools. 
8. Once a password is allotted for your universities email 
account, you do the following: (Select One most suitable) 
a) I never change my 
default password 
b) I change it when 
system asks me to      
change it 
c) I usually change it 
d) I always change it 
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9. How often do you change your passwords (select the one 
most appropriate): 
a) Never 
b) Rarely 
c) Every 3 months 
d) Every month 
e) Whenever system 
prompts me to change 
it. 
10. If requested whom you will disclose your password to: 
a) Co-worker 
b) Network 
Administrator 
c) Head of 
Department 
 
d) Supervisor 
e) None of above 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
 
 
Items used for Studying Relationship 
of Information Security Awareness and 
Security Behaviour– Chapter 6 
 
 
 
 
 
IMB Model 
Construct: 
Information 
Measure used Threat Awareness (self-developed) (list 
of threats taken from [238], [239]) 
How would you rate your awareness to following threats to 
your information security and privacy? 1: Very poor to 5: 
Excellent 
TA1 Virus 
TA2 Trojan 
TA3 Malware 
TA4 Rogueware/Ransomware 
TA5 Botnet 
TA6 Keylogger 
TA7 Zero-day attack 
TA8 Social engineering 
TA9 e-mail harvesting 
TA10 Spyware 
TA11 virtual stalking 
TA12 identify theft 
TA13 internet surveillance (governmental/agencies) 
TA14 Phishing 
TA15 Cookies 
TA16 Shoulder surfing 
TA17 Data harvesting (Applications/apps) 
TA18 Theft/loss of devices (laptops, tabs, phones) 
TA19 Theft/loss of cards & wallets 
TA20 Information Leakage-Online social networks 
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IMB Model 
Construct: 
Motivation/Personal 
Measure used Security Attitude (adapted from [240]) 
Please read each of the following statement and select the option 
that best describes you (1: Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly 
Agree) 
SA1 
Using measures for information security is a good 
idea. 
SA2* Using measures for information security is foolish. 
SA3* 
I do not like using different security measures for my 
information security. 
SA4 
Using information security measures are for my 
benefit. 
IMB Model 
Construct: 
Motivation/Social  
Measure used Social Norm(adapted from [255], [256]) 
Please read each of the following statement and select the option 
that best describes you (1: Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly 
Agree) 
SN1 
Friends who influence my behavior think that I 
should take measures to for my information security  
SN2 
Significant others who are important to me think 
that I should take measures for my information 
security 
SN3 My peers think that I should take security measures 
IMB Model 
Construct: 
Behavioral Skills 
Measure used Self-efficacy (adapted from [172], 
[240]) 
Please read each of the following statement and select the option 
that best describes you (1: Strongly Disagree to 7: Strongly 
Agree) 
SE1 
I feel comfortable taking measures to secure my 
information security. 
SE2 
Taking the necessary security measures is entirely 
under my control. 
SE3 
I have the resources and the knowledge to take the 
necessary security measures. 
SE4 Taking the necessary security measures is easy. 
SE5 I can protect my information security by myself. 
SE6 
I can enable security measures on my system 
(computer/laptop). 
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IMB Model 
Construct: 
Behavioral Skills 
Measure used Measures Familiarity (list of measures 
taken from [227]) 
How would you rate your familiarity with the following security 
measures? 
(1: Not at all familiar to 5: Extremely familiar) 
MF1 Use of anti-virus software 
MF2 Automatic Operating System (OS) updates 
MF3 Update anti-virus software regularly 
MF4 Use software from trusted sources 
MF5 Change passwords regularly 
MF6 Use of two-factor authentication 
MF7 Use of strong passwords 
MF8 Use of unique passwords 
MF9 Use of password manager 
MF10 Avoid clicking unexpected emails attachments 
MF11 Not responding to emails from strangers 
MF12 Taking your data backups regularly 
MF13 Deleting cookies/Browsing history 
MF14 Use of VPN 
MF15 Check for HTTPS while browsing 
MF16 Verify URL of the websites 
MF17 Avoid clicking ads 
MF18 Be critical and suspicious while surfing 
MF19 Avoid sharing personal information online 
MF20 Use of Linux 
IMB Model 
Construct: 
Behavior 
Measure used Security Behavior (list taken from 
[228]) 
Please read each of the following statement and select the option 
that best describes you  
(1: Never, 2: Rarely, 3: Sometimes, 4: Often, 5: Always) 
SB1 
I verify that my anti-virus software has been 
regularly updating itself 
SB2 
When I am prompted of about operating system 
update, I install it right away. 
SB3 I use different passwords for different accounts. 
SB4 
When I create passwords for my accounts, I 
include alpha-numeric characters (for example, A, 
a, *, %,1) so that it is not easy to guess. 
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SB5 
I install software updates right away when 
prompted. 
SB6 
I use password management tools (password 
managers) for better password management and 
protection. 
SB7 
While sending or entering personal information on 
a website I first make sure that the website is 
secure by checking “https:// or lock sign”. 
SB8 
I download software/applications from trusted 
sources only. 
SB9 I use two-factor authentication, where available. 
SB10* 
While web-surfing, I get rid of appearing dialogue 
boxes quickly by clicking “OK”, without reading the 
message, so that I continue with my surfing. 
SB11 
I manually lock my computer screen when I step 
away from it. 
SB12 
I avoid opening attachments that I am not 
expecting. 
* items reverse coded for analysis 
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